2800 N. Broad St., LLC v. Com. of PA, DOT

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 2, 2021
Docket925 C.D. 2020
StatusPublished

This text of 2800 N. Broad St., LLC v. Com. of PA, DOT (2800 N. Broad St., LLC v. Com. of PA, DOT) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
2800 N. Broad St., LLC v. Com. of PA, DOT, (Pa. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

2800 N. Broad Street, LLC : : v. : No. 925 C.D. 2020 : ARGUED: June 7, 2021 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : Department of Transportation, : Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge (P) HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: July 2, 2021

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County overruling the Department’s preliminary objections to the petition for appointment of a board of viewers filed by 2800 N. Broad Street, LLC (Condemnee) pursuant to Section 502 of the Eminent Domain Code (Code), 26 Pa.C.S. § 502. We reverse and remand this matter with directions to the trial court to grant Condemnee’s request for appointment of a board of viewers for purposes of ascertaining just compensation for the de jure partial taking of Condemnee’s properties, and to strike Condemnee’s request that the court declare a de facto taking. The relevant background is as follows. In October 2018, the Department filed a declaration of taking for a partial taking of Condemnee’s properties at 3900-18 Richmond Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,1 as a part of the

1 In the declaration of taking and condemnation plan, the Department refers to the properties as Parcel 71. Parcel 71 is a consolidation of the properties at issue. road improvement project for State Route 0095, Section AF3.2 (Decl. of Taking, Schedule of Prop. Condemned at 1; Reproduced R. “R.R.” at 5a.) In addition to a temporary construction easement of 1955 square feet, the partial taking included 1104 square feet from a total of 18,264 square feet. Condemnee did not file preliminary objections to the declaration of taking. In March 2020, Condemnee filed a petition for appointment of a board of viewers seeking damages for the de jure partial taking of its properties under Section 502(a) of the Code and a declaration of a de facto taking of the remainder of its properties under Section 502(c). Specifically, Condemnee contended that the Department’s partial de jure condemnation effected a de facto taking of the entirety of Condemnee’s property interest such that the remainder had no economic value after the condemnation. In support, Condemnee alleged that it had obtained permits, development approvals, and zoning approvals before the declaration of taking to construct fourteen two-family attached dwellings but that the condemnation had rendered development impossible because the entirety of the property was necessary for the planned development.3 (Mar. 18, 2020, Pet. for Appt. of a Bd. of Viewers, ¶¶ 8, 12, and 13; R.R. at 13a-14a.) In preliminary objections, the Department asserted that where there was a declaration of taking, Condemnee erred in asserting a de facto taking in the petition for appointment of a board of viewers. The Department alleged that “[t]he

2 This segment of the project effects a total of 0.187 miles of roadway situated along portions of land adjacent to I-95 and extending along Richmond Street to just beyond the intersection of Wheatsheaf Lane. The purpose of the partial taking is to improve the access ramps from I-95 to the Betsy Ross Bridge. 3 Condemnee asserted that the Philadelphia Zoning Code required off-street parking for the proposed units and that the planned vehicular access was to be via a common drive from Wheatsheaf Lane, a cross street to Richmond Street. (May 11, 2020, Br. of Condemnee in Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 3; R.R. at 76a.)

2 condemnation and filing of a declaration of taking, whether considered a partial or total taking, ‘encompasses’ the entire parcel for purposes of determining just compensation.” (Apr. 20, 2020, Prelim. Objs., ¶ 18; R.R. at 43a.) The Department alleged that only a de jure taking occurred and that any damages were part of and the result of the declaration of taking. It also contended that Condemnee failed to allege or to establish any exceptional circumstances that substantially deprived it of the beneficial use and enjoyment of the properties, other than the declaration of taking. In addition, the Department objected to allegations that any of its actions affected the highest and best use of the properties, including the remainder, other than the declaration of taking. The Department also denied that it prevented Condemnee from developing or using the remainder after the declaration of taking. (Id., ¶¶ 41 and 42; R.R. at 46a.) Accordingly, the Department argued for the dismissal of Condemnee’s de facto taking claims under Section 502(c) of the Code. Without specifically ruling on the Department’s preliminary objections, the trial court granted Condemnee’s petition and ordered an appointment of viewers. Following the Department’s motion for reconsideration asserting, inter alia, that there were factual issues to be determined in an evidentiary hearing,4 the trial court vacated its order and directed the Department to file an answer to Condemnee’s petition within ten days. In the answer, the Department incorporated its preliminary objections, denied the petition’s seminal averments, and demanded strict proof of the averments at an evidentiary hearing. Condemnee’s answer to the preliminary objections followed. Subsequently, the trial court overruled the preliminary objections and, without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluded that a de facto taking had occurred. The Department’s appeal to this Court followed.

4 (June 19, 2020, Mot. for Reconsid., ¶¶ 15 and 17; R.R. at 125a-26a.)

3 The issues before us are as follows:5 1) whether Condemnee erred in filing a petition seeking damages for the de jure partial taking of its properties under Section 502(a) of the Code and a declaration of a de facto taking of the remainder of its properties under Section 502(c), and thus whether the trial court erred in overruling the Department’s preliminary objections as to Section 502(c) of the Code (de facto taking); 2) whether the trial court erred in determining that a de facto taking occurred without holding an evidentiary hearing; and 3) whether Condemnee erred in failing to file preliminary objections to the declaration of taking. I As an initial matter, we note that Condemnee properly filed a petition for a board of viewers to assess damages for the de jure partial taking of its properties under Section 502(a) of the Code. However, that part of the petition seeking a declaration of a de facto taking of the remainder of its properties under Section 502(c) was erroneous. Presumably, Condemnee believed that a de facto claim was needed to assert that the property not included in the declaration of taking had been rendered valueless. This is incorrect. Where there is a declaration of taking filed for a de jure partial taking, damages are determined by considering both the value of the property actually acquired and the damages to the remaining property. In other words, the de jure partial taking of the properties already contemplates damages to the remainder of the property. Condemnee appears to conflate the concept of a de facto taking with the circumstance in which a government action has rendered one’s property valueless. This is a misconception. Just as a de jure taking of a portion of property may (or may not) diminish the value of the remaining portion or render it entirely valueless, a de facto taking may render the property valueless or

5 We have restated and reordered the issues for accuracy and clarity.

4 may simply diminish its value. The difference lies not in the extent of lost value but in the manner in which the value was lost, i.e., by a declaration of taking or by some other action by an entity which has the power of eminent domain.

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Bluebook (online)
2800 N. Broad St., LLC v. Com. of PA, DOT, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/2800-n-broad-st-llc-v-com-of-pa-dot-pacommwct-2021.