89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy

44 A.D.2d 417, 355 N.Y.S.2d 584, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5022
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 14, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 44 A.D.2d 417 (89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 44 A.D.2d 417, 355 N.Y.S.2d 584, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5022 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

Murphy, J.

Both petitioner and respondent appeal from a judgment entered below in an article 78 proceeding instituted by petitioner landlord (on behalf of itself and all other landlords similary situated) to review and annul the determination of respondent Rent Commissioner denying a protest to certain sections of the City Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations which purport to interpret the statutory requirements for eligibility for a 1974 rent increase under the current City Rent and Rehabilitation Law.

In denying virtually all of the relief sought by petitioner, the judgment below affirmed the Maximum Base Rent (“MBR”) sections of the city rent regulations requiring a landlord to ceritfy that he has expended 90% of the total amount of the cost index for operation and maintenance (“O&M”) established for his type of building in order to obtain a rent increase, effective January 1, 1974, pursuant to the MBR sections of the statute (§ Y 51-1.0 et seq. of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, as amd. by Local Laws, 1970, No. 30 of City of New York). However, Special Term permitted petitioner to collect, effective January 1, 1974, a 7%% increase in rent for any apartment below the MBR established in 1972, despite the landlord’s seeming failure to comply with the 90% O&M certification mandated by the statute, on condition that it make up the deficiency in expenditures during 1974. Petitioner appeals from the entire judgment, except to the extent that it permits collection of a 1974 increase subject to the above condition; and respondent appeals from so much thereof as granted petitioner even limited relief.

The central issue on this appeal is the construction to be given the following statutory provision which prescribes the condi[419]*419tions for the MBR calculation and recalculation, particularly the portion dealing with certification of expenditures.

“No new maximum rent shall be established pursuant to paragraph (.3) [providing for the maximum base rents effective January 1, 1972] or (4) [requiring the establishment of maximum base rents effective January 1, 1974 and biennially thereafter] of subdivision a of this section unless not more than one hundred fifty days nor less than ninety days prior to the effective date thereof, the landlord has certified that he is maintaining all essential services required to be furnished with respect to the housing accommodations covered by such certification, and that he will continue to maintain such services so long as such new maximum rent is in effect. Each such certification filed to obtain a new maximum rent pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision a of this section shall be accompanied by a certification by the landlord that he has actually expended or incurred ninety percentum of the total amount of the cost index for operation and maintenance established for his type of building. ” (Administrative Code, § Y51-5.0, subd. g, par. [6] cl. [d].)

Examination of Local Law No. 30 of 1970 reveals that the City Council made a concerted effort to cope with the widespread problem of housing disinvestment and abandonment and to preserve the existing stock of rent-controlled apartments in New York City; and to balance the interests of both landlords and tenants. After providing for rent increases on the basis of the prior rental history >of the individual apartments in a building and for increased labor costs, it introduced a new long-range system for rent control by establishing an MBR for each controlled apartment. A statutory scheme was devised, essentially, to increase the financial returns of rent-controlled buildings and allocate to each apartment its fair share of the amount the landlord required to carry the building and to realize a fair return on its value, to assure the improved maintenance and upgrading of rent-controlled buildings out of the increased income obtained through the MBR provisions and to limit the amount of annual increases to 7%% over the previously existing maximum rent.

In its initial phase, an MBR for each apartment, effective in 1972 and 1973, was to be computed. Consideration was to be given to the size and location of, and the number of rooms contained in, the housing accommodation and the computation was to be based on such factors as real estate taxes, water rates and sewer charges, a formula allowance for O&M, a [420]*420limited vacancy allowance and an 8% % return on capital value. (Administrative Code, § Y51-5.0, subd. a, par. [3].) Eligibility to collect the initial MBR increase (limited to 7%% per annum [id., § Y51-5.0, subd. a, par. [5]) was conditioned upon the landlord providing timely certification in 1971 that he (a) was maintaining and would continue to maintain all essential services (id., § Y51-5.0, subd. g, par. [6], cl. [d]), (b) had cleared, corrected or abated all rent-impairing violations and (c) had cleared, corrected or abated at least 80% of all other violations of a stated age (or agreed to enter into a written agreement with the city rent agency to deposit all income derived from the property into an escrow or trust account for such purpose). (Id., § Y51-5.0, subd. h, par. [6].)

The statutory plan then appears to mandate the disestablishment of the 1972 MBRs and the establishment of new MBRs effective January 1, 1974 and biennially thereafter to reflect changes, if any, in the factors upon which the prior MBR was based, since it states: ‘1 The city rent agency shall establish maximum rents effective January first, nineteen hundred seventy-four and biennially thereafter by adjusting the existing maximum rent to reflect changes, if any, in the factors which determine maximum gross building rental under paragraph (3) of this subdivision.” (Id., § Y51-5.0, subd. a, par. [4].)

In order to be eligible for a rent increase in 1974 the landlord was required, pursuant to the same provisions referred to above, to timely file new certifications as to the maintenance of essential services and the correction of rent impairing and other housing code violations. However, and in addition to the foregoing, the last sentence of clause (d). (subd. g, par [6]) of section Y51-5.0 now became operable; and the landlord was also required to provide a certification that ‘1 he has actually expended or incurred ninety percentum of the total amount of the cost index for operation and maintenance established for his type of building. ’ ’

By Amendment No. 33 to its Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations, respondent promulgated regulations sections 24, 25 and 26 to implement Local Law No. 30. On October 4, 1973, he interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring an expenditure for the building equal to 90% of the established O&M, even if such amount had not been collected.

The premises involved herein is a 20-unit, walk-up structure which had qualified for a January 1, 1972 MBR of $21,467, predicated, inter alia, on an O&M of $11,269.40. Because of [421]*421the 7%% rent increase limitation, petitioner was precluded from collecting more than $14,957.52 through 1973 and would need approximately six additional 7%% annual increases to reach its 1972 MBR.

In applying for its January 1, 1974 rent increase petitioner certified that it had expended $9,108.93 for O&M. This sum was $1,033.53 less than the required expenditure of $10,142.46 (i.e., 90% of $11,269.40), but substantially in excess of the O&M actually collected.

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Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apartments Co.
106 Misc. 2d 936 (New York Supreme Court, 1981)
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56 A.D.2d 626 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1977)
160 Columbia Heights Corp. v. Joy
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Bluebook (online)
44 A.D.2d 417, 355 N.Y.S.2d 584, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/89-christopher-inc-v-joy-nyappdiv-1974.