A. Christina Bronner-Stafford v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 20, 2023
DocketAT-0752-16-0683-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of A. Christina Bronner-Stafford v. Department of Defense (A. Christina Bronner-Stafford v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
A. Christina Bronner-Stafford v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

A. CHRISTINA BRONNER- DOCKET NUMBER STAFFORD, AT-0752-16-0683-I-1 Appellant,

v. DATE: June 20, 2023 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Armand C. Stafford, Smyrna, Georgia, for the appellant.

Cleora S. Anderson, Esquire, Smyrna, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal on due process grounds and found that the appellant proved her claim of disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate. On petition for

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has det ermined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decision s. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

review, the agency disputes the administrative judge’s due process and disability discrimination analyses. On cross petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to address matters concerning the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, alleged false statements by agency employees, and a hostile work environment. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findi ngs of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the i nitial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 The parties have filed numerous motions in addition to the petition for review and cross petition for review. For instance, the appellant has filed a motion to enforce interim relief and for sanctions, a motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review, a motion for leave to submit a compact diskette, a motion for agency perjury and/or false statements, a motion for leave to file a reply to the agency’s response to her cross petition for review, and other motions of a procedural nature. E.g., Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4, 12, 16, 19, 25, 29, 38, 40. The agency also has filed a motion for leave to file a reply brief to the appellant’s response to the agency’s opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition for review, and it filed various responses to the appellant’s 3

motions. E.g., PFR File, Tabs 9, 17, 24, 32. We have reviewed each of the parties’ motions. Given the extensive amount of briefing by both parties, the voluminous record below, and our finding that the initial decision was correctly decided, we deny the parties’ various requests to submit additio nal pleadings or evidence on review. We also deny the appellant’s motion for agency perjury or false statements. However, we will briefly discuss two of the appellant’s motions. ¶3 The Board will not entertain a motion to enforce an interim relief order; it will treat such a motion as a motion to dismiss the petition for review. Parbs v. U.S. Postal Service, 107 M.S.P.R. 559, ¶ 5 (2007), aff’d, 301 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Batten v. U.S. Postal Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 6, aff’d, 208 F. App’x 868 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Because the appellant already has filed a motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review, we will consider the arguments in her motion to enforce as part of her motion to dismiss. ¶4 As part of the interim relief order in the initial decision, the administrative judge ordered the agency to effect the appellant’s appointment to the Contract Termination Specialist position and to provide her with pay and benefits of the position, even if the agency determines that her return to or presence in the workplace would be unduly disruptive. Initial Appeal File, Tab 56, Initial Decision at 20. The agency indicates in its petition for review that it reappointed the appellant to her position, effective May 1, 2017, the date the initial decision was issued, and it provided her with a step increase. PFR File, Tab 2 at 30, Tab 9 at 40-41, 48-51. The record also reflects that the agency placed her on paid leave after it made a determination that her return to duty would constitute an undue disruption. PFR File, Tab 9 at 25 26, 54-55. ¶5 In pertinent part, the appellant challenges the agency’s undue disruption determination, particularly because she would have been working from home 5 days per week due to her medical conditions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5 -6, 9, Tab 15 at 14 15. This argument is unavailing. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 4

§ 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), the appellant shall be granted the relief provided in the initial decision unless the agency “determines that the return or presence of such employee . . . is unduly disruptive to the work environment.” Our reviewing court has addressed the scope of the Board’s review of an agency’s undue disruption determination. Noting that the Board does not have p lenary jurisdiction, the court has held that “Congress intended the agency to determine the effect of returning an employee to the workplace and gave it discretion when it determined that returning [her] would cause undue disruption” and it “did not provide for any review of this decision.” King v. Jerome, 42 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The court thus held that the scope of the Board’s revi ew of an undue disruption determination “is limited to determining whether the agency actually made an undue disruption determination and whether the employee has received appropriate pay and benefits.” Id. at 1375. The Board has followed the court’s direction in this regard. E.g., Christopher v. Department of the Army, 107 M.S.P.R. 580, ¶ 6, aff’d, 299 F. App’x 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Cook v. Department of the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 178, ¶¶ 7-8 (2007). ¶6 The record reflects that the agency made an undue disruption determination. PFR File, Tab 9 at 25, 54-55. Moreover, the appellant concedes that, by June 26, 2017, she was provided with pay and benefits, effective May 1, 2017, and the record supports that the agency complied with the interim relief order in this regard. PFR File, Tab 9 at 49-51, Tab 15 at 20. Thus, we find that the agency has complied with the interim relief order.

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Related

Parbs v. United States Postal Service
301 F. App'x 923 (Federal Circuit, 2008)
John H. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts
726 F.2d 730 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Batten v. United States Postal Service
208 F. App'x 868 (Federal Circuit, 2006)
Christopher v. Department of Army
299 F. App'x 964 (Federal Circuit, 2008)

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