A-3946-22 – Amber Jones, Etc. v. American Coradius International LLC

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 2, 2025
• Docket: A-3946-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3946-22

AMBER JONES, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

AMERICAN CORADIUS INTERNATIONAL LLC,

Defendant-Respondent. ___________________________

Argued April 9, 2025 – Decided May 2, 2025

Before Judges Mayer and Puglisi.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-0895-22.

Mark H. Jensen argued the cause for appellant (Kim Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Philip D. Stern and Yongmoon Kim, on the briefs).

Aaron R. Easley argued the cause for respondent (Sessions Israel & Shartle, LLC, attorneys; Aaron R. Easley and Jay I. Brody, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Plaintiff Amber Jones, individually and on behalf of those similarly

situated, appeals from the July 13, 2023 Law Division order granting defendant

American Coradius International, LLC's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint

for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

Plaintiff incurred a debt and the lender transmitted that debt to defendant,

a debt collector. Defendant engaged a third-party letter vendor to draft, print,

address and mail a collection letter to plaintiff. The letter included plaintiff's

account number, the amount due to the lender and plaintiff's full name and

address.

In May 2022, plaintiff filed a single-count purported class action

complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 1692p. Defendant, in lieu of an answer, moved

to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).

In June 2023, after hearing oral argument, the judge granted defendant's

motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice in an oral decision.1 A July

13, 2023 order memorialized the decision.

1 In dismissing the complaint, the judge rejected defendant's argument plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim for violation of the FDCPA. We decline to address defendant's appellate arguments on this issue because defendant failed to file a timely cross-appeal. See Reich v. Borough of Fort Lee Zoning Bd. of

A-3946-22 2 In evaluating whether plaintiff sufficiently plead a claim for a violation of

the FDCPA, the judge found defendant's communication with a letter vendor

[was] not a violation that was intended within the [FDCPA]. A third[-]party vendor [was] doing something that could easily be done in house. [The letter vendor] just . . . create[d] a letter to send out. It mean[t] nothing. There cannot be a violation of the [FDCPA] because it is just a hyper technical argument, if you will.

Technically, yes, there[ was] a violation because they sent it to the printer, but [did] it violate the purpose of the [FDCPA]? Clearly, it [did] not. . . . [T]o say that it does creates an uncritical literalism, which is not appropriate.

This appeal follows.

We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant

to Rule 4:6-2(e). Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021)

(citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl,

P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)).

In considering a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, "[a] reviewing court must examine

'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,' giving

the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid. (quoting

Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 483, 499 n.9 (App. Div. 2010) (declining to address respondent's assertion of error because it was not properly raised by cross - appeal). A-3946-22 3 Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107). "The essential test [for determining the

adequacy of a pleading] is simply 'whether a cause of action is "suggested" by

the facts.'" Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451-52 (2013) (quoting

Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "At

this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt is not concerned with the

ability of [the] plaintiff to prove the allegation contained in the complaint."

Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746.

"[I]f the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will

not give rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed." Dimitrakopoulos,

237 N.J. at 107. "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.

366, 378 (1995).

On appeal, plaintiff largely reprises the same arguments raised before the

motion judge: her claims should not be dismissed. We disagree, addressing

plaintiff's claims in turn.

In order to establish an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)

the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector; (3) the

challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a "debt" as defined by the

A-3946-22 4 FDCPA; and (4) the defendant violated the FDCPA in attempting to collect the

debt. Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel, 446 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App. Div. 2016)

(quoting Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir.

2014)). Here, the trial judge correctly considered legislative intent to determine

whether the alleged conduct violated the FDCPA.

In examining the plain meaning of a statute, "the Legislature's intent is

paramount and, generally, the statutory language is the best indicator of that

intent." Hodges v. Sasil Corp., 189 N.J. 210, 223 (2007). "Statutory words are

ascribed their ordinary meaning and are read in context with related provisions,

giving sense to the legislation as a whole." Ibid. "Our duty is to construe and

apply the statute as enacted." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)

(quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)).

Plaintiff alleged defendant's use of a letter vendor to create a debt

collection letter was, in and of itself, abusive, deceptive or unfair. In support of

her arguments, plaintiff cites out-of-state decisions interpreting the FDCPA. We

note "decisions of the federal courts of appeals are not binding on this court,"

Daniels v. Hollister Co., 440 N.J. Super. 359, 367 n.7 (App. Div. 2015), and

therefore decline to address the out-of-jurisdiction cases cited by plaintiff. See

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.5 on R. 1:36-3 (2025)

A-3946-22 5 ("On questions of federal constitutional law and statutory law, only decisions of

the United States Supreme Court are binding on the courts of this state.").

We concur with the motion judge's determination that plaintiff's proposed

interpretation of the FDCPA was uncritically literal. Defendant's disclosure of

debt-related information to a letter vendor was not abusive, deceptive, nor

unfair, and was not the type of conduct Congress intended to regulate when it

enacted the FDCPA. When viewing plaintiff's complaint and affording her all

reasonable inferences of fact, plaintiff did not "genuinely allege" any facts

establishing defendant's conduct violated the FDCPA.

To the extent we have not expressly addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

issues, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-3946-22 6