3086 Purchase LLC v. The Town/Village of Harrison, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 23, 2026
Docket7:25-cv-09917
StatusUnknown

This text of 3086 Purchase LLC v. The Town/Village of Harrison, et al. (3086 Purchase LLC v. The Town/Village of Harrison, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
3086 Purchase LLC v. The Town/Village of Harrison, et al., (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

W. . a 140 Grand Street, Suite 705, White Plains, New York 10601 vankwitt a | t 914.686.1500 - f 914.487.5000 - www.yankwitt.com | June 22, 2026 Via ECF MEMO ENDORSED Honorable Victoria Reznik United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York 300 Quarropas Street White Plains, NY 10601 Re: 3086 Purchase LLC v. The Town/Village of Harrison, et al., 25-cv-9917-JGLC-VR Dear Judge Reznik: Pursuant to Local Rule 37.2 and Section 2(A) of Your Honor’s Individual Practices, Defendant Old Oaks Country Club, Inc. (the “Club’”’) respectfully submits this letter seeking a pre- motion conference regarding its anticipated motion for a protective order. As set forth below, the Club will seek a protective order in response to Plaintiff’ s improper attempt to subpoena the Club’s privileged communications from non-parties Alston & Bird LLP (“Alston”) and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (“Simpson,” and collectively, the “Law Firms”). See Exhibit A. Following a pre- motion conference and briefing, the Court should grant the requested protective order. A. Relevant Background For more than 100 years, the Club has operated a country club with a golf course, practice facilities and other amenities available to its private membership. Plaintiff is a limited liability company that owns a single-family home that borders the Club’s golf course on two sides. Plaintiff's members, Justin and Kerri Hamill, purchased the home in 2021. Since 2023, the Club has faced a constant barrage of threatened legal actions and litigations initiated by Plaintiff. On March 5, 2025, Plaintiff commenced an action against the Club in the Supreme Court, Westchester County, alleging claims for private nuisance and trespass, which remains pending before Justice Nancy Quinn Koba (the “State Court Action’). Then, on November 26, 2025, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against the Club and the Town/Village of Harrison (the “Town’”) and certain of its employees, alleging federal constitutional and civil racketeering claims arising out of the Town’s enforcement of its zoning laws to a children’s playhouse in Plaintiffs backyard.! As relevant here, the parties in the State Court Action are currently litigating the Club’s inclusion on its privilege log of privileged communications involving Michael Hefter, a partner at Alston, and Nicholas Goldin and Joseph Kaufman, both partners at Simpson.” Hefter, Goldin, and Kaufman comprise the Club’s Law Committee (the “Law Committee Members”), which is

! Relatedly, in the Town of Harrison Justice Court, Plaintiff is charged with violations of the Town’s code, and has repeatedly issued subpoenas to Club members, employees, and representatives. Plaintiff also previously commenced an Article 78 proceeding against the Club on November 17, 2024, which has now been disposed of. ? We are advised that Mr. Kaufman recently retired.

Honorable Victoria Reznik June 22, 2026 hd Page 2 of 4 empowered by the Club’s By-Laws to “render general legal advice as required to the Club’s President, Board of Governors, General Manager, and Committee chairs,” and “subject to approval of the President and the Board of Governors . . . engage independent attorneys as may from time to time be needed to represent the Club in litigation and other matters affecting the Club.” Plaintiff served the Law Firms with subpoenas on June 8 seeking production of, among other things, documents that are clearly the privileged communications of the Law Committee members that may be housed on the Law Firms’ servers. The subpoenas are returnable on July 1, 2026, two weeks after fact discovery was scheduled to close.? On June 17, 2026 at 10:00 a.m., counsel for Plaintiff and the Club participated in a meet and confer via Microsoft Teams, which lasted for nine minutes. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the Club’s counsel advised Plaintiff's counsel that the parties were at an impasse and that the Club would be requesting a conference with the Court. B. Applicable Law Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(A) provides that “[a] party ... may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending,” and “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order . . . forbidding the disclosure or discovery.” As the holder of the attorney-client privilege, the Club has standing to challenge the subpoenas to the Law Firms. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., et al., 327 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (‘Parties generally do not have standing to object to subpoenas issued to non-party witnesses [but] exceptions are made for parties who have a claim of some personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought,” including “claims of attorney-client privilege”); see also Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 332 Fed. App’x 643, 745 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Because Orascom was claiming a privilege regarding the materials sought in the subpoena, it had standing to challenge the subpoena served on White & Case LLP.”). C. A Protective Order Should Be Granted Plaintiff's attempt to obtain documents withheld in the State Court Action by issuing subpoenas to the Law Firms for the same documents is an obvious attempt to end-run around Justice Koba’s forthcoming adjudication of the privilege issues in that action. On that basis alone, the Court should issue a protective order staying compliance with the subpoenas pending a ruling in the State Court Action. To the extent that this Court addresses the propriety of the subpoenas, it should issue a protective order forbidding the disclosure of the Law Committee Members emails that are indisputably privileged. It is well-established that “[c]ommunications with in-house counsel in the role of attorney-advisor are afforded the same protection as outside counsel[.]” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 70 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 23, 2010). Here, the Club’s Law Committee is specifically empowered to operate as the Club’s in-house counsel. Since June 2023 when Plaintiff first threatened legal action, the Law Committee members have provided legal advice to the Club

3 The Court has since granted Plaintiff’s motion to extend the discovery deadline by 60 days.

Honorable Victoria Reznik June 22, 2026 hd Page 3 of 4 in connection with matters relating to the parties’ dispute or in anticipation of eventual litigation.* See Kraus v. Brandstetter, 185 A.D.2d 300, 301 (2d Dept. 1992) (reversing order of the trial court and holding that reports issued by a hospital’s Law Committee, which was comprised of attorneys and whose “function and purpose” was to address “legal concerns,” were attorney-client privileged); Lead Creation Inc. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations identified on Schedule A, 668 F. Supp. 3d 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (member of Infringement Committee’ □ communications were privileged because his relationship with Plaintiff was “analogous to the relationship that an in-house counsel has with his corporate employer’). Alternatively, the Law Committee Members’ emails are also work product because they reflect their legal analysis, conclusions, theories, and strategies. See Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am. Inc., No. 02 CIV.7955 DLC, 2003 WL 21998674, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (“The [work product] doctrine protects a lawyer’s ability to prepare his client’s case, protects against the disclosure of the attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, strategies, or theories, and also avoids the unfairness that would occur if one party were allowed to appropriate the work of another.’”’). Unable to credibly argue an entitlement to privileged communications, Plaintiff now takes the position that the Law Committee Members’ emails are not privileged because they are housed on their respective Law Firm’s servers.° This argument is meritless.

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Related

Kraus v. Brandstetter
185 A.D.2d 300 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1992)
Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
94 F. Supp. 3d 585 (S.D. New York, 2015)
In re Modell
171 B.R. 510 (S.D. New York, 1994)
Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?, Inc.
271 F.R.D. 58 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Gupta
281 F.R.D. 169 (S.D. New York, 2012)

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3086 Purchase LLC v. The Town/Village of Harrison, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/3086-purchase-llc-v-the-townvillage-of-harrison-et-al-nysd-2026.