360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC

Opinion

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ 360 M.S.R. ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL. v. 350 MAIN STREET MIDDLETOWN, LLC, ET AL.

(AC 47817) Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Seeley, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendants, M Co. and B, appealed from the trial court’s judgment determining, inter alia, that they had interfered with the plaintiff’s use of an easement over an alleyway, a ten foot wide strip of land that runs between the property of M Co. and the property of the plaintiff. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court had improperly concluded that the easement was not limited to pedestrian use. Held:

The trial court did not err in concluding that the easement, which was created in a 1905 deed between the predecessors in title of the plaintiff and M Co., was not limited to pedestrian use, as the unambiguous language of the deed created an express right-of-way easement without any limitations on how it could be used, and the circumstances surrounding the alleyway that was the subject of the easement, its physical characteristics, and public policy did not warrant a different interpretation of the deed’s language.

The trial court did not err in concluding that passage over the alleyway by motor vehicles to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property was a reasonable use of the easement, as there was a lack of evidence to establish that historical use of the servitude by vehicles unreasonably interfered with the servient estate, the easement accommodated vehicle use by the plaintiff and its tenants without issue up until the time that B, M Co.’s tenant, placed obstructions in the alleyway, use of the easement was the only way in which the plaintiff could access the rear of its property, and the 1905 deed did not contain language limiting the scope or use of the easement to pedestrians.

The trial court did not err by failing to evaluate and conclude as a matter of law that vehicular use of the alleyway was unlawful and against public policy, as vehicular use of the easement was reasonable, and the court found that the defendants did not establish their claims that vehicular use of the easement violated the Life Safety Code, which ensures fire safety compliance, or public policy governing safe passage by impeding access to the alleyway by pedestrians in the event of a fire or other emergency.

The trial court reasonably could have determined, on the basis of the testimony before it, that B’s conduct in obstructing vehicular use of the easement was intentional and was designed to block the plaintiff’s use of the easement area, even though B did not testify, and, accordingly, this court could not conclude that the trial court’s decision to award punitive damages constituted an abuse of its discretion.

*

The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

This court declined to review the defendants’ claim that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff as to certain counts of the defendants’ counterclaim, as that claim was not adequately briefed.

Argued January 22—officially released August 25, 2026

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction prohibiting the defendants from blocking or interfering with the named plaintiff’s use of an easement, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the defendants filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the plaintiff Ford News Diner, LLC, withdrew its claims against the defendants, and the defendants withdrew the counts of the counterclaim as against the plaintiff Ford News Diner, LLC; subsequently, the case was tried to the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee; judgment in part for the named plaintiff on the complaint and on the counterclaim, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jonathan M. Shapiro, with whom was Isabella Tatar, for the appellants (defendants).

Mark A. Balaban, for the appellee (named plaintiff).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendants, 350 Main Street Middletown , LLC (350 Main), and Susan Bauer, doing business as The Cooking Company, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC,1 with respect to counts one and two of the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that the defendants had interfered with the plaintiff’s use of an easement over a ten foot wide strip of land that runs between property of the plaintiff and 350 Main, and as to the claims against the plaintiff in a counterclaim filed 1 Ford News Diner, LLC, a tenant of 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC, originally was a plaintiff in this case. Ford News Diner, LLC, subsequently withdrew its claims against the defendants and is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC, as the plaintiff in this opinion.

by 350 Main. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that the easement is not limited to pedestrian use only, (2) found that vehicular use of the easement was reasonable, (3) determined that vehicular use of the easement did not violate public policy and applicable fire code provisions, (4) found that Bauer intentionally obstructed and interfered with the plaintiff’s use of the easement, thereby justifying an award against Bauer of nominal damages in the amount of $10 and punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees, and (5) rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff with respect to counts three, eight and nine of the counterclaim. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts, as set forth by the court in its memorandum of decision or as otherwise undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendants’ appeal. The plaintiff owns property located at 360 Main Street in Middletown, and 350 Main owns abutting property located at 350 Main Street in Middletown. The plaintiff is the holder of the dominant estate, and 350 Main is the holder of the servient estate. The right-of-way easement at issue in this case “was first created by a deed dated May 1, 1905 [1905 deed], from August Johnson, a predecessor in title of [350 Main’s] property, to the plaintiff’s predecessor in title, The Pythian Building Corporation [Pythian].” Pursuant to the 1905 deed, Johnson conveyed to Pythian the parcel of property now owned by the plaintiff and provided Pythian “with a right of way to the rear of said premises over the passageway on the south side of [Pythian’s property] about ten (10) feet in width” (1905 easement). The easement area referenced in the 1905 deed is situated between the buildings owned by the plaintiff and 350 Main, leads from Main Street to the rear of the buildings, and was referred to at trial as an alleyway (alleyway).2 2 We note that the alleyway between the two buildings also was referred to at trial as an accessway, a passageway and a driveway as well. For

On May 15, 1925, Pythian entered into an agreement (1925 agreement) with 350 Main’s then predecessor in title, Alessandro Saraceno. Under the 1925 agreement, each party granted to the other the right to use a five foot wide strip of land to the rear of each party’s premises, thereby establishing a ten foot wide passageway (passageway ) that “shall always remain open on the boundary between the lands of said parties.” The 1925 agreement further stated that Pythian “shall have the right of using the drive-way from Main [Street], so as to be able to enter freely into said passage [1925 easement].” The “drive- way” referenced in the 1925 agreement is the alleyway that leads from Main Street to the rear of the buildings. In 1925, prior to the execution of the 1925 agreement, a historic theater known as the Capitol Theater was built, and it was situated in the rear of the property now owned by 350 Main. The ten foot wide passageway created in the 1925 agreement surrounded the Capitol Theater on the rear and both sides and led to the ten foot wide alleyway that leads out to Main Street. The court specifically found that it was “reasonable to infer that the 1925 agreement, dated around the time the Capitol Theater was built, was entered into in order to create a ten foot wide passageway in the rear of the plaintiff’s property.” The 1905 and 1925 easements “are deed referenced and depicted on a map showing the plaintiff’s property . . . and are also referenced and depicted on maps of [350 Main’s] property.” (Citation omitted.)

The plaintiff acquired the property located at 360 Main Street by quitclaim deed in 2008. Its deed specifically provides: “Premises conveyed together with the ten (10) foot right-of-way contained in a Warrantee Deed from . . . Johnson to [Pythian] dated on May 1, 1905, and recorded in Volume 133, at Page 527 of the Middletown Land Records; and together with right-of-way as contained in a[n] agreement between Pythian . . . and . . . Saraceno dated May 15, 1925 and recorded in Volume 171 at Page 236 of the Middletown Land Records, all ease of reference, we will refer to it as an alleyway or a right-of-way in this opinion.

as shown on the aforesaid map.” “After [the plaintiff] purchased the property [at 360 Main Street], [Alford] Quinland [a principal of the plaintiff] . . . would visit the property three times a week to perform repairs. When he visited the property, Quinland would drive his vehicle over the [alleyway] and park his car in the rear of 360 [Main Street].” Quinland was able to drive a motor vehicle through the alleyway without issue from the time the plaintiff purchased the property located at 360 Main Street until approximately 2017.

Michael Stone, the sole member of 350 Main, purchased the property located at 350 Main Street in 2012. Two large doors on the side of the building located at 350 Main Street open into the alleyway between the buildings owned by 350 Main and the plaintiff. As we indicated previously in this opinion, prior to Stone’s purchase, “a portion of the property [at 350 Main Street] was utilized as . . . the Capitol Theater [which] was . . . demolished [in part] in 2011.”3 (Footnote omitted.) Subsequent to Stone’s purchase in 2012, the property remained vacant until sometime in 2017, when Bauer leased the property and began operating The Cooking Company. At all relevant times, Bauer was a tenant of 350 Main. Sometime after The Cooking Company began conducting business at 350 Main Street, Bauer, unilaterally and without permission from the plaintiff, placed cement barriers, tables, chairs, and flowerpots in the alleyway to benefit patrons of The Cooking Company. After receiving complaints from tenants, Quinland spoke to Stone, and, subsequently, the items were removed from the alleyway. Stone also instructed Bauer to refrain from blocking the alleyway.

In or around 2019, Bauer, again unilaterally and without permission from the plaintiff, installed two platforms with stairs that extended approximately four feet into 3 The main theater building was demolished in 2011; however, the lobby building remains on the property. The lobby of the theater building previously operated as a liquor store, and it now comprises the premises leased to Bauer for the operation of The Cooking Company.

the ten foot alleyway. The platforms allow access to the alleyway from the doors on the side of the building located at 350 Main Street. The defendants assert that these platforms and stairs are necessary to comply with the Middletown fire marshal’s instructions. As a result of the installation of the platforms and stairs, the plaintiff was unable to drive a motor vehicle over the alleyway.

Thereafter, the plaintiff initiated the present action. By way of a four count, second revised verified complaint (operative complaint) dated July 2, 2020, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants, by installing the platforms and stairs, unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the 1905 easement over the alleyway. In the first and second counts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ actions constituted a nuisance because they interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the 1905 easement. In the third and fourth counts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ actions tortiously interfered with business relations between the plaintiff and its tenant, Ford News Diner, LLC, because Quinland could not access the rear of the property with a motor vehicle to perform his duties as a landlord. With respect to relief, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment, injunctive and equitable relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.

On May 6, 2019, the defendants filed an answer denying the plaintiff’s allegations, five special defenses,4 and a counterclaim. In the ten count counterclaim, 350 Main alleged claims against the plaintiff for trespass, nuisance, quiet title, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference with business relations, as well as claims against Ford News Diner, LLC, for trespass and nuisance .5 It also sought injunctive and declaratory relief.

4 The defendants do not contest the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to their special defenses, which alleged unclean hands, estoppel, bad faith, and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

5 Counts six and seven of the counterclaim, which were directed at Ford News Diner, LLC, were withdrawn prior to trial.

The case was tried before the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee, on December 19 and 20, 2023. Thereafter, both parties filed posttrial briefs. Prior to trial, the plaintiff and the defendants consented to the court’s visit to the property, without the presence of counsel, to view the property at issue in this case.

At trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from Quinland as its only witness. Quinland testified that, at the time the plaintiff purchased the 360 Main Street property , Quinland understood that the alleyway was “protected by an easement,” although he did not obtain the details of the 1905 easement until the purchase was completed. Quinland testified that, from the time the plaintiff purchased the property until the time that Bauer obstructed the alleyway, he and his tenants drove over the alleyway without issue. Specifically, Quinland testified that, shortly after The Cooking Company became a tenant of 350 Main, Bauer placed flowerpots, tables and chairs in the alleyway, as well as concrete barriers, all of which obstructed the alleyway. Quinland explained that, as a result, he spoke with Stone, and, subsequently, the concrete barriers, tables and chairs were removed, but that, in 2019, Bauer installed platforms and stairs that protruded approximately four feet into the right- of-way. Further, Quinland testified that, as a result of those actions, he could not park his motor vehicle in the back of his property where there was sufficient space for parking but, instead, had to park in a metered parking space on Main Street, which required frequent attention to ensure that he did not receive a parking ticket. Quinland testified that it was difficult for him to bring equipment from his vehicle parked on Main Street into the basement of the plaintiff’s building, which is accessed through the alleyway. Finally, Quinland testified about his prior complaints regarding the alleyway, including at least two complaints to the Middletown Fire Department about safety concerns after Bauer installed the platforms and stairs. Following cross-examination of Quinland, the plaintiff rested its case.

Thereafter, the defendants offered testimony from Stone; Ok Yi, the owner of Ford News Diner, LLC; and Al Lespier, a Middletown Deputy Fire Marshal. Stone testified that, prior to his purchase of 350 Main Street in 2012, he undertook “[s]tandard due diligence” and commissioned a survey of the property, which was admitted into evidence. Stone testified that there were no steps attached to the two doors on the side of the building at the time he purchased the property at 350 Main Street. Stone further testified that, to his knowledge, Bauer installed the platforms and stairs to comply with the fire marshal’s instructions. On cross-examination, Stone acknowledged that the platforms and stairs impacted approximately 40 percent of the alleyway but asserted that the platforms and stairs did not block the alleyway and that it was “still passable.”

Yi testified that she has owned and operated Ford News Diner, LLC, since 1984 and was familiar with the alleyway between Ford News Diner, LLC, and the building at 350 Main Street, and that she previously had parked her car in the alleyway with permission from the plaintiff’s predecessor in title sometime during the 1990s. Yi also testified that she recalled others, including Quinland, parking in the alleyway. Further, Yi testified that, as a result of Bauer placing objects in the alleyway, it was inconvenient and difficult to receive deliveries. Yi also testified that, prior to the installation of the two stairways in the alleyway, she would drive through the alleyway on a regular basis to unload groceries at the back door of her diner, but that she could no longer do so after the stairways were installed.

The defendants’ final witness, Lespier, testified that, in his role as the Deputy Fire Marshal of the Middletown Fire Department, he had visited the property located at 360 Main Street after Quinland submitted complaints about the obstruction of the alleyway. Lespier testified that he had received a complaint from Quinland that set forth safety concerns resulting from the defendants’ conduct in blocking the alleyway. Lespier testified that he had evaluated the alleyway and platforms and stairs to determine whether there was ample area for a path of travel in the event of an emergency. Lespier testified that he had applied the Life Safety Code,6 which requires a twenty-eight inch wide path of egress that is free from obstructions in the event of an emergency. When questioned by the court, Lespier could not state whether a path that could accommodate a motor vehicle violated the Life Safety Code.

On June 27, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of decision finding in favor of the plaintiff with respect to counts one and two of the operative complaint7 and counts one, two, three, four, five, eight and ten of the counterclaim.8 This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendants first challenge the court’s interpretation of the 1905 easement over the alleyway. Specifically, 6 The Life Safety Code is employed by fire marshals as part of the fire safety compliance assessment required to operate a business in Connecticut . Notably, the defendants did not plead a violation of the Life Safety Code in their special defenses or the counterclaim.

7 The court found that, with respect to counts three and four of the operative complaint, which alleged tortious interference with business relations, the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to prove the allegations in those counts, and it rendered judgment in favor of the defendants as to counts three and four.

8 As we already have indicated, counts six and seven of the counterclaim were withdrawn prior to trial. See footnote 5 of this opinion. With respect to count nine of the counterclaim, which sought a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties with respect to the 1905 easement, the court concluded that the 1905 easement over the alleyway was not limited to pedestrian traffic and that “the passage of motor vehicles over the right-of-way to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property [was] a reasonable use of the right-of-way,” and it rendered a declaratory judgment “in accordance with [those] conclusions.”

With respect to the defendants’ special defenses, the court stated in its memorandum of decision: “Although the defendants filed general special defenses as to the plaintiff’s claims, they did not produce evidence at the trial to establish these defenses. Furthermore, they did not address their special defenses in their posttrial brief. Further discussion of the special defenses is not warranted.”

the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) determined that the 1905 easement over the alleyway is not limited to pedestrian use, (2) determined that vehicular use of the 1905 easement is a reasonable use of the right-of-way, and (3) failed to evaluate and conclude as a matter of law that vehicular use of the right-of-way is unlawful and against public policy. We address each claim in turn. Before doing so, however, we set forth general principles governing easements and the applicable standard of review.

“It is well settled that [a]n easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the rules authorized by the easement. . . . [T]he benefit of an easement . . . is considered a nonpossessory interest in land because it generally authorizes limited uses of the burdened property for a particular purpose. . . . [E]asements are not ownership interests but rather privileges to use [the] land of another in [a] certain manner for [a] certain purpose . . . . Except as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of an easement . . . is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. . . . Likewise, [e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude. . . . 57 Broad Street Stamford, LLC v. Summer House Owners, LLC, 184 Conn. App. 834, 841, 195 A.3d 1143 (2018).

“The use of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit. . . . Ordinarily when [judicial] opinions speak of the use of an easement, it arises in right-of-way cases. Thus use frequently involves the amount of traffic over the easement or alterations to the land to make it passable. . . . This is not to overlook, however, that [t]he owner of an easement has all rights incident or necessary to its proper enjoyment, [although] nothing more. . . . Kuras v. Kope, 205 Conn. 332, 341, 533 A.2d 1202 (1987).

“Significantly, the full scope of the use to be made of [an easement] requires evaluation of the purpose it was to serve. . . . [A]ppellate case law . . . [has] used the terms location, scope, and use somewhat interchangeably . . . . [Our Supreme Court has] read scope and use as having similar meanings insofar as they involve what [the] holder [of the easement] may do with it, [and] the purposes for which it may be used.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, 221 Conn. App. 657, 669–71, 303 A.3d 13 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024).

In the present case, the parties do not dispute the existence of the 1905 easement over the alleyway between the two properties. At issue in this case is the permissible scope of the 1905 easement and whether the plaintiff’s utilization of the easement for vehicular access to the area located in the rear of its building constitutes a reasonable use of the easement.

“Both this court and our Supreme Court have noted that Connecticut case law regarding the standard of review in easement cases is somewhat confusing . . . . Deane v. Kahn, [317 Conn. 157, 167 n.6, 116 A.3d 259 (2015)], quoting Sanders v. Dias, 108 Conn. App. 283, 290, 947 A.2d 1026 (2008). In an attempt to provide some clarity, our Supreme Court, in Deane v. Kahn, supra, 167 n.6, stated: Our scope of review as to the intent behind language in a deed is plenary. . . . Although the intent to create an easement by deed is therefore a question of law over which our review is plenary . . . if the language of the deed is incomplete or ambiguous regarding the location, scope, or use of the easement, the trial court’s resolution of those issues represents a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . In the absence of unambiguous or complete language in the deed, therefore, determining the location, scope, and use of an express easement is a fact-intensive inquiry properly subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . .

“Nevertheless, when faced with a question regarding the construction of language in deeds, the reviewing court does not give the customary deference to the trial court’s factual inferences. . . . The meaning and effect of the [language in the deed] are to be determined, not by the actual intent of the parties, but by the intent expressed in the deed, considering all its relevant provisions and reading it in the light of the surrounding circumstances. . . .

“Our basic rule of construction is that recognition will be given to the expressed intention of the parties to a deed . . . and that it shall, if possible, be so construed as to effectuate the intent of the parties. . . . In arriving at the intent expressed . . . in the language used, however, it is always admissible to consider the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction, and every part of the writing should be considered with the help of that evidence. . . .

“In the construction of a deed or grant, the language is to be construed in connection with, and in reference to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and the obvious purpose the parties had in view. . . . [I]f the meaning of the language contained in a deed or conveyance is not clear, the trial court is bound to consider any relevant extrinsic evidence presented by the parties for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity. . . .

“Finally, we note that [t]he fact that servitudes are intended to bind successors to interests in the land, as well as the contracting parties, and are generally intended to last for an indefinite period of time, lends increased importance to the writing because it is often the primary source of information available to a prospective purchaser of the land. The language should be interpreted to accord with the meaning an ordinary purchaser would ascribe to it in the context of the parcels of land involved.

Searching for a particular meaning adopted by the creating parties is generally inappropriate because the creating parties intended to bind and benefit successors for whom the written record will provide the primary evidence of the servitude’s meaning. . . . Simone v. Miller, 91 Conn. App. 98, 108–10, 881 A.2d 397 (2005); see also Rocamora v. Heaney, 144 Conn. App. 658, 665–66, 74 A.3d 457 (2013). For this reason, [i]n determining the scope of an express easement, the language of the grant is paramount in discerning the parties’ intent. Leposky v. Fenton, 100 Conn. App. 774, 778, 919 A.2d 533 (2007). In addition, [a]ny ambiguity in the instrument creating an easement, in a case of reasonable doubt, will be construed in favor of the grantee. Mackin v. Mackin, [186 Conn. 185, 189, 439 A.2d 1086 (1982)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 673–75.

In sum, “[i]n determining the character and extent of an easement created by deed, the ordinary import of the language will be accepted as indicative of the intention of the parties, unless there is something in the situation of the property or the surrounding circumstances that calls for a different interpretation.” Oak Leaf Marina, Inc. v. Ertel, 23 Conn. App. 91, 96, 579 A.2d 568, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 827, 582 A.2d 206 (1990).

A

The defendants first claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the 1905 easement over the alleyway between the two properties is not limited to pedestrian use. In support of this claim, the defendants contend that the court failed to consider the 1905 easement “in light of all [of] the surrounding circumstances at the time it was created,” namely, that it provided a means of egress from the fire escape at the rear of the building on the plaintiff’s property to the alleyway and then to Main Street and that it served the purpose of providing safe passage for pedestrians to exit from the Capitol Theater. The defendants further assert that the characteristics of the alleyway, namely, its “ ‘narrow’ ” size and the fact that doors in the buildings abutting the alleyway open directly into the alleyway, “overwhelmingly” support a conclusion that the 1905 easement over the alleyway was intended for pedestrian use only. Finally, the defendants contend that the court improperly failed to address their claim that public policies governing safe passage supported a conclusion that the 1905 easement was intended to be limited to pedestrian traffic. We are not persuaded by these contentions.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that “the [1905] easement is not restricted to pedestrian use,” and its finding was predicated on “the words ‘right-of-way’ used in the 1905 easement.” Specifically, the court found that “[t]he right-of-way granted in the [1905] easement is a general right-of- way to the rear of the plaintiff’s property; there is no limiting language in the grant; the language used in the [1905] easement is clear.” The court found “further support for its conclusion that the [1905] right-of-way is not limited to pedestrian use in the clear language used by the previous owners of the dominant and servient estates in their 1925 agreement. Although that agreement created a new right-of-way that was separate from the one created in 1905, the two rights-of-way were connected . Significantly, the parties to the 1925 agreement expressly stated that the plaintiff’s property ‘shall have the right of using the drive-way from Main [Street], so as to be able to enter freely into said passage.’ The use of the term ‘drive-way’ implies use by vehicles that have a driver. Significantly, the parties did not use the term ‘walkway.’ It is reasonable to infer that in 1925 motor vehicles used the right-of-way.” (Emphasis in original.)

Moreover, the court was unpersuaded by the defendants ’ claims that the purposes of the 1925 agreement were to “provide a path of safety from the fire escape at the rear of the plaintiff’s building to Main Street,” and “to provide a ten foot passageway around the perimeter of the former Capitol Theater building to allow for safe passage for the building’s occupants to Main Street.” With respect to the claim regarding the fire escape, the court concluded that that “interpretation conveniently ignore[d] the fact that the right-of-way grant is in general terms and is not limited in any manner.” Moreover, although the court agreed that, given the seating capacity of the Capitol Theater of 1100 people, “it [was] reasonable to infer that the 1925 agreement related to the creation of a ten foot wide pedestrian passageway to serve the theater building,” the court determined that that inference was not sufficient to establish that the 1905 easement was limited to pedestrian use. As the court explained: “It is undisputed that the passageway established by the 1925 agreement connected with the plaintiff’s right- of-way [that] was created under the 1905 easement. . . . [T]he 1925 agreement referred to the plaintiff’s 1905 right-of-way as a driveway. The fact that [350 Main’s] predecessor in title may have sought to create a pedestrian passageway over other property of [350 Main’s] predecessor in title does not alter or diminish the general right-of-way in favor of the plaintiff created in the 1905 deed.” (Emphasis in original.) We agree with the court’s analysis in this respect. The fact that the parties to the 1925 agreement sought to and did create an easement in the rear of their properties likely intended for pedestrian use in connection with the theater, does not change the express right-of-way easement created in the 1905 deed, which contains no limitations or specifications on the means by which it may be used.

The 1905 deed creates an express right-of-way easement over the alleyway “to the rear” of the plaintiff’s property. The 1905 easement contains no language limiting how the right-of-way may be used, it does not include the term “walkway,” and it does not include any language limiting its use to foot traffic or pedestrian use. Moreover, pursuant to the clear language of the 1925 agreement, the plaintiff’s predecessor in title was provided with “the right of using the drive-way from Main [Street], so as to be able to enter freely into [the 1925 easement or passageway that was created in the rear of the two properties].” We conclude that, when “construed in connection with, and in reference to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of the grant at the time the instrument [was] executed, and the obvious purpose the parties had in view”; Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 674; the unambiguous language of the 1905 deed conveys a general right-of-way easement to the plaintiff that is not limited to pedestrian use.9 Our conclusion is supported by this court’s decision in Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 676, in which this court stated: “[T]he . . . deed designates a ‘right of way’ without limitation or reservation. The language, ‘open as a right of way for the use and benefit of the grantee,’ clearly reflects the grantor’s intent to create a general right-of-way easement . The . . . deed contains no specifications of any particular manner in which [the lot at issue] should be used and imposes no limitation on the scope of the easement . More particularly, the language does not limit the right-of-way to foot passage or to ingress and egress. Consequently , we conclude that the . . . deed and the . . . map expressly grant a general right-of-way in terms that are clear and unambiguous.” Thus, in Williams, this court similarly held that a deed that did not include restrictions 9 Relatedly, the defendants claim that the trial court placed “undue reliance” on the term “drive-way” as used in the 1925 agreement to reference the 1905 easement established in the earlier 1905 deed. The defendants argue that the court erroneously inferred that the use of the term “drive-way” suggested that motor vehicles used the alleyway in 1925. The defendants claim that “[t]here is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that motor vehicles used the right-of-way in the [alleyway] in 1925. In fact, in doing so, the trial court ignored all other evidence before it to reach its conclusion.” A review of the record, however, reveals that this inference is reasonable based on the evidence before the court. We construe the term “drive-way” according to its ordinary meaning at the time of the 1925 agreement, which implies use by motor vehicles. See, e.g., Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (3rd Ed. 1916) pp. 310, 836 (defining “driveway” as “[a] passage, or way, along which vehicles or animals are driven” and defining “road,” in part, as “an open way or public passage for vehicles, persons, and animals”).

“clearly and unambiguously created a general right-of- way . . . . See, e.g., Heuer v. Webster, 187 Ill. App. 273, 274–76 (1914) (language of grant, shall be and remain an open court for light, air, access and right of way, for the common benefit of the parties hereto, was plain and unambiguous); Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 78 Nev. 254, 261–62, 371 P.2d 647 (1962) (Here the grantor conveyed an easement [and right-of-way] with full right of use. To our mind, that phrase is clear and without ambiguity. It may not, under the veil of interpretation, be considered to mean a restricted right of use.).” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 680.

The defendants claim that the circumstances surrounding the alleyway—its narrow width, the two doors of the defendants’ building that open into the alleyway, the plaintiff’s fire escape that requires use of the alleyway, the use of the parties’ respective properties at the time of the 1925 agreement, the fact that motor vehicles did not use the right-of-way over the alleyway in 1905 when it was created, and public policy considerations—warrant a different interpretation of the language of the 1905 easement. We do not agree.

In support of these contentions, the defendants first argue that the alleyway was a necessity for pedestrians in 1905 after the plaintiff’s predecessor in title converted the building at 360 Main Street from single-use to multiuse . The defendants, however, provided no evidence to the court to support this assertion to demonstrate that this was a consideration at the time the 1905 easement was created.10 See McBurney v. Paquin, 302 Conn. 359, 10 The defendants point to testimony from Lespier to support this argument and their contention that public policy considerations governing safe passage warrant a determination that the 1905 easement is limited to pedestrian use. The court, however, found that Lespier’s testimony did not support the defendants’ claim. In making that finding, and in finding for the plaintiff on all claims, the court necessarily did not credit Lespier’s testimony. We must defer to the court’s credibility assessment of Lespier’s testimony. See Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc., 224 Conn. App. 668, 681, 315 A.3d 414 (2024) (“[t]he weight to be given 378, 28 A.3d 272 (2011) (“[t]he scope of an easement is determined by examining the instrument that created it and the circumstances that existed at the time of its creation”); see also Oak Leaf Marina, Inc. v. Ertel, supra, 23 Conn. App. 96 (it is appropriate to consider conditions at time of grant). Furthermore, although the defendants maintain that the court improperly failed to consider the circumstances at the time of the creation of the 1905 easement, their arguments primarily focus on the circumstances surrounding the 1925 agreement creating the walkway in the rear of the properties for the Capitol Theater and the alleged safety concerns for patrons exiting the theater. Those safety concerns, however, did not exist in 1905, the year when the easement at issue in this appeal was created, given that the theater was not built until 1925. As the court pointed out, “[t]here’s nothing in the language [of the 1905 easement] . . . that talks about the right-of-way [at issue in this appeal] serving the Capitol Theater.”

With respect to the physical characteristics of the alleyway, the defendants argue that “[t]he size and character of the [alleyway] . . . overwhelmingly [support] the conclusion that the right-of-way [over the alleyway] was intended for pedestrian use only.” Specifically, the defendants argue that “[i]t is illogical to conclude that the owners of the Pythian building (which also had doors leading and opening directly into the [alleyway]) and the Capitol Theater property would direct occupants into oncoming traffic in the ‘narrow alley’ that constitutes the [alleyway].” (Emphasis added.) The defendants contend that “[t]he only logical inference is that the parties did not intend for [more than one] thousand people to exit into oncoming traffic without room to maneuver.”11 First, during the trial, the court rejected the use of the term “traffic,” stating: “You use the term ‘traffic.’ I to the evidence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within the determination of the trier of fact” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

11 The defendants claim that, when the Capitol Theater was built in 1925, the buildings on the defendants’ property had a capacity of more than 1100 people. The capacity of the remaining structure is unclear think we’re really focused on access because . . . nothing I’ve seen so far shows that this is like a thruway connecting one road to the other. What [it] appears to be, as I’m learning about it, is vehicular access to the rear of another property. It’s not through traffic. It’s vehicular access over a driveway, the word is used over a driveway, to other property owned by the dominant estate.” We concur with the court that the defendants’ argument about “traffic” in the narrow alleyway being a safety concern mischaracterizes the circumstances at issue.

The defendants’ arguments regarding the characteristics of the alleyway again relate to the alleged safety concerns for patrons exiting the theater, which, as we already have indicated, do not shed light on the intent of the grantor in 1905, when the right-of-way easement over the alleyway was created. Rather, given the language of the 1905 deed, which conveyed the property at 360 Main Street with the buildings thereon “with a right of way to the rear of said premises,” it is reasonable to infer that the 1905 easement was intended to provide the plaintiff with a means to access the rear of its property. Moreover, the evidence before the court demonstrates that the alleyway is not so narrow that vehicles cannot pass over it.

We are mindful that any ambiguity in the 1905 deed “must emanate from the language used . . . rather than from one party’s subjective perception of the terms.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fiorillo v. Hartford, 212 Conn. App. 291, 302, 275 A.3d 628 (2022). The fact that the defendants advance this alternative interpretation of the 1905 easement does not require a conclusion that the language of the easement is ambiguous. The defendants’ argument also ignores the facts that the alleyway between the two properties is the only means for based on the evidence presented at trial. We agree with the court that it is reasonable to infer that the parties to the 1925 agreement intended the 1925 easement to the rear of the properties to be used by pedestrians; however, this inference, without more, does not support the defendants’ claim that the easement over the alleyway that was created in 1905 must be limited to only pedestrians.

the plaintiff to access the area to the rear of its building from Main Street, and that the 1905 easement, which created a “right of way to the rear of [the plaintiff’s] premises over the [alleyway],” was granted in general terms without restrictions on its use.

The defendants also rely on Russo v. Stepp, 2 Conn. App. 4, 475 A.2d 331 (1984), to support their position. In Russo, this court held that the holder of an easement for “general driveway purposes”; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 5; could not park a vehicle in the easement area located in a steep driveway for extended periods because the characteristics of the driveway made “ingress and egress inherently dangerous when vehicles are parked on any portion of the easement,” as “there was evidence that on several occasions vehicles of the plaintiffs , in attempting to back out of the driveway, ha[d] collided with vehicles parked within the easement.” Id., 6. We conclude that the defendants’ reliance on Russo is misplaced, as the defendants’ contention that driving over the alleyway in the present case is inherently dangerous due to the specific characteristics of the alleyway, or that pedestrians would be harmed or restricted from moving through the alleyway if vehicles are allowed to use it, is based on speculation. See Hagist v. Washburn, 16 Conn. App. 83, 87–88, 546 A.2d 947 (1988) (there were no physical characteristics of property that would render use of easement dangerous if plaintiff parked vehicle within easement area).

Accordingly, the defendants’ challenge to the court’s finding that the 1905 easement was not limited to pedestrian use fails, and we find no merit to their contention that the court failed to consider the creation of the right- of-way over the alleyway in light of its surrounding circumstances and physical characteristics, and public policy. Our review of the record shows that the court considered but rejected those claims, and we concur with its conclusions.

B

The defendants next claim that, in light of the “circumstances surrounding the area, the potential harm, and the rights of the servient estate,” the trial court erred in concluding that “passage over the right-of-way by vehicles to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property is a reasonable use of the [1905] easement . . . .” We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that “[i]t is obvious from the map exhibits and a view of the property that the only access to the rear of the plaintiff’s building from Main Street is over the ten foot right-of-way that is the subject of this action. The 1905 easement expressly created ‘a right of way to the rear of [the plaintiff’s] premises over the [alleyway].’ In the past, authorized users have utilized the right-of- way for vehicular access to the area located at the rear of the building located on the plaintiff’s property. This is a reasonably necessary use of the right-of-way. The defendants have not pointed to any limiting language that would prohibit vehicle use in the 1905 easement or the 1925 agreement. . . . [T]he right-of-way remained open for vehicular use until 2017.” The court stated further: “The defendants have not persuaded the court that the assertion in their brief that ‘automobiles were not in use in 1905 at the time the right-of-way for the [alleyway] was granted’ is correct. In any event, ‘that a means of traversing a right-of-way was not in use at the time of the granting does not indicate a prohibition against such a means of travel.’ Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, [221 Conn. App. 682].”

As we indicated previously in this opinion, the court also was unpersuaded with the defendants’ argument that vehicular use of the alleyway is “illogical” because the alleyway is ten feet wide and “two doors exist on the side of the defendants’ building that open [into] the right- of-way.” Additionally, the court rejected the defendants’ claim that vehicular use in the alleyway is illegal, therefore invalidating the 1905 easement. The court did “not find that Lespier’s testimony supports the defendants’ claim” that “use of the right-of-way by vehicles would violate the Life Safety Code since the use would impede access for pedestrians using the [alleyway] in the event of a fire or other emergency.” The court elaborated that, “[w]hen the court asked Lespier whether a driveway could serve as a means of egress under the Life Safety Code, he could not give a definitive answer. He responded that it would be a matter for planning and zoning.” The court noted that “[t]here is no evidence to establish [that] the concern now raised by the defendants was a concern for the parties when the [1905] easement was created. The court has determined that, under the terms of the [1905] easement and the facts of this case, the easement allows vehicles to pass over the [alleyway]. The possibility that the plaintiff’s exercise of its rights under the [1905] easement may give rise to consequences is beyond the court’s purview in this action.” (Emphasis omitted.)

With respect to whether the plaintiff’s use of the alleyway overburdened the servient estate, the court explained that, “[i]n determining that vehicle use of the right-of-way is reasonably necessary for convenient use of the servitude, the court has also considered the servient estate. There was a lack of evidence to establish that the historical use of the servitude by vehicles unreasonably interfered with the servient estate. The defendants filed their claims against the plaintiff only after the plaintiff brought this action. As noted earlier, the [1905] easement was capable of accommodating vehicle use up until the time obstructions were placed in the [alleyway] by Bauer. This is not a case where the servient estate claims that the dominant estate has overburdened the easement. See Fitch v. Forsthoefel, 194 Conn. App. 230, [238–39] 220 A.3d 876 (2019) (where easement was limited to ingress and egress, children playing in easement area overburdened easement). Here, the servient estate has interfered with the dominant estate’s reasonable use of its easement.”

“It is well established that ‘[a] right of way granted or reserved in general terms may be used for any purpose reasonably necessary for the party entitled to use it. . . . The grant being general in terms, it must be construed to include any reasonable use to which the land may be devoted.’ . . . Peck v. Mackowsky, 85 Conn. 190, 194, 82 A. 199 (1912); see also Mackin v. Mackin, supra, 186 Conn. 189 (easement created by grant in general terms without restrictions on use ‘is to be construed as broad enough to permit any use which is reasonably connected with the reasonable use of the land to which it is appurtenant ’ . . . ); Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 413, 101 A.2d 274 (1953) (same); Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71, 78 (1881) (general grant conveys ‘unlimited way of necessity for all legal uses’). ‘The reasonable uses, to which the granted right-of-way may be put, need only be reasonably connected with the land and are not limited to those to which the land was being put when the way was granted. . . . For instance, the owner of an easement may use the easement in ways which take advantage of modern innovations such as commercial utilities.’ . . . Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 164 Conn. App. 279, 293, 134 A.3d 1278 (2016), aff’d, 327 Conn. 431, 174 A.3d 779 (2018). . . . [When] the language of the . . . deed clearly and unambiguously create[s] an easement in general terms without restrictions on its use, the scope of the easement includes ‘any use which is reasonably connected with the reasonable use of the land to which [the easement] is appurtenant.’ ” Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 676–77.

Because the 1905 deed does not contain language limiting the scope or use of the 1905 easement to pedestrians but, rather, created a general right-of-way easement, the scope of the plaintiff’s right-of-way over the alleyway “must be construed to include any reasonable use to which the land may be devoted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 685. “[T]he determination of the scope of an easement is a question of fact . . . [and the] decision as to what would constitute a reasonable use of a right-of-way is for the trier of fact whose decision may not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stefanoni v. Duncan, 282 Conn. 686, 699, 923 A.2d 737 (2007). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Our authority, when reviewing the findings of a judge, is circumscribed by the deference we must give to decisions of the trier of fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence. . . . The question for [an appellate] court . . . is not whether it would have made the findings the trial court did, but whether in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 236 Conn. App. 109, 124–25, 347 A.3d 198 (2025). “[I]n a case tried before the court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded to specific testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finocchio Bros., Inc. v. 587 CTA, LLC, 226 Conn. App. 351, 355–56, 317 A.3d 838 (2024).

As we have stated, “[a]n easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the rules authorized by the easement. . . . Except as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of an easement . . . is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. . . . Likewise, [e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 669–70. Additionally, “[t]he use of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted .) Id., 670. “[Our Supreme Court has] read scope and use [of an easement] as having similar meanings insofar as they involve what [the] holder [of the easement] may do with it, [and] the purposes for which it may be used.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 670–71. “The reasonable uses, to which the granted right-of-way may be put, need only be reasonably connected with the land and are not limited to those to which the land was being put when the way was granted. . . . For instance, the owner of an easement may use the easement in ways which take advantage of modern innovations such as commercial utilities. . . . Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, [supra, 164 Conn. App. 293].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 677. “The issue of reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined on a case by case basis, considering all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, its foreseeability, the purpose or motive with which the act was done, and the consideration of whether the utility of the use of the land outweighed the gravity of the harm resulting.” Peterson v. Oxford, 189 Conn. 740, 745, 459 A.2d 100 (1983).

In support of their claim that motor vehicle use of the alleyway is unreasonable, the defendants argue that (1) the characteristics surrounding the alleyway demonstrate safety concerns that render vehicular use of the 1905 easement unreasonable, (2) the plaintiff failed to establish harm if vehicular use of the alleyway is prohibited , and (3) the court failed to balance the rights of both the dominant and servient estates in determining whether vehicular use of the alleyway is reasonable. The plaintiff counters that an easement granted in general terms “should be construed as broad enough to permit any use reasonably connected with the use of the land,” and that automobile use over the alleyway is “reasonably connected with the use of the land.” We agree with the plaintiff.

We conclude that the court’s finding that vehicular use of the alleyway to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property constitutes a reasonable use of the 1905 easement is not clearly erroneous and is supported by the record. To start, use of the 1905 easement in the alleyway by a motor vehicle to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property where parking spaces are present is reasonably connected with the use of the land. The evidence in the record demonstrates that vehicular use of the alleyway was utilized by the plaintiff and its tenants without issue for many years. Indeed, the court had before it testimony from Quinland, which it specifically credited, and from Yi, as well as photographs, supporting its subordinate findings that, in the past, motor vehicles utilized the right-of-way as a means to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property and that “the [1905] easement was capable of accommodating vehicle use up until the time obstructions were placed in the [alleyway] by Bauer.” Furthermore, as previously noted, the only way for the plaintiff to access the rear of its property was by way of the alleyway, which lends further support to the court’s finding that vehicular access to the alleyway was a reasonably necessary use. We also agree with the court that the use of the term “drive-way” in the 1925 agreement lends further support to a finding that vehicular use of the alleyway constituted a reasonable use of the 1905 easement. Finally, the defendants presented no evidence establishing that the use of the 1905 easement by vehicles unreasonably interfered with the servient estate. As the court aptly found, “[t]he defendants filed their claims against the plaintiff only after the plaintiff brought this action. . . . This is not a case where the servient estate claims that the dominant estate has overburdened the easement. . . . Here, the servient estate has interfered with the dominant estate’s reasonable use of its easement.” (Citation omitted.) Nothing in the record supports a determination that vehicular use of the 1905 easement is unreasonable.

With respect to the defendants’ concerns regarding fire safety, the court found Lespier’s testimony to be unsupportive of the defendants’ claims and that “[t]his interpretation conveniently ignores the fact that the right-of-way grant is in general terms and is not limited in any manner.” Moreover, although the defendants elicited testimony from Lespier regarding pedestrian egress into the alleyway in the event of an emergency, the court noted that, “[w]hen the court asked Lespier whether a driveway could serve as a means of egress under the Life Safety Code, he could not give a definitive answer. He responded that it would be a matter for planning and zoning.” See also footnote 10 of this opinion. The defendants have offered no support, beyond speculation , demonstrating that vehicular use of the 1905 easement is unreasonable. For example, unlike in Russo v. Stepp, supra, 2 Conn. App. 6, the defendants in the present case have failed to demonstrate a history of harm to others through vehicular use of the 1905 easement. Instead, the defendants summarily claim that the court “ignored” compelling evidence that the plaintiff’s use is unreasonable due to the “potential harm” posed by driving a vehicle in a place where pedestrians may traverse. The defendants next argue that the plaintiff will suffer no harm if vehicular use of the 1905 easement is prohibited but that pedestrians stand to suffer harm in that the plaintiff’s use of the alleyway will block a route of emergency egress. The defendants’ argument is unavailing because it ignores the general rule that “[a] covenant may be enforced by injunction without a showing that violation of the covenant will cause harm to the plaintiff , so long as such relief is not inequitable. . . . It is well settled that the owner of an easement is entitled to relief upon a showing that he will be disturbed or obstructed in the exercise of his right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gancsos v. Israel, 233 Conn. App. 584, 594, 342 A.3d 283 (2025).

The defendants also take issue with the court’s findings that (1) the doors on the defendants’ building had no steps, (2) the doors on the defendants’ building were loading doors and not for ingress and egress, and (3) the alleyway could accommodate an automobile from the time of its inception to 2019, when Bauer constructed platforms and stairs that blocked automobiles from entering . Although the court found that, “[h]istorically, there were no steps or landings in front of the doors on the side of [350 Main’s] building,” Quinland testified that he remembered steps to at least one of those doors and that, when he purchased his property in 2007, there was one step. Nevertheless, the court’s misstatement of that fact did not render clearly erroneous its ultimate finding that vehicular use of the 1905 easement was reasonable, especially given Quinland’s testimony that the step did not interfere with his ability to navigate an automobile through the alleyway. See Utzler v. Braca, 115 Conn. App. 261, 270, 972 A.2d 743 (2009) (“[t]he possibility that the court misstated a subsidiary fact does not, however, establish that the court’s ultimate finding was clearly erroneous”). The same holds true with respect to any impropriety in the court’s finding that the doors on the defendants’ building were loading doors and not for ingress and egress. Finally, the court’s finding that the alleyway was capable of accommodating automobiles from the time of its inception until 2019, when Bauer installed the platforms and stairs, is not clearly erroneous and is supported by the testimony of Quinland and Yi that they could and did drive over the alleyway and park their vehicles in the alleyway prior to when Bauer installed the platforms and stairs.

After a thorough review of the record, we are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in finding that motor vehicle use of the alleyway is reasonable. See Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 682 (“The fact that photographs of the area surrounding [the easement] from the time of the granting do not display vehicles or evidence of vehicular use on [the easement area] does not lead to the conclusion that the grantors intended to prohibit passage via motor vehicle. The absence of evidence of a use does not definitively indicate an intent to preclude such use, especially where the grant of the easement was a general right-of-way.”).

C

The defendants next claim that the trial court erred in failing to evaluate and conclude as a matter of law that the vehicular use of the alleyway is unlawful and against public policy. In their principal appellate brief, the defendants’ analysis of this claim consists of the following: “[T]he trial court failed to analyze whether vehicular use is illegal or violates public policy. For all the same reasons set forth [previously in their brief, which includes an analysis of public policy considerations and the Life Safety Code], the proposed use of the [alleyway] for vehicular access violates public policy and the provisions of the Life Safety Code. Accordingly, the only reasonable use for the [alleyway] is for pedestrian use only, and this court should reverse the trial court’s determination.” Thus, in making this claim, the defendants appear to be reasserting the claims raised in part I A and B of this opinion and arguing, again, that vehicular use of the 1905 easement is not reasonable. Additionally, their arguments about the Life Safety Code and public policy concerning safe passage are premised on the testimony of Lespier, which, as we already have indicated, the court implicitly did not credit and found did not establish their claim that vehicular use of the 1905 easement violated the Life Safety Code and public policy governing safe passage.12 See footnote 10 of this opinion. In light of the lack of credible evidence before the court, it properly did not engage in further analysis of the claim, especially given that the defendants did not plead a violation of the Life Safety Code in their special 12 The court noted that, “[m]ore importantly, in this case the court must determine the scope and reasonable use of the [1905] easement based upon the intention of the parties, as expressed in the language used in the easement documents. There is no evidence to establish [that] the concern now raised by the defendants was a concern for the parties when the [1905] easement was created. The court has determined that, under the terms of the [1905] easement, and the facts of this case, the [1905] easement allows vehicles to pass over the [alleyway]. The possibility that the plaintiff’s exercise of its rights under the [1905] easement may give rise to consequences is beyond the court’s purview in this action.” (Emphasis omitted.)

defenses or the counterclaim. See Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc., 224 Conn. App. 668, 685, 315 A.3d 414 (2024) (trial court did not err in finding that there was no evidence to support plaintiffs’ claims when only evidence presented to support claims was found to be not credible); see also Lenczewski v. Lenczewski, 229 Conn. App. 752, 761–62, 328 A.3d 718 (2024) (“ ‘[I]t is fundamental in our law that the right of a [party] to recover is limited to the allegations in his [pleading]. . . . Facts found but not averred cannot be made the basis for a recovery. . . . Thus, it is clear that [t]he court is not permitted to decide issues outside of those raised in the pleadings.’ ”). Because, in raising this claim, the defendants, in essence, are repeating arguments already addressed and rejected by this court, we do not discuss it further.13

II

Next, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in (1) finding that Bauer intentionally interfered with and obstructed the plaintiff’s use of the 1905 easement, which formed the basis for its decision to award nominal damages and punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees against Bauer, and (2) rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to counts three, eight and nine of the counterclaim. Before addressing each claim in turn, we first set forth the following additional facts.

With respect to count one of the operative complaint , the court found in its memorandum of decision that “Bauer/The Cooking Company has intentionally obstructed and interfered with the plaintiff’s use of the right-of-way by the installation of the platforms and steps that protrude into the right-of-way. Although 350 13 In their appellate reply brief, the defendants claim further that the court improperly failed to consider their “criminal exposure for violating the Life Safety Code,” as well as their exposure to civil liability for any such violations. These claims, however, were raised by the defendants for the first time in their appellate reply brief, and, thus, we decline to review them. See, e.g., McCullough v. Rocky Hill, 239 Conn. App. 70, 91 n.16, ___ A.3d ___ (2026) (declining to review claim raised for first time in reply brief).

Main may have not installed the offending platforms or steps, it was certainly aware of their construction. As Bauer’s landlord, and the owner of the [servient] estate, 350 Main took no action in response to Quinland’s complaints regarding the obstructed right-of-way. The plaintiff is entitled to relief in the form of an injunction requiring the removal of the platforms and steps located within the right-of-way that are in front of the two doors on the side of the building located at 350 Main Street. The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief related to counts one and two. The court will order injunctive relief against 350 Main and Bauer. The plaintiff has not established that [it] is entitled to damages from 350 Main.

“As to count two, the plaintiff has proven that Bauer intentionally interfered with its right-of-way by constructing the subject platforms and stairs; however, the plaintiff did not present evidence regarding compensatory damages resulting from the defendants’ interference with the right-of-way. The plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages on this count. . . . The plaintiff is awarded nominal damages [in the amount] of $10 as to Bauer.

“The plaintiff also seeks punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees. . . . The court finds that Bauer violated the plaintiff’s rights related to the right-of-way by constructing the steps and landing in front of [the] doors [on the side of 350 Main’s building]. As early as 2017, Bauer was aware of Quinland’s concerns about interference with [the plaintiff’s] right-of-way. Despite these concerns, in 2019, Bauer constructed the landing and stairs that block vehicle use of the right-of-way. Bauer unilaterally and intentionally constructed the platform and stairs that violated the plaintiff’s rights. Such action justifies an award of punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees against Bauer. Pursuant to Practice Book § 11-21, the plaintiff should file a motion for attorney’s fees, with a supporting affidavit, within thirty days of the filing of this memorandum of decision. Thereafter, the court will conduct a hearing on the motion in accordance with

Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 839 A.2d 589 (2004).” (Citations omitted.)

With respect to the claims raised by 350 Main in its counterclaim, the court concluded that “350 Main did not present sufficient evidence to establish the allegations contained in [counts one through five, and count ten, of the counterclaim]. Additionally, in their posttrial brief, the defendants only addressed [the] claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. Judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiff . . . on the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and tenth [counts of the counterclaim]. . . . Based upon the evidence presented, the court finds that 350 Main is not entitled to injunctive relief against [the plaintiff]. Judgment may enter in favor of the plaintiff . . . on [count eight of the counterclaim].” With respect to count nine of the counterclaim, the court rendered a declaratory judgment that the “right-of-way may be used by motor vehicles to access the rear of the premises owned by [the plaintiff].”

A

We first address the defendants’ challenge to the court’s finding that Bauer intentionally interfered with and obstructed the plaintiff’s use of the 1905 easement, which finding formed the basis for the court’s award of nominal damages and punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees against Bauer.14 Specifically, the defendants claim that there was no evidence presented at trial that supports the court’s finding that Bauer acted in an intentional manner. The defendants argue that Bauer’s intent could not be determined on the evidence because Bauer did not testify at trial and Stone’s testimony did not suggest that “Bauer or anyone associated with [The 14 We construe this claim as a challenge to the court’s decision to award punitive damages on the basis of its underlying finding of intentional conduct by Bauer, not to the court’s postjudgment award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $26,560, as the defendants did not amend their appeal to challenge the court’s order awarding attorney’s fees, which was issued after the defendants filed this appeal. See Freeman v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., 174 Conn. App. 649, 651–52 n.1, 166 A.3d 857, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 927, 171 A.3d 60 (2017).

Cooking Company] had any knowledge about the [1905] easement or its terms.” The plaintiff counters, inter alia, that Bauer15 had knowledge of the 1905 easement and its terms in 2017, when Bauer first obstructed the alleyway with tables, chairs, and flowerpots. We agree with the plaintiff.

We set forth our standard of review and the relevant legal principles that guide us in resolving this claim. “In order to obtain an award of common-law punitive damages , the pleadings must allege and the evidence must be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find that the defendant exhibited a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Development Co., 318 Conn. 847, 878, 124 A.3d 847 (2015). “[T]he trial court has broad discretion in determining whether [punitive] damages are appropriate. . . . Its decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. . . . Punitive damages are awarded when the evidence shows a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights. . . . Punitive damages . . . in Connecticut are limited to attorney’s fees less taxable costs . . . . Such damages, however, are not awarded as a matter of right, but rather as a matter of discretion, to be determined by the [court] upon a consideration of all the evidence . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Avery v. Medina, 151 Conn. App. 433, 449, 94 A.3d 1241 (2014).

“Under the common law, [i]n order to establish that the [defendant’s] conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the [defendant], the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts . . . . [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. . . . [I]n order to infer it, 15 Although the plaintiff, in its appellate brief, refers to the defendants in asserting this argument, the court’s award of nominal and punitive damages was against Bauer only.

there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them. . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gilman v. Shames, 189 Conn. App. 736, 744, 208 A.3d 1279 (2019).

In the present case, the court found that Bauer violated the plaintiff’s rights with respect to the right-of-way over the alleyway by constructing the steps and landings therein, which precluded vehicular use of the right-of- way. The court had before it testimony demonstrating that, in 2017, Quinland expressed concerns relating to the placement of tables, chairs, large cement potted plants and other items in the alleyway to Stone, who testified that he had instructed The Cooking Company “not to block the [alleyway].” The items were removed at that time. Nevertheless, in 2019, Bauer installed platforms and stairs that protruded approximately four feet into the ten foot right-of-way. Despite the warning from Stone, which supports an inference that Bauer was made aware of the 1905 easement, the platforms and stairs installed by Bauer continued to prevent the plaintiff from driving over the alleyway. Accordingly, we conclude that the court reasonably could have determined on the basis of the testimony before it that Bauer’s conduct in obstructing vehicular use of the right-of-way over the alleyway was intentional and designed to block the plaintiff’s use of the alleyway, even though Bauer herself did not testify. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the court’s decision to award punitive damages constituted an abuse of its discretion. See Curto v. Hartmann, 235 Conn. App. 40, 58–59, 344 A.3d 1244 (2025).

B

Finally, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff with respect to counts three (quiet title), eight (injunctive relief) and nine (declaratory judgment) of the counterclaim. Because the defendants did not adequately brief this claim, we decline to review it.

“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis , rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alterio v. Spak, 237 Conn. App. 84, 90, 349 A.3d 614 (2026). Finally, “[a]lthough the number of pages devoted to an argument in a brief is not necessarily determinative, relative sparsity weighs in favor of concluding that the argument has been inadequately briefed.” State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 726, 138 A.3d 868 (2016).

In the present case, the defendants’ briefing of this claim consists of one short paragraph, in which the defendants referenced the three counts of the counterclaim being challenged, stated that those counts “sought to prevent the plaintiff from using the right-of-way in the [alleyway] in a manner that violated its terms, including preventing the plaintiff from driving vehicles and parking in it,” and stated further: “For all the same reasons set forth [previously in the brief] as to the plaintiff’s claims, the trial court erred in [rendering] judgment in favor of the plaintiff on [those counts of] the [counterclaim], and this court should reverse the judgment on such counts.” The defendants cite no authority to support this claim beyond this bare assertion, nor have they provided any analysis of their claim. See Bongiorno v. J & G Realty, LLC, 211 Conn. App. 311, 323–24, 272 A.3d 700 (2022)

(“conclusory assertions regarding a claim, with no mention of the relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record, will not suffice” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In asserting this claim, the defendants rely on their briefing in support of their other claims; however, counts three and eight of the counterclaim assert claims for quiet title and injunctive relief, which were not previously briefed, and the defendants’ appellate briefs contain no relevant legal authority pertaining to quieting title or injunctive relief, or demonstrating why the court should have quieted title to the alleyway in their favor or awarded them injunctive relief. Accordingly , we decline to review this claim. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 139 Conn. App. 540, 552 n.7, 56 A.3d 747 (2012) (declining to review defendants’ claim that, if this court deemed claim to be unpreserved, “this court should review the claim ‘for all of the reasons cited in [the portion of his brief devoted to claim I],’ ” and concluding that “[t]his abstract assertion, unsupported by adequate legal analysis related to the particular claim to which it applies, is wholly inadequate”), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 928, 64 A.3d 121 (2013). Moreover, even if we were to review this claim and to the extent that it relies on the arguments set forth by the defendants in the other portions of their principal appellate brief, which we already have rejected, the claim nonetheless fails, for the reasons already set forth in this opinion.

The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.