500 Park Avenue Equities, LLC v. Cortney Williams

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 9, 2024
• Docket: A-0826-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0826-23

500 PARK AVENUE EQUITIES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CORTNEY WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued September 17, 2024 – Decided October 9, 2024

Before Judges Mawla and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-009248-23.

Cortney Williams, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Barry A. Kozyra argued the cause for respondent (Kozyra & Hartz, LLC, attorneys; Barry A. Kozyra, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Cortney Williams appeals from an August 28, 2023 Special

Civil Part order ejecting her from an apartment located in a multi-unit building

at 500 Park Avenue in East Orange, currently owned by plaintiff 500 Park

Avenue Equities, LLC. Because the record is unclear as to defendant's

ownership interest, if any, in that apartment, we remand for further proceedings.

We summarize the pertinent facts from the limited record developed on

the return date for the summary ejectment action. In its verified complaint for

ejectment, supported by the certification of its property manager Jacob Marcus,

plaintiff asserted it is the legal owner of the building at 500 Park Avenue.

Plaintiff also attested it never entered either a written or verbal lease with

defendant, she never paid it rent or other compensation, and she was essentially

an "illegal squatter." Plaintiff further maintained defendant's actions caused it

significant hardships, as it was unable to take rightful possession of the premises

and use it as intended.

Defendant disputed certain of plaintiff's contentions. Specifically, she

maintained before plaintiff's purchase of the building, 500 Park Avenue E.O.,

Inc., operated as a cooperative association and that entity issued her thirty-six

shares reflecting her ownership interest in unit nineteen in the building.

A-0826-23 2 Defendant presented the court with a copy of those shares, as well as two pages

of a Proprietary Lease signed by 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc., and her.

Plaintiff's counsel argued the "[cooperative association] . . . voted to sell

all their shares to the former owner," 500 Park Ave EO NJ, LLC. Plaintiff's

counsel also argued they have "documentation that the Board of Directors

convened and voted to sell the property." Additionally, counsel stated all the

"shareholders minus Ms. Williams and . . . two other units voted to sell in

accordance with the bylaws . . ."

After the sale, defendant did not dispute that she continued to live in unit

nineteen without paying rent, maintenance fees, or any other expenses.

Defendant justified her continued possession by arguing: 1) her occupancy was

authorized by the Proprietary Lease, 2) plaintiff's proofs did not establish it

properly obtained title to the property, and 3) the Special Civil Part did not have

jurisdiction over the ejectment action in light of her disputed ownership claims.

Before us, plaintiff reprises the arguments it made before the Special Civil

Part. Plaintiff specifically maintains defendant's claimed interest in unit

nineteen did not appear in the plaintiff's chain of title, which reflected it

possessed clear title to the building, and defendant and the other "unauthorized

A-0826-23 3 occupants", were mere "former owners who … lost [their interests] after the sale

of the … association…. "

Although not disclosed to the Special Civil Part Judge by defendant, we

take judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff was involved in a prior action with

500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc. In that action, 500 Park Avenue E.O, Inc.,

contended defendant had failed to pay her required maintenance fees and other

expenses, and it sought possession of defendant's shares, defendant's stock

certificate, the apartment, a judgment in the amount of $34,263.30 for unpaid

monthly assessments and fees, a warrant of removal or writ of possession,

unspecified compensatory damages, and counsel fees and costs. See 500 Park

Avenue E.O., Inc. v. Williams, A-3595-21 (App. Div. Oct. 16, 2023) (slip op.

at 2-3). According to 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc.'s Bylaws and the Proprietary

Lease between 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc. and defendant, which was submitted

in the record in that action, if a resident failed to pay monthly assessments, 500

Park Avenue E.O., Inc., had "the right to institute legal proceedings to obtain

possession of both stock certificate and the allocated apartment." Id. at 2.1

1 Although defendant did not present the Special Civil Part with the complete Proprietary Lease, or the cooperative association's Bylaws, the entire lease and Bylaws were included in the record in the 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc. v. Williams action. We accordingly consider those materials as they are "records

A-0826-23 4 After a trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of 500 Park Avenue

E.O., Inc., in the amount of $55,350.08, representing $46,143.40 in unpaid

monthly assessments and $9,206.68 in attorney's fees. Notably, it did not

address 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc.'s, request to obtain possession of the stock

certificate, or its request for a warrant of removal and, instead, ordered

exclusively monetary, as opposed to equitable, relief. Id. at 1. We affirmed that

award. Id. at 6-7.

With respect to the Special Civil Part proceeding at issue, the court

granted plaintiff's application and issued an order of ejectment but stayed the

order until October 12, 2023. The court rejected plaintiff's jurisdictional

challenges and found defendant's proofs failed to establish a right to possession.

Instead, the court determined plaintiff met its burden of proof in establishing

ownership of the property, the absence of a landlord-tenant relationship between

the parties, and defendant failed to establish her right to possession.

On November 1, 2023, on defendant's ex parte application, the court

entered an emergent stay of the ejectment order pending an appeal to us.

of the court in which the action is pending and of any other court of this state. ..." N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4); State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270, 274 (App. Div. 2007) (allowing the trial court to take judicial notice of materials in the record of a domestic violence court under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4)). A-0826-23 5 Plaintiff thereafter moved before us to vacate the November 1, 2023 order. We

remanded to the Special Civil Part for reconsideration, reasoning the "better

practice would have been for the trial court to conduct a hearing and consider

testimony from both parties before deciding the request for a stay or monetary

security pending the appeal."

The court subsequently held a hearing consistent with our remand

instructions. Defendant received notice of the proceeding but failed to appear.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an August 1, 2024,

order conditioning the stay of execution of the order for possession on

defendant's deposit of $23,000 with the court by August 15, 2024, and $2,300

on the first of each month thereafter. In its oral decision, the court expressly

stated it was not substantively addressing defendant's contentions regarding any

alleged defects in plaintiff's ownership interest. After defendant failed to satisfy

the conditions of the August 1, 2024 order, the court entered a September 6,

2024 order vacating the stay and an October 2, 2024 order denying defendant's

supplemental request for a stay.

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

I. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE MATTER. PURSUANT TO RULE 6:1-2(a)(4) AS THE MATTER WAS

A-0826-23 6 OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIAL CIVIL PART.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT IMPROPERLY ISSUED AN EX PARTE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IN THIS MATTER AS PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO THE COURT ON ITS FACE PROVIDED NO LEGAL BASIS FOR A SUMMARY PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO R. 4:67-1(a)

A trial judge's factual findings made following a bench trial are accorded

deference and will be left undisturbed so long as they are supported by

substantial credible evidence. Reilly v. Weiss, 406 N.J. Super. 71, 77 (App.

Div. 2009) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-

84 (1974)). On the other hand, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the

legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any

special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)

(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,

378 (1995)).

A summary action for ejectment is a limited action brought by a party

"claiming the right of possession of real property in the possession of another,

or [a party] claiming title to such real property." See N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1; R. 6:1-

2(a)(4) (authorizing summary actions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 to -3, "where

A-0826-23 7 the defendant has no colorable claim of title or possession"); see also J & M

Land Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 520 (2001). To prevail, the

party seeking possession must demonstrate ownership of, or control over, the

property and that the person facing ejectment has no right to remain at the

property. See Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532, 615

(App. Div. 2021). That is because new owners of property take possession

subject to any tenancies. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J.

209, 223 (1994).

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1, "[a]ny person claiming the right of

possession of real property in the possession of another, or claiming title to such

real property, shall be entitled to have his rights determined in an action in the

Superior Court." In Marder v. Realty Construction Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 320

(App. Div. 1964) (emphasis omitted), we observed there was "no doubt" that

N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 was "intended to allow a remedy to one who claims title to

property in the possession of another." Thus, we concluded that "[t]he statute

replace[d] the common law action of ejectment." Ibid.

"In an action in ejectment the plaintiff has the burden of establishing his

title, and if he fails to establish a good paper title the judgment must go against

him." Perlstein v. Pearce, 12 N.J. 198, 204 (1953). "[T]he plaintiff must recover

A-0826-23 8 upon the strength of his own title, and . . . cannot rely upon the weakness of that

of his adversary." Phoenix Pinelands Corp., 467 N.J. Super. at 615 (alterations

in original) (quoting Troth v. Smith, 68 N.J.L. 36, 37 (Sup. Ct. 1902)). "If the

plaintiff 'fails to support his own title, the defendant will retain possession until

he is ousted by someone who has a superior title.'" Ibid. (quoting Troth, 68

N.J.L. at 37).

A cooperative apartment association a is form of property ownership

which does not fit into traditional common law classifications. Plaza Road

Coop., Inc. v. Finn, 201 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1985). Typically, legal

title to the real property of the housing development is held in a cooperative

entity. Presten v. Sailer, 225 N.J. Super. 178, 184-85. Individuals, or residents,

purchase shares of stock in the cooperative corporation. Id. at 185. This

provides the individual the right "to occupy a dwelling within the cooperative

project under a proprietary lease." Ibid. (citing Plaza Road Coop., Inc., 201 N.J.

Super. at 175). "A cooperative apartment association . . . is governed by

corporate law concerning its internal management." Plaza Road Coop., Inc.,

201 N.J. Super. at 180.

Based on the limited record before us, we are unable to discern defendant's

ownership interest, if any, in unit nineteen. This is so, because the record does

A-0826-23 9 not contain competent evidence as to how 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc., divested

defendant of her thirty-six shares. Although we acknowledge the Bylaws and

Proprietary Lease related to those shares authorized the cooperative

association's board to commence judicial action against a shareholder to recover

possession of the unit, and potentially divest them of those shares in the event

of unpaid maintenance and assessments, and defendant indisputably failed to

pay the required fees resulting in the $55,350.08 judgment in the 500 Park

Avenue E.O., Inc. v. Williams action, the court in that proceeding granted

monetary relief only, and did not divest defendant of her ownership interest, or

eject her, as best we can discern from the record.

At the hearing in support of the order to show cause before the Special

Civil Part, plaintiff's counsel contended 500 Park Ave EO NJ, LLC, took

ownership of the entire building when it purchased all the shares in 500 Park

Avenue E.O., Inc. Further, counsel argued it has evidence the "board of

directors convened and voted to sell the property," yet plaintiff produced no

supporting evidence before us, and none before the Special Civil Part as best we

can discern from the record, to support these contentions. As noted, plaintiff

relied on the title search which, even if accepted as accurate, does not address

the disposition of defendant's shares.

A-0826-23 10 Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings. The court shall make

factual findings and legal conclusions with respect to defendant's prior and

current ownership interest in unit nineteen, and, in the event the court concludes

defendant was defeased of her interest, how that divestment occurred.

In light of our remand, we do not address defendant's jurisdictional

challenges other than to state, as noted, the Special Civil Part ordinarily has

jurisdiction to resolve ejectment actions. If on remand, however, the court

concludes the matter should not proceed summarily based on the nature of the

proofs submitted and issues raised, the court can proceed in a manner that

permits the proper development of the record to establish defendant's ownership

in, or divestment of, her interest in unit nineteen.

Nothing in our opinion shall be interpreted as a reflection of our views of

the outcome of the remanded proceedings, nor a limitation on any legal or

equitable argument available to the parties related to defendant's disputed

ownership interest addressed in this opinion. In light of our decision, the order

of ejectment is stayed to permit the court to conduct the remanded proceedings.

In the event the court determines ejectment is an appropriate remedy, the court

shall consider whether a further stay is appropriate, and if any modification of

the August 1, 2024, order is necessary.

A-0826-23 11 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's

arguments it is because we have concluded they are without sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-0826-23 12