24CA1162 2800 v Residences 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1162 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV31396 Honorable David H. Goldberg, Judge
2800 E. 2nd Avenue #304, a Colorado limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The Residences at Northcreek Association, a Colorado nonprofit corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Fox and Harris, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
Sweetbaum Miller PC, Alan D. Sweetbaum, Andrew S. Miller, Ryan Hull, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Hall & Evans, LLC, Valerie Garcia, Heather A. Thomas, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 This appeal arises from a dispute between 2800 E. 2nd
Avenue #304, LLC (Owner) and The Residences at Northcreek
Association (the Association) over a proposed project to enclose an
outdoor rooftop patio. The Association approved the proposed
improvements subject to conditions. Owner filed suit challenging
the conditions.
¶2 Owner moved for summary judgment, and the Association
moved for the determination of a question of law central to the case.
The court denied Owner’s motion, granted the Association’s motion,
and entered judgment in the Association’s favor on all claims.
Owner appeals. We affirm and remand with directions.
I. Background
¶3 The Residences at Northcreek (Residences) is a luxury
condominium development located in the Cherry Creek North area
of Denver. The Residences was formed in 2007 as a common
interest ownership community and is subject to a “Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions” and the “Master
Declarations of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for
Northcreek” (collectively, the Declaration). The Residences’
formative documents also include a condominium map, which
1 describes and illustrates its units, common elements, and limited
common elements. The condominium map also identifies the
“location . . . of the horizontal boundaries of each unit” and “[t]he
approximate location and dimensions of limited common elements,
including porches, balconies, and patios.” § 38-33.3-209(2)(g),
(2)(j), C.R.S. 2025 (describing the map requirements for a common
interest ownership community).
¶4 The Residences is subject to the Colorado Common Interest
Ownership Act (CCIOA). See §§ 38-33.3-101 to -401, C.R.S 2025.
The Association is responsible for the management of the
Residences. Proposed improvements at the Residences must be
approved by the Association’s Design Review Board.
¶5 In 2021, Owner purchased Unit 304, which is located on the
top floor of the Residences and includes an enclosed elevator and
stairway (shared with Unit 303) that provides access to the
Association’s enclosed mechanical closet and two unenclosed
rooftop patios, one for Unit 303 and the other for Unit 304. The
following are floorplans of the third floor (left image) and rooftop
(right image) from the condominium map setting forth the
2 horizontal and vertical boundaries of Unit 304, the limited common
elements, and some general common elements:
¶6 The rooftop patio above Unit 304 is a limited common element
for Unit 304’s exclusive use, subject to an easement in favor of the
Association to access the entirety of the rooftop for repair and
maintenance of the mechanical and utility elements located there.
¶7 On August 10, 2022, Owner applied to make improvements to
the rooftop patio. Specially, Owner sought approval to build out
and enclose most of the rooftop patio with exterior walls and a roof
and interior finishes that included an office, library, kitchenette,
and bathroom. The estimated cost of the proposed improvements
3 was $4.4 million. In the application, Owner did not expressly seek
to alter the boundaries of Unit 304. To the contrary, Owner argued
that the proposed improvements did not change the boundaries of
Unit 304 in any manner and that the enclosed portion of the rooftop
patio would remain a limited common element for Owner’s exclusive
use subject only to the Association’s utility easement.
¶8 Two weeks after submitting the application, Owner contacted
the Association to follow up on its status. The Association informed
Owner that it had sent the application to the Design Review Board
for further consideration. Over the following months, the Design
Review Board evaluated the application and requested additional
information to assist in its review, which Owner provided.
¶9 In March 2023, after several communications and exchanges
of information with Owner, the Design Review Board conditionally
approved the application. The conditional approval required the
Owner to obtain a conveyance from the Association of the limited
common element and approval of the transfer from 67% of the
Association’s members and 50% of the entities holding first
mortgages on all units in accordance with section 17.3(c) of the
Declaration (requiring consent from 50% of the first mortgagees to
4 any change in a unit boundary) and section 38-33.3-312(1), C.R.S.
2025 (requiring consent from 67% of unit owners for the
Association’s transfer of common elements).
¶ 10 Owner objected to the approval conditions, and when the
dispute could not be resolved, it initiated this lawsuit. Owner
brought claims against the Association for declaratory relief, breach
of contract, and breach of the Declaration’s implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Owner requested the court to find that
(1) the application must be “deemed approved” because the Design
Review Board did not approve or deny the application within thirty
days from its submittal; (2) the Association had waived any right to
treat the proposed improvements as a change in the boundaries of
Unit 304 and the limited common element; and (3) the proposed
addition did not modify the boundaries of Unit 304 or necessitate a
transfer of the limited common element.
¶ 11 Owner filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the
Association filed a motion for the determination of a question of law
regarding whether the proposed improvements would change the
boundaries of Unit 304, thereby triggering the voting conditions
5 imposed by the Association. The district court granted the
Association’s motion and denied Owner’s motion.
¶ 12 As relevant on appeal, the court rejected Owner’s argument
that the Association had implicitly approved the application by
failing to take definitive action within thirty days. The court also
concluded that Owner’s contemplated enclosure of the rooftop
patio, and associated improvements, converted the rooftop patio
from a limited common element for the exclusive use of Unit 304
into part of Unit 304. The court also decided that the changes to
Unit 304’s boundaries required a conveyance of the limited common
element to Owner from the Association; such a conveyance, in turn,
required approval by 67% of the other unit owners and 50% of the
first mortgagees. Alternatively, the court concluded that, even if the
improvements did not effectuate a change in the boundaries of Unit
304 or the ownership of the limited common element, the Design
Review Board acted within its reasonable discretion by imposing the
conveyance and voting requirements.
6 ¶ 13 Owner now appeals these portions of the district court’s
judgment,1 along with its determination that the Association was
the prevailing party in the litigation and therefore entitled to an
award of its costs and attorney fees.
II. Analysis
¶ 14 We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
applicable law. We then address the parties’ arguments regarding
the implied approval issues. Finally, we turn to the court’s
conclusions that the improvements amounted to a modification of
Unit 304’s and the limited common element’s boundaries, thus
triggering the transfer and approval conditions, and its related
conclusion that the imposed conditions were reasonable.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 15 C.R.C.P. 56(h) permits a party to move for determination of a
question of law, and the district court may decide the question if
“there is no genuine issue of any material fact necessary for [its]
determination.” Mitton v. Danimaxx of Colo., Inc., 2023 COA 18, ¶ 9
(quoting C.R.C.P. 56(h)). “Under C.R.C.P. 56(c), a party may move
1 Owner does not appeal the district court’s rejection of its waiver
argument, so we do not address that issue further.
7 for, and a court may enter, summary judgment if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Mitton, ¶ 9. “We review
orders under both rules de novo, applying the same standards as
the district court.” Id. (first citing Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2020
CO 73, ¶ 11; and then citing In re Estate of Davies, 2022 COA 90,
¶ 11). When applying the undisputed facts, we draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Timm v.
Reitz, 39 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Colo. App. 2001).
¶ 16 Homeowners’ association (HOA) by-laws and declarations are
contracts. Briargate at Seventeenth Ave. Owners Ass’n v. Nelson,
2021 COA 78M, ¶ 54; see also Swan Creek Vill. Homeowners v.
Warne, 2006 UT 22, ¶ 50 (“[T]he Declaration constitutes a contract
between the HOA and its members and . . . a recorded Declaration
imparts notice of its contractual terms to all who acquire property
subject to it.”).
¶ 17 We review a district court’s interpretation of a contract de
novo, but we defer to the court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. French v. Centura Health Corp., 2022 CO 20,
8 ¶ 24. When interpreting a contract provision, our primary goal is to
give effect to the parties’ intent. Id. ¶ 25.
B. Deemed Approved Claim
¶ 18 Owner argues that the Association “was required to make a
final determination on any design review application ‘no later than
30 days’ after receipt of the completed application.” Because the
Association did not respond within thirty days, Owner’s argument
continues, the Association’s approval must be deemed granted. The
Association contends that Owner’s position misapprehends the
controlling provision of the Declarations and the undisputed facts.
The district court agreed with the Association’s argument. We
discern no error in that ruling.
¶ 19 Section 10.5 of the Declaration articulates the design review
process, with a subsection describing the timing of design review
decisions. The subsection reads, in relevant part, as follows:
The Design [Review Board] shall make a determination on each application after receipt of a completed application with all required information. The Design [Review Board] may permit or require that an application be submitted or considered in stages, in which case a final decision shall not be required until after the final, required submission. . . . The Design [Review Board] shall notify the
9 Applicant in writing of the final determination on any application no later than 30 days after its receipt of a completed application and all required submissions. . . .
If the Design [Review Board] fails to respond to an application within [30 days], approval shall be deemed given.
¶ 20 The Declaration clearly states that the Board may receive an
application in stages and that it will “make a determination . . .
after receipt of a completed application.” Moreover, contrary to
Owner’s contention, the Declaration does not require approval of
the application within thirty days of its original submission, but
rather, within thirty days of the submission of a complete
application and all required submittals. Finally, the “deemed
approved” language is triggered only if the Design Review Board
“fails to respond to an application” within thirty days. (Emphasis
added.)
¶ 21 The district court found, based on undisputed facts, that the
Design Review Board responded to the application or initiated
communications with Owner on August 22 and September 1, 8, and
9, 2022, all within thirty days of the application’s submission. In
the following months, there were numerous communications
10 between Owner and the Design Review Board. Owner did not
upload the final requested documents until January 2023.
Thereafter, the parties agreed to delay the Design Review Board’s
final vote on the application until March 2023. As evidenced by
these communications, the Design Review Board first responded to
the application twelve days after it was submitted and was clearly
working with Owner and keeping it updated on the status of the
application.
¶ 22 Given the clear language of section 10.5 of the Declaration and
the undisputed facts, the district court did not err by rejecting
Owner’s argument that the Association had implicitly approved the
C. Definition of a Unit Applied by the District Court
¶ 23 In evaluating Owner’s claim that CCIOA does not require a
vote of the unit owners and first mortgagees as a condition
precedent to approving the proposed improvements, the district
court grounded its analysis in two different statutory definitions of
a “unit.”
¶ 24 The court, first quoting portions of section 38-33.3-209(2)(g),
began by noting that CCIOA requires a condominium map to
11 evidence “[t]he location, with reference to established data, of the
horizontal boundaries of each unit.” The district court then focused
on a definition of a unit, reasoning as follows:
Describing a unit’s boundaries in both generalized and specific terms is commonplace under Colorado law. See CCIOA [sic] §§ 103(3) and (4) (defining an “individual air space unit” as an “enclosed room” while empowering declaration drafters to include language providing that various other components outside of that “enclosed room” are also part of a unit); see also CCIOA [sic] § 105.5(1)(d) (requiring condominium declaration to describe boundaries of the unit).
The CCIOA [sic] defines a “condominium unit” as “an individualized air space together with the interests in the common elements appurtenant to such a unit.”
¶ 25 The problem with this analysis is that the court said it was
based on the provisions of CCIOA, which provides the statutory
framework for the formation and administration of the Residences.
The statutes the court relied on, however, are not contained in
CCIOA. Rather, they are located in CCIOA’s predecessor: the
Condominium Ownership Act (COA). See §§ 38-33-101 to -113,
C.R.S. 2025.
12 ¶ 26 CCIOA applies to common interest communities created after
July 1, 1992. § 38-33.3-115, C.R.S. 2025. The COA does not apply
to common interest communities created after that date. Id.; see
B.B. & C. P’ship v. Edelweiss Condo. Ass’n, 218 P.3d 310, 315
(Colo. 2009). The Residences was created in 2007. Therefore, the
COA definition of a unit has no relevance to the parties claims
under CCIOA, and the district court clearly erred by applying the
COA’s definition of a unit to this dispute.
¶ 27 This error was not — as the Association asserts — a mere
typographical error or a de minimis passing reference. The COA
definition of a unit weighed heavily in the court’s analysis of
Owner’s CCIOA and breach of contract claims.2 In a section titled
“Application of CCIOA,” the district court returned to its focus on
COA section 38-33-103, C.R.S. 2025:
CCIOA [sic] defines a unit to be an “individualized air space.” Here, [Owner] plans to enclose the [limited common element] with drywall or wood paneling and metal siding. [Owner]’s proposed improvements entail the construction of a roof over the [limited common element, as well as the installation of HVAC equipment to moderate the temperature within the newly created air space. [Owner]
2 Claims three, four, and five in Owner’s “Amended Complaint.”
13 has exclusive use of the [limited common element], and as such, only [Owner] and [its] invitees and licensees have access to and use of the individual air space created by [Owner]’s proposed improvements. Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes that [Owner]’s proposed improvements fall within the definition of “condominium unit” under [section] 38-33-103 because [Owner]’s proposed improvements alter, change, and modify the individual air space of Unit 304.
¶ 28 Ironically, the district court did not cite or apply CCIOA’s
definition of a unit: “‘Unit’ means a physical portion of the common
interest community which is designated for separate ownership or
occupancy and the boundaries of which are described in or
determined from the declaration.” § 38-33.3-103(30), C.R.S. 2025.
Unlike the COA, CCIOA’s definition does not contain any reference
to an “individual air space unit,” § 38-33-103(1), (4)-(5), which
played a central role in the district court’s conclusion that the
proposed improvements would alter the boundaries of Unit 304.
¶ 29 Owner argues that this error was material and impacted the
district court’s disposition of its CCIOA and breach of contract
claims. Specifically, Owner notes that nothing in CCIOA or the
Declaration requires that other unit owners and first mortgagees
approve the enclosure of a limited common element unless the
14 applicant seeks to modify the boundaries of the unit or the limited
common element. Thus, Owner emphasizes that the district court’s
improper reliance on COA’s definition of a unit was essential
because it allowed the district court to apply the “individual air
space” framework which then drove its conclusion that the
proposed improvements would alter the boundaries of Unit 304 and
the associated limited common element.
¶ 30 In a perfunctory analysis, the Association’s answer brief
attempted to dismiss the district court’s repeated references to the
COA definition of a unit as a typographical error or inconsequential
mistake. And the Association asserted that any error is harmless
because “[w]hile the district court’s analysis referred to
‘individualized air space,’ the CCIOA definition can readily be
included in place of the COA definition with no impact on the
district court’s ruling.” But the Association did not perform such
an analysis.
¶ 31 Nonetheless, we may affirm a summary judgment ruling on
any grounds supported by the record, even reasons not decided by
the district court. Roque v. Allstate, Ins. Co., 2012 COA 10, ¶ 7. In
their briefs before the district court, neither party referenced the
15 COA; this is understandable because the district court’s reliance on
the COA was unexpected. Although the parties’ initial appellate
briefs addressed the court’s error in relying on the COA, their
written and oral arguments only briefly addressed whether the
proposed improvements would modify the boundaries of Unit 304
and the associated limited common element under CCIOA and the
terms of the Declaration. So, we asked them to submit
supplemental briefs addressing these issues. We now have the
benefit of those briefs and turn to the merits of that question.
D. Unit Boundaries under CCIOA and the Declaration
¶ 32 Neither party disputes that the court should apply CCIOA’s
definition of a unit, although it differs from the definition provided
in the Declaration. After reviewing both definitions, we conclude
that CCIOA’s definition of a “unit” and the Declaration’s definition
do not necessarily conflict. See § 38-33.3-104, C.R.S. 2025
(“Except as expressly provided in this article, provisions of this
article may not be varied by agreement, and rights conferred by this
article may not be waived. A declarant may not . . . use any . . .
device to evade the limitations or prohibitions of this article or the
declaration.”); Ryan Ranch Cmty. Ass’n v. Kelley, 2016 CO 65, ¶ 25
16 (“[D]ocuments concerning CCIOA common interest communities
must comply with that statute’s provisions; to the extent they
conflict, the statute prevails.”). Having reached this determination,
we move forward with our analysis, grounded in the CCIOA
definition of unit and related CCIOA provisions, but also drawing on
the Declaration’s definition to supplement our analysis.
¶ 33 Recall that, as relevant here, CCIOA defines a “unit” as “a
physical portion of the common interest community which is
designated for separate ownership or occupancy and the
boundaries of which are described in or determined from the
declaration.” § 38-33.3-103(30). A declaration includes associated
plats and maps. § 38-33.3-103(13). The plats and maps describe
“[t]he location and dimensions of the vertical boundaries of each
unit, and [t]he location, with reference to established data, of the
horizontal boundaries of each.” § 38-33.3-209(1)(f)-(g).
¶ 34 Section 38-33.3-103(16.5), defines a “[h]orizontal boundary”
as “a plane of elevation relative to a described bench mark that
defines either a lower or an upper dimension of a unit such that the
real estate respectively below or above the defined plane is not a
part of the unit.” CCIOA defines a “[v]ertical boundary” as “the
17 defined limit of a unit that is not a horizontal boundary of that
unit.” § 38-33.3-103(32).
¶ 35 The Declaration specifies that a unit consists of “enclosed
rooms . . . bounded by the unfinished perimeter walls and windows
thereof.” We read this description as consistent with CCIOA’s
definition of a unit’s vertical boundaries. See § 38-33.3-103(16.5).
The Declaration also includes within the definition of a unit “the
upper surface of the concrete slab at the highest boundary of the
unit . . . [including] any ceiling installed below the underside of the
concrete slab that is the highest boundary of the unit.” This
description is consistent with CCIOA’s definition of a unit’s
horizontal boundary.
¶ 36 With these definitions in mind, we turn to the changes created
by the proposed improvements. Owner proposed enclosing 1,080
square feet of what is currently the uncovered portion of the space
above the existing rooftop of Unit 304. The proposed improvements
involve building vertical exterior walls and creating a new horizontal
boundary through the addition of a new ceiling and rooftop above
the existing roof of Unit 304. Moreover, the improvements include
18 substantial plumbing and electrical components to service the
newly enclosed space.
¶ 37 While Unit 304’s limited common element was already
designated for Owner’s exclusive use, we conclude that enclosing
1,080 square feet of the currently open space with exterior walls,
windows, and a new ceiling and rooftop would manifestly modify the
existing vertical and horizontal boundaries of Unit 304.
¶ 38 Despite these physical realities, the Owner argues that the
improvements will not modify the existing boundaries of Unit 304,
the related common element, or the common elements because it
did not ask or intend to modify the boundaries. But that begs the
question at issue. We may not analyze the improvements’ impact
based on Owner’s subjective intent; rather, we must assess the
improvements’ physical and legal impact on the existing boundaries
of Unit 304 and its limited common element. For the reasons
previously stated, that assessment leads to the conclusion that the
proposed addition would modify those boundaries.
¶ 39 Owner next argues that the Association has previously
approved rooftop improvements by other owners, including the
additions of a pergola and a sauna, which also added exterior walls
19 and roofing to the units’ limited common elements. Owner notes
that the Association did not treat those improvements as
modifications of the existing boundaries or require the type of
approvals it has imposed on Owner’s. So, Owner argues, the
Association should not be permitted to do so here. We reject
Owner’s contention.
¶ 40 First, Owner did not appeal the district court’s determination
that the Association’s past approval, without voting conditions, of
limited patio amenities proposed and built by other units did not
amount to a waiver of its right to impose such conditions here.
Thus, Owner’s attempt to undermine the approval conditions
imposed on it based on past approvals of a pergola or sauna
without conditions is unavailing.
¶ 41 Moreover, the improvements proposed here are not minor
amenities. The scale of a pergola or sauna is materially different
than creating a 1,080-square-foot structure, covered by a new
rooftop at least eleven feet above the current rooftop of the building.
We need not try to decipher the exact point at which the addition of
limited improvements on an existing rooftop becomes a modification
20 of the unit’s boundaries. It is sufficient to resolve this case for us to
conclude that this proposed addition certainly does.
¶ 42 Finally, Owner argues that the proposed improvements would
not change the status quo because the owner of each unit is
currently responsible for maintaining its associated limited common
elements. Even if we accept that assertion as true, CCIOA
nonetheless requires the Association to maintain “[p]roperty
insurance on the common elements . . . [in] the total amount of . . .
not less than the full insurable replacement cost of the insured
property less applicable deductibles at the time the insurance is
purchased and at each renewal date.” § 38-33.3-313(1)(a), C.R.S
2025. The estimated construction cost of the proposed
improvements was $4.4 million. If, as Owner argues, the
improvements would continue as limited common elements, the
other owners — who collectively pay for the cost of insuring the
limited common elements — would be adversely impacted. This too
suggests that the proposed improvements must be treated as a
material modification of the boundaries between Unit 304 and its
limited common element.
21 ¶ 43 These undisputed facts lead to the legal conclusion that the
proposed improvements would modify the existing boundaries of
Unit 304 and its limited common element. Accordingly, the district
court did not err by granting summary judgment in the
Association’s favor on this issue.
E. Conditions of Approval
¶ 44 The Declaration requires 50% of the first mortgagees to
consent to any change in a unit’s boundaries. CCIOA provides that
any transfer of the common elements — which include limited
common elements — must be approved by 67% of the unit owners.
§ 38-33.3-312(1). The Design Review Board approved the proposed
addition subject to the conditions that Owner obtain (1) a transfer
of the entire limited common element associated with Unit 304 from
the Association; (2) the consent of 50% of the first mortgagees; and
(3) the consent of 67% of the unit owners.
¶ 45 Building on its contention that the proposed improvements
would not modify the boundaries of Unit 304 or its limited common
element, Owner argues that it was unreasonable for the Association
to approve the improvements subject to the noted conditions. But
we have already concluded that the proposed addition would modify
22 the boundaries between Unit 304 and its limited common element.
Thus, we perceive no error in the district court’s determination that
the Association’s approval requirements were reasonable.
F. Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 46 Based on its ruling, the district court concluded that the
Association was the prevailing party in this litigation and awarded it
attorney fees and costs. See § 38-33.3-123(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2025
(Subject to a limited exception not applicable here, “[i]n any civil
action to enforce or defend this article 33.3 or the declaration,
bylaws, articles, or rules and regulations, the court shall award
reasonable attorney fees, actual costs, and actual costs of collection
to the prevailing party.”). Thus, we reject Owner’s contention that it
should be awarded attorney fees and costs for the trial court
proceedings or on appeal.
¶ 47 Under section 38-33.3-123(1)(c), the Association is also the
prevailing party on appeal and therefore is entitled to an award of
appellate fees and costs. See Accetta v. Brooks Towers Residences
Condo. Ass’n, 2021 COA 147M2, ¶¶ 50-51. Because the district
court is uniquely suited to undertake the factfinding necessary to
determine such an award, we exercise our discretion and remand to
23 the district court to determine and award the Association its
reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs under C.A.R. 39.1 and
C.A.R. 39(c)(1).
III. Disposition
¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
district court to determine the Association’s award of appellate
attorney fees and costs.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE HARRIS concur.