4front Advisors, LLC v. Mass Alternative Care, Inc.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 10, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-1048
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-1048

4FRONT ADVISORS, LLC

vs.

MASS ALTERNATIVE CARE, INC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Mass Alternative Care, Inc. (MAC) appeals from a Superior

Court judge's denial of its motion to dismiss and entry of

judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of the

appellee, 4Front Advisors, LLC (4Front). MAC argues that the

final award entered by the arbitration panel (panel) was

interlocutory, and thus, that entry of judgment by the Superior

Court was improper. We affirm.

Background. MAC, a Massachusetts cannabis dispensary,

licensed instruction manuals and materials from 4Front designed

for use in the operation of dispensaries. The parties signed a

licensing agreement in April, 2015, and approximately one year later, executed an addendum.1 4Front filed a demand for

arbitration pursuant to the agreement to resolve disputes

relating to the calculation of fees owed to the company. On the

first day of the arbitration, the parties agreed that the panel

would not address whether an interpretation of the agreement

would result in payments that would exceed fair market value or

be commercially unreasonable. The panel issued an interim

decision on November 19, 2024, followed by a final award,

incorporating the interim decision, on January 31, 2025.

On February 6, 2025, 4Front filed a complaint in the

Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award pursuant to

G. L. c. 251, § 11. MAC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

which, following a hearing, was denied on May 16, 2025. The

judge found that she had no discretion to dismiss the complaint

and entered judgment for 4Front in July 15, 2025.2 This appeal

followed.

1 The addendum provided the appellant with the option to "reassess the terms" of the original agreement "to safeguard [the appellant's] compliance with the Massachusetts Department of Public Health [g]uidance] for [r]egistered [m]arijuana [d]ispensaries for [n]on-[p]rofit [c]ompliance, namely to ensure that ongoing payments under th[e] [a]greement do not exceed fair market value and remain commercially reasonable."

2 A second judgment was docketed on July 25, 2025 and a corrected judgment was docketed with minor language corrections on August 29, 2025. The parties do not raise any arguments concerning either of these judgments, which are substantially the same.

2 Discussion. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de

novo. Hornibrook v. Richard, 488 Mass. 74, 78 (2021).

First, we note that MAC does not dispute that the judge had

no discretion under G.L. c. 251, § 11, to confirm the final

arbitration award. Section 11 states that "[u]pon application

of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless within the

time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating

or modifying or correcting the award . . . ." (emphasis added).

If a party wishes to vacate, modify, or correct an award, they

must do so "within thirty days after delivery of a copy of the

award to the applicant." G. L. c. 251, §§ 12-13. MAC did not

move to vacate, modify, or correct the award but instead moved,

outside of the thirty days, to dismiss 4Front's complaint to

confirm the award. Where MAC filed no motion to vacate, modify,

or correct the award, 4Front is entitled to the confirmation of

a final award. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, Am. Fed'n of

Teachers, AFL-CIO v. School Committee of Boston, 494 Mass. 519,

522 (2024) ("based on the plain language of the statute, unless

a party makes a timely motion to vacate or modify the award

pursuant to § 11 or 12 . . . the Superior Court is required to

confirm it").

Rather, MAC argues that the arbitration award was an

interlocutory order and not a final award because the panel did

3 not address any issues relating to fair market value or

commercial reasonableness under the addendum. We are not

persuaded. There is no indication in the record that the

parties intended for the panel to render an interlocutory order.

See Gaffney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1,

6 n.4 (1996) (conclusory statements in brief do not rise to

level of appellate argument); Zora v. State Ethics Comm'n, 415

Mass. 640, 642 n.3 (1993). On the contrary, the parties

explicitly agreed that the panel would not consider fair market

value or commercial reasonableness and would issue a final

award. As stated by the panel, "[c]laims, defenses, and

arguments relating to the [a]ddendum are reserved to the

[p]arties and are not resolved by this [i]nterim [d]ecision or

any final award entered in this arbitration." While the record

does not contain a written stipulation or a transcript of those

portions of the arbitration proceeding where the parties'

agreement was transmitted to the panel,3 the award shows the

parties' intent; to wit, that the panel not consider certain

issues, and, nonetheless, reach a final resolution. Moreover,

the agreement does not indicate any intent for the panel to

3 See Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 604 n.26 (2009). ("It is [appellant's] obligation to include in the record appendix any document on which he relies").

4 consider these issues in the future; rather, the claims were

"reserved to the parties" to pursue outside of the current

arbitration and were not determined by "any final award entered

in this arbitration."

Finally, the plain language of the arbitration award speaks

for itself; it is clearly labeled as a "FINAL AWARD," a phrase

that accurately captures the ultimate and substantive

disposition of the matter that the parties placed before the

arbitrator.4 As discussed above, MAC did not move to modify the

award to reflect that it was not a final disposition. We

conclude that the award is, indeed, final and that the judge

properly denied MAC's motion to dismiss and entered judgment

confirming the award.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Hodgens & Allen, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: April 10, 2026.

4 The interim decision issued on November 19, 2024, and after input from the parties on attorney's fees, costs, and interest, the final award issued on January 31, 2025, incorporating the interim decision by reference.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.