United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1518 29 GREENWOOD, LLC,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NEWTON; NEWTON HISTORICAL COMMISSION; MAYOR RUTHANNE FULLER, individually and in her official capacity; DOUG CORNELIUS, individually and in his official capacity; PETER DIMOND, individually and in his official capacity; KATY HOLMES, individually and in her official capacity; JOHN LOJEK, individually and in his official capacity; ANTHONY CICCARIELLO, individually and in his official capacity,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, U.S. District Judge]
Before Montecalvo, Circuit Judge, Breyer,* Associate Justice, and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Thomas H. Curran, with whom Brian J. LeFort and Thomas H. Curran Associates, LLC, were on brief, for the appellant. Kristen N. Annunziato, with whom Jonah M. Temple and The City of Newton Law Department were on brief, for appellees.
* Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation. February 4, 2025
- 2 - BREYER, Associate Justice. This is a land use dispute
between a developer and local government authorities concerning
the restoration of a property that has been designated as a
historical landmark. The developer argues that the local
government violated its federal constitutional rights by forcing
it to stop restoring the property. Because this dispute could be
substantially narrowed or mooted by the resolution of state-law
issues presently pending in state court, we decline to reach the
merits at this time and instead direct the district court to stay
the suit while the state-court proceedings are ongoing.
Because this case arrives to us on a motion to dismiss,
we take as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.
See Martin v. Somerset Cnty., 86 F.4th 938, 941 (1st Cir. 2023).
In 2017, the Newton Historical Commission issued a permit
authorizing a developer to restore the Gershom Hyde House located
at 29 Greenwood Street in Newton, Massachusetts. A few years
later, a company called 29 Greenwood, LLC, purchased the property
for $1.15 million. The construction permit was transferred with
the sale.
The new company -- Greenwood -- says that shortly after
it began restoration work, it discovered that the building
(originally constructed in 1744) was in worse physical shape than
it had thought. So it tore down large portions of the building
to reconstruct them, it says, in the original style with many of
- 3 - the original parts. But the Commission concluded that, by doing
so, Greenwood had violated its permit and a local ordinance
regulating historical landmarks. It thus ordered Greenwood to
stop its work and initiated a criminal complaint seeking to impose
fines. Greenwood disagreed with the Commission's assessment, but
it obeyed the stop-work order. Although state law provided a
mechanism to challenge the Commission's determination that it had
violated its permit, Greenwood did not invoke that method.
In an attempt to continue its project, Greenwood
submitted a series of revised proposals to the Commission, each
time asking the Commission to issue a modified permit. The
Commission denied all of Greenwood's applications. Greenwood
began to think that the Commission would never authorize it to
rebuild the house. And so, since it thought the value of the
property in that condition was low, it brought this action in
February 2023, accusing the Commission of taking its property
without compensation in violation of the federal Constitution.
See U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation."). Greenwood also
claimed that the alleged Taking constituted a violation of state
law and that the Commission's fines were unconstitutionally
excessive. Greenwood initially filed this suit in state court,
but the defendants removed it to federal court.
- 4 - On April 30, 2024, the federal district court concluded
(among other things) that this case amounts to an everyday
zoning-type dispute between a zoning board and a property
owner -- the type of dispute that is not sufficiently unusual to
trigger the Takings Clause. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)
(suggesting that "normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" do not
ordinarily raise problems under the Takings Clause); cf. Mongeau
v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e
have generally been hesitant 'to involve federal courts in the
rights and wrongs of local planning disputes[.]'" (quoting Nestor
Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st
Cir. 1992))). It therefore dismissed Greenwood's complaint for
failing to state a claim.
In this appeal, Greenwood contends that the district
court failed to appreciate that the Commission acted in bad faith.
According to Greenwood, the Commission violated the Takings Clause
because its actions demonstrate that it will never permit Greenwood
to continue its reconstruction of the property, no matter what
Greenwood promises to do.
The primary question raised in this suit is whether the
Commission violated the Takings Clause by failing to grant
Greenwood the reconstruction permission it seeks. We do not reach
- 5 - this, or the other issues that Greenwood raises on appeal, however,
for one basic reason. Two actions are presently pending in state
court. And through those state-court actions, the federal issue
in this case is likely to be mooted or narrowed.
Before Greenwood filed this (initially state-court)
action, it had brought another action in state superior court
(which we will call the “original state-court action”).
Complaint, 29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton, No. 2281-3240
(Middlesex Sup. Ct. Sept. 1, 2022). In that original state-court
action -- filed in September 2022 –- Greenwood challenged the
Commission’s rejection of its remedial plans under state law. See
id. at 17-18; see also Warner v. Lexington Hist. Dists. Comm'n,
831 N.E.2d 380, 384 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (recognizing that a
commission decision will be vacated if "it is based on a legally
untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious, or
arbitrary" (quoting Gumley v. Bd. of Selectmen of Nantucket, 358
N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1977))).
In July 2023, on application of the Commission, a state
court issued a criminal complaint against Greenwood. Greenwood
then filed an emergency motion in the original state-court action
seeking an emergency stay of the criminal proceedings. The state
court denied relief as to the criminal proceedings and retained
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United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1518 29 GREENWOOD, LLC,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NEWTON; NEWTON HISTORICAL COMMISSION; MAYOR RUTHANNE FULLER, individually and in her official capacity; DOUG CORNELIUS, individually and in his official capacity; PETER DIMOND, individually and in his official capacity; KATY HOLMES, individually and in her official capacity; JOHN LOJEK, individually and in his official capacity; ANTHONY CICCARIELLO, individually and in his official capacity,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, U.S. District Judge]
Before Montecalvo, Circuit Judge, Breyer,* Associate Justice, and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Thomas H. Curran, with whom Brian J. LeFort and Thomas H. Curran Associates, LLC, were on brief, for the appellant. Kristen N. Annunziato, with whom Jonah M. Temple and The City of Newton Law Department were on brief, for appellees.
* Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation. February 4, 2025
- 2 - BREYER, Associate Justice. This is a land use dispute
between a developer and local government authorities concerning
the restoration of a property that has been designated as a
historical landmark. The developer argues that the local
government violated its federal constitutional rights by forcing
it to stop restoring the property. Because this dispute could be
substantially narrowed or mooted by the resolution of state-law
issues presently pending in state court, we decline to reach the
merits at this time and instead direct the district court to stay
the suit while the state-court proceedings are ongoing.
Because this case arrives to us on a motion to dismiss,
we take as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.
See Martin v. Somerset Cnty., 86 F.4th 938, 941 (1st Cir. 2023).
In 2017, the Newton Historical Commission issued a permit
authorizing a developer to restore the Gershom Hyde House located
at 29 Greenwood Street in Newton, Massachusetts. A few years
later, a company called 29 Greenwood, LLC, purchased the property
for $1.15 million. The construction permit was transferred with
the sale.
The new company -- Greenwood -- says that shortly after
it began restoration work, it discovered that the building
(originally constructed in 1744) was in worse physical shape than
it had thought. So it tore down large portions of the building
to reconstruct them, it says, in the original style with many of
- 3 - the original parts. But the Commission concluded that, by doing
so, Greenwood had violated its permit and a local ordinance
regulating historical landmarks. It thus ordered Greenwood to
stop its work and initiated a criminal complaint seeking to impose
fines. Greenwood disagreed with the Commission's assessment, but
it obeyed the stop-work order. Although state law provided a
mechanism to challenge the Commission's determination that it had
violated its permit, Greenwood did not invoke that method.
In an attempt to continue its project, Greenwood
submitted a series of revised proposals to the Commission, each
time asking the Commission to issue a modified permit. The
Commission denied all of Greenwood's applications. Greenwood
began to think that the Commission would never authorize it to
rebuild the house. And so, since it thought the value of the
property in that condition was low, it brought this action in
February 2023, accusing the Commission of taking its property
without compensation in violation of the federal Constitution.
See U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation."). Greenwood also
claimed that the alleged Taking constituted a violation of state
law and that the Commission's fines were unconstitutionally
excessive. Greenwood initially filed this suit in state court,
but the defendants removed it to federal court.
- 4 - On April 30, 2024, the federal district court concluded
(among other things) that this case amounts to an everyday
zoning-type dispute between a zoning board and a property
owner -- the type of dispute that is not sufficiently unusual to
trigger the Takings Clause. See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)
(suggesting that "normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" do not
ordinarily raise problems under the Takings Clause); cf. Mongeau
v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e
have generally been hesitant 'to involve federal courts in the
rights and wrongs of local planning disputes[.]'" (quoting Nestor
Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st
Cir. 1992))). It therefore dismissed Greenwood's complaint for
failing to state a claim.
In this appeal, Greenwood contends that the district
court failed to appreciate that the Commission acted in bad faith.
According to Greenwood, the Commission violated the Takings Clause
because its actions demonstrate that it will never permit Greenwood
to continue its reconstruction of the property, no matter what
Greenwood promises to do.
The primary question raised in this suit is whether the
Commission violated the Takings Clause by failing to grant
Greenwood the reconstruction permission it seeks. We do not reach
- 5 - this, or the other issues that Greenwood raises on appeal, however,
for one basic reason. Two actions are presently pending in state
court. And through those state-court actions, the federal issue
in this case is likely to be mooted or narrowed.
Before Greenwood filed this (initially state-court)
action, it had brought another action in state superior court
(which we will call the “original state-court action”).
Complaint, 29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton, No. 2281-3240
(Middlesex Sup. Ct. Sept. 1, 2022). In that original state-court
action -- filed in September 2022 –- Greenwood challenged the
Commission’s rejection of its remedial plans under state law. See
id. at 17-18; see also Warner v. Lexington Hist. Dists. Comm'n,
831 N.E.2d 380, 384 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (recognizing that a
commission decision will be vacated if "it is based on a legally
untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious, or
arbitrary" (quoting Gumley v. Bd. of Selectmen of Nantucket, 358
N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Mass. 1977))).
In July 2023, on application of the Commission, a state
court issued a criminal complaint against Greenwood. Greenwood
then filed an emergency motion in the original state-court action
seeking an emergency stay of the criminal proceedings. The state
court denied relief as to the criminal proceedings and retained
jurisdiction over Greenwood's assertions that the Commission had
violated state law. The criminal proceedings remain ongoing.
- 6 - Back in federal court, the Commission next moved to
dismiss Greenwood’s complaint. The federal district court granted
the motion, and Greenwood filed this appeal. Six months later,
in the original state-court action, the state superior court denied
the Commission's motion for summary judgment on the merits, sending
to trial the question of whether the Commission had acted properly
under state law. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, 29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of
Newton, No. 2281-3240 (Middlesex Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2024). The
state court has not yet held that trial.
The Supreme Court has directed that, in certain
circumstances, a federal court should abstain from reaching a
federal constitutional issue where it is likely that the dispute
could be resolved (or narrowed) in state court under state law.
See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). The
purpose of Pullman abstention is to enable courts "to avoid
resolving . . . federal question[s] by encouraging a state-law
determination that may moot the federal controversy." San Remo
Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 339 (2005).
Abstention also "serves to 'avoid federal-court error in deciding
state-law questions antecedent to federal constitutional issues.'"
Batterman v. Leahy, 544 F.3d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting
Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997)). It
is thus often appropriate for a federal court to abstain from
- 7 - reaching a constitutional issue "[w]here there is an action pending
in state court that will likely resolve the state-law questions
underlying the federal claim." Harris Cnty. Comm'rs Ct. v. Moore,
420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975). This is particularly true when a
constitutional question implicates issues of land-use planning --
a "sensitive area of social policy into which the federal courts
should not lightly intrude." Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n v.
City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 802 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pearl
Inv. Co. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 774 F.2d 1460, 1463 (9th Cir.
1985)).
Given the overlapping legal issues between the pending
state-court case (concerning state law, not federal constitutional
law) and the case here (concerning a federal constitutional issue),
the best course is for the state court to analyze this dispute
before the federal courts weigh in further. The outcome of
Greenwood's state court case could moot -- or significantly narrow
-- this case. If Greenwood loses its case in state court, that
means the Commission acted reasonably under state law, suggesting
that this is the sort of ordinary zoning dispute not likely to
trigger the Takings Clause. And if Greenwood prevails, it should
be able to obtain there a significant portion of the relief it
seeks here. Greenwood's other claims could be mooted or narrowed
by the state-court proceeding, too. Whether the fines, not yet
issued in the state criminal action, would be constitutionally
- 8 - excessive turns at least in part on the legality of the
Commission's actions under state law. And the state-law claims
that Greenwood has raised here are largely derivative of its
federal Takings claim. We recognize that the Commission has not
requested abstention here, but we "may raise the issue of
abstention sua sponte." Ford Motor Co. v. Meredith Motor Co., 257
F.3d 67, 71 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001).
We therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of
the claims Greenwood appealed and remand with instructions to enter
a stay under Pullman. The district court may proceed after the
Massachusetts state courts have ruled on the Commission's actions
under state law. Each party shall bear its own costs.
- 9 -