40 MEADOWBROOK LANE REALTY, LLC v. KYLE ANDRESS & Another.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedAugust 18, 2025
Docket24-P-1112
StatusUnpublished

This text of 40 MEADOWBROOK LANE REALTY, LLC v. KYLE ANDRESS & Another. (40 MEADOWBROOK LANE REALTY, LLC v. KYLE ANDRESS & Another.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
40 MEADOWBROOK LANE REALTY, LLC v. KYLE ANDRESS & Another., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1112

40 MEADOWBROOK LANE REALTY, LLC

vs.

KYLE ANDRESS & another. 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, a judge

found that the plaintiff, 40 Meadowbrook Lane Realty, LLC, had a

thirty-foot right of way along the entire length of Pine Needle

Lane in Norton and a prescriptive easement over certain horse

trails that lay on the defendants' property. Having done so,

the judge permanently enjoined the defendants, Kyle and Gary

Andress, from interfering with the plaintiff's continued use of

Pine Needle Lane and the trails. The defendants moved to stay

the judgment pending appeal; after the motion was denied, they

sought a stay from a single justice of this court pursuant to

Mass. R. A. P. 6 (a), as appearing in 494 Mass. 1601 (2024).

1 Gary Andress. The single justice denied the defendants' motion, and they

timely appealed. We affirm.

"[W]e review the action of a single justice for errors of

law and, if none appear, for abuse of discretion." Troy Indus.

Inc. v. Samson Mfg. Corp., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 581 (2010).

To obtain a stay pending appeal, the defendants were required to

demonstrate "(1) the likelihood of appellant's success on the

merits; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm to appellant if

the court denies the stay; (3) the absence of substantial harm

to other parties if the stay issues; and (4) the absence of harm

to the public interest" if the stay is granted (citation

omitted). C.E. v. J.E., 472 Mass. 1016, 1017 (2015). These

factors mirror those considered for a preliminary injunction.

See Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 488 Mass. 643, 650

(2021). The single justice was obligated to balance the

relative risks of harm to the parties against the likelihood of

success on the merits in determining whether to grant a stay.

See Packaging Indus. Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 609, 617

(1980).

Here, the balance of harms weighed against granting a stay.

The judgment preserved a pattern of use that had existed for

more than four decades, and which was known to the defendants

before they purchased their land. Nothing in the judgment

prevented the defendants from developing their property

2 consistent with the use of the land at the time of purchase. By

contrast, issuance of a stay would have disrupted the

plaintiff's business (the plaintiff operates and manages a

commercial stable on the property) and limited access to local

riders who routinely use the trails for recreation and to access

conservation land.

The defendants' merits-based challenge focuses on the

introduction of evidence to show the existence of a prescriptive

easement over the property. The defendants argue that the

plaintiff's theory of a prescriptive easement was not pleaded

and came as a surprise, and that evidence of a prescriptive

easement should have been excluded. However, the heart of this

dispute was the historical ownership and use of the lane and

trails, and the defendants' burden on the evidentiary issue --

to establish that the judge abused her substantial discretion --

is a heavy one. See Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 488

Mass. 399, 413 (2021) ("A judge has broad discretion to make

evidentiary rulings, and substantial discretion to determine

whether evidence is relevant" [quotations and citations

omitted]); Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 507 (2003) ("We do not

disturb a judge's decision to admit evidence absent an abuse of

discretion or other legal error"). "Evidence is relevant if (a)

it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it

would be without the evidence and (b) the fact is of consequence

3 in determining the action." Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2025).

Regardless of whether the prescriptive easement claim was

properly before the court, given the nature of the case, we are

not persuaded that the defendants' likelihood of success on

their evidentiary claim is such that it outweighs the balance of

harms. 2 See Ellis v. Wingate, 338 Mass. 481, 486 (1959) (where

defendants' answer denied existence and public use of road,

there was "no merit" to contention that plaintiff's testimony

about public use of road was irrelevant). Therefore, we

perceive no error in the single justice's denial of the motion

to stay. 3 See Gifford v. Gifford, 451 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2008),

quoting Mezoff v. Cudnohufsky, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 874, 874 (1977)

2 The plaintiff maintains that, to merit a stay, the defendants also had to show they were likely to prevail on a claim for ownership of the northern disputed area. Because our assessment of the likelihood of success on the evidentiary claim is dispositive, we do not address this argument.

3 In affirming the denial of the stay, "we do not prejudge the merits of the [defendants'] appeal. . . . The [defendants] remain[] free to raise the same arguments on a fully developed record . . . , and we trust that [the panel that ultimately decides the appeal] will consider [their] arguments with an open mind." C.E., 472 Mass. at 1017 n.3.

4 ("'Rarely, if ever, can it be said that a single justice is in

error in denying relief' under Mass. R. A. P. 6").

Order of the single justice affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Hand & Hershfang, JJ. 4),

Clerk

Entered: August 18, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Ellis v. Wingate
155 N.E.2d 783 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1959)
Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney
405 N.E.2d 106 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1980)
Zucco v. Kane
789 N.E.2d 115 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2003)
Gifford v. Gifford
888 N.E.2d 924 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2008)
C.E. v. J.E.
37 N.E.3d 623 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2015)
Mezoff v. Cudnohufsky
367 N.E.2d 1189 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1977)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
Troy Industries, Inc. v. Samson Manufacturing Corp.
924 N.E.2d 325 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2010)

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