47-40 41st Realty Corp. v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

47-40 41st Realty Corp. v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal

225 A.D.2d 547, 638 N.Y.2d 755, 638 N.Y.S.2d 755, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1979

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 4, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 225 A.D.2d 547 (47-40 41st Realty Corp. v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

47-40 41st Realty Corp. v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal, 225 A.D.2d 547, 638 N.Y.2d 755, 638 N.Y.S.2d 755, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1979 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

It is well established that, when reviewing a determination of an administrative agency, the court’s inquiry is limited to whether the determination is arbitrary or capricious or without a rational basis in the record and a reasonable basis in law (Matter of Ista Mgt. v State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 161 AD2d 424, 426; Matter of Drizin v Commissioner of Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 140 AD2d 605, 606; Matter of Plaza Mgt. Co. v City Rent Agency, 48 AD2d 129, 131, affd 37 NY2d 837). The court should refrain from substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency (Fresh Meadows Assocs. v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 88 Misc 2d 1003, affd 55 AD2d 559, affd 42 NY2d 925). Furthermore, an administrative agency’s interpretation of the statutes and regulations that it administers, if reasonable, must be upheld (Matter of Seales v Mirabal, 152 AD2d 672, 674).

We agree with the Supreme Court that the determinations of the New York State Division of Housing and Community renewal (hereinafter DHCR) have a reasonable basis in law, a rational basis in the record and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The petitioner’s reliance upon a September 1989 stipulation which discontinued a holdover proceeding and in which the tenant purportedly waived the protections of the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 (Administrative Code of City of NY, tit 26, ch 4) is misplaced. Under section 2520.13 of the Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR): "An agreement by the tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of the RSL or this Code is void; provided, however, that based upon a negotiated settlement between the parties and with the approval of the DHCR, or a court of competent jurisdiction where a tenant is represented by counsel, a tenant may withdraw, with prejudice, any complaint pending before the DHCR” (9 NYCRR 2520.13).

[548]*548The DHCR did not approve the stipulation in this case, nor is there any evidence in the record that the Civil Court of the City of New York, before which the holdover proceeding was pending, reviewed and approved it. Accordingly, the DHCR properly refused to enforce the purported waiver provision of the stipulation (see, Matter of 430 Realty Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 196 AD2d 725). Balletta, J. P., Joy, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

It is well established that, when reviewing a determination of an administrative agency, the court’s inquiry is limited to whether the determination is arbitrary or capricious or without a rational basis in the record and a reasonable basis in law (Matter of Ista Mgt. v State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 161 AD2d 424, 426; Matter of Drizin v Commissioner of Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 140 AD2d 605, 606; Matter of Plaza Mgt. Co. v City Rent Agency, 48 AD2d 129, 131, affd 37 NY2d 837). The court should refrain from substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency (Fresh Meadows Assocs. v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 88 Misc 2d 1003, affd 55 AD2d 559, affd 42 NY2d 925). Furthermore, an administrative agency’s interpretation of the statutes and regulations that it administers, if reasonable, must be upheld (Matter of Seales v Mirabal, 152 AD2d 672, 674).

We agree with the Supreme Court that the determinations of the New York State Division of Housing and Community renewal (hereinafter DHCR) have a reasonable basis in law, a rational basis in the record and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The petitioner’s reliance upon a September 1989 stipulation which discontinued a holdover proceeding and in which the tenant purportedly waived the protections of the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 (Administrative Code of City of NY, tit 26, ch 4) is misplaced. Under section 2520.13 of the Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR): "An agreement by the tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of the RSL or this Code is void; provided, however, that based upon a negotiated settlement between the parties and with the approval of the DHCR, or a court of competent jurisdiction where a tenant is represented by counsel, a tenant may withdraw, with prejudice, any complaint pending before the DHCR” (9 NYCRR 2520.13).

[548]*548The DHCR did not approve the stipulation in this case, nor is there any evidence in the record that the Civil Court of the City of New York, before which the holdover proceeding was pending, reviewed and approved it. Accordingly, the DHCR properly refused to enforce the purported waiver provision of the stipulation (see, Matter of 430 Realty Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 196 AD2d 725). Balletta, J. P., Joy, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

225 A.D.2d 547, 638 N.Y.2d 755, 638 N.Y.S.2d 755, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/47-40-41st-realty-corp-v-new-york-state-division-of-housing-community-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack