A. C. Alexander Lumber Co. v. Livingston

12 S.E.2d 89, 63 Ga. App. 733, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 538
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedNovember 27, 1940
Docket28477.
StatusPublished

This text of 12 S.E.2d 89 (A. C. Alexander Lumber Co. v. Livingston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
A. C. Alexander Lumber Co. v. Livingston, 12 S.E.2d 89, 63 Ga. App. 733, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

Stephens, P. J.

T. J. Livingston instituted suit to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him as the result of the *734 destruction by fire, on April 18, 1936, of Ms residence, the furniture and certain other property therein located, and certain trees and shrubbery surrounding his residence, which he contends was caused by the negligence of six defendants, including A. C. Alexander Lumber Company and Roy Jones. The plaintiff alleged that a sawmill, owned and operated by the lumber company and located near the plaintiff’s residence, was improperly and negligently constructed, was not equipped with the proper spark' screen or arrester on the boiler smokestack, and also was improperly operated, causing large sparks or live coals to be emitted from the smokestack and to be carried by the wind to the plaintiff’s residence, and setting fire thereto and destroying the household contents and surrounding trees and shrubbery. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Jones was the fireman and engineer of the lumber company and operated the sawmill machinery and fired the boiler thereof, and that through his negligent operation thereof on the day the plaintiff’s home was destroyed, the fire referred to was ignited; that Jones was negligent in firing the boiler with the smokestack and screen or spark arrester out of repair, and without a sufficient and proper screen or spark arrester, and in allowing the steam in the boiler to run so low that it would not propel the sawmill machinery, “and then piling in wood, scantlings, and shavings in great quantities, and stirring the same with a great poker which jarred loose the cinders and live sparks of coal,” and also in using “a blower to accelerate the increase in steam desired, and in so doing would cause larger sparks of fire than usual to be emitted from the top of said smokestack and to be blown for a considerable distance, some three or four hundred yards.” The plaintiff attached to the petition an itemized list of articles of furniture, personal property, and of jewelry and money, which he claims were in the house and destroyed by the fire, with the claimed value thereof, including the residence valued at $3000, and the trees and shrubbery valued at $450. In all, the plaintiff claimed damages in the sum of $6479.73.

The defendants demurred generally to the petition on the ground that no cause of action was stated, and also because the allegations thereof were “too vague, indefinite, and the petition as a whole fails to specifically state a cause of action or to properly paragraph by numbers the petition as required by law, and all the allegations are simply argumentative and alternative in effect.” The defend *735 ants also demurred specially to various paragraphs of the petition on the ground, among others, of irrelevancy, vagueness, and indefiniteness; and also on the ground that the joinder of the six defendants as joint tort-feasors in the one suit amounted to a misjoinder of parties and rendered the petition multifarious, and that such petition was duplicitous. The judge sustained the “general and special demurrers” and dismissed the petition “unless amended within ten days from the date of this order.” Thereup'on the plaintiff “in order to comply with and meet objections raised to the petition by the demurrers . . and to conform and comply” with the order of the court, amended the petition and struck therefrom all of the defendants with the exception of A. C. Alexander Lumber Company and Boy Jones, together with all allegations relative to the defendants stricken. The order of the judge allowing this amendment is as follows: “The foregoing amendment to the original petition in the within made in compliance with the ruling of the court on demurrers of the defendants and to meet the same made, considered, and it is hereby allowed subject to demurrer, and ordered filed as part of the record in said cause.” By another amendment on October 31, 1939, in compliance “with the ruling of the court on demurrers of the defendants and .- . in response to objections urged in paragraph 6 of defendants’ amended demurrer,” the plaintiff alleged notice to the general manager of the lumber company, given about a week before the fire, of the “unsafe condition” of the smokestack and of the negligence of Jones in firing the boiler, and also notified the yard foreman of the company thereof, as well as informing Jones that the operation of the engine at the sawmill threw sparks onto the plaintiff’s property.

The defendants filed their objections to the first amendment of October 6, 1939, and also urged their original demurrers to the petition as amended. They objected to such amendment on the ground that it failed'to meet the requirements of the order of the court sustaining the general and special demurrers to the petition. Paragraph 6 of these objections set up that the plaintiff in the original petition alleged that the defendants had been notified of “certain defective conditions,” but that it was not alleged what officers or employees were notified or who notified them, which allegations were specially demurred to in the original demurrers. *736 These written objections amounted in effect to a renewal of all the demurrers, both general and special, to the petition as amended. On January 15, 1940, the judge overruled the objections to the first amendment and the renewed demurrers to the petition as amended, and to this judgment the defendants excepted pendente lite.

At the trial it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff had died testate since the institution of the suit, and that two of his sons and a daughter-in-law were his executors and executrix.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 S.E.2d 89, 63 Ga. App. 733, 1940 Ga. App. LEXIS 538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/a-c-alexander-lumber-co-v-livingston-gactapp-1940.