25 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1538, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,883 Madeline H. Newman, Pandora D. Baker, Florence G. Middleton, Ruthie S. Backman, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, and Ulhma D. Warren, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Dr. Alton C. Crews, Individually and as Superintendent of the Charleston County School District Keith Thompson, Individually and as a Member and Representative of Members of the Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District, and Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District

651 F.2d 222
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJune 4, 1981
Docket79-1070
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 651 F.2d 222 (25 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1538, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,883 Madeline H. Newman, Pandora D. Baker, Florence G. Middleton, Ruthie S. Backman, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, and Ulhma D. Warren, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Dr. Alton C. Crews, Individually and as Superintendent of the Charleston County School District Keith Thompson, Individually and as a Member and Representative of Members of the Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District, and Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
25 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1538, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,883 Madeline H. Newman, Pandora D. Baker, Florence G. Middleton, Ruthie S. Backman, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, and Ulhma D. Warren, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Dr. Alton C. Crews, Individually and as Superintendent of the Charleston County School District Keith Thompson, Individually and as a Member and Representative of Members of the Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District, and Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District, 651 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1981).

Opinion

651 F.2d 222

25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1538,
26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,883
Madeline H. NEWMAN, Pandora D. Baker, Florence G. Middleton,
Ruthie S. Backman, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, and Ulhma D. Warren, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Appellants,
v.
Dr. Alton C. CREWS, individually and as Superintendent of
the Charleston County School District; Keith Thompson,
individually and as a member and representative of members
of the Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District,
and Board of Trustees, Charleston County School District, Appellees.

No. 79-1070.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 2, 1980.
Decided June 4, 1981.

Ray P. McClain, Charleston, S. C. (McClain & Derfner, Charleston, S. C., on brief) for appellants.

Augustine T. Smythe, Susan Smythe, Charleston, S. C. (Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, Charleston, S. C., on brief) for appellees.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge, FIELD, Senior Circuit Judge, and HALL, Circuit Judge.

HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge:

Since 1945 the South Carolina Board of Education has certified its teachers on the basis of their scores on the National Teacher Examinations ("NTE"). In United States v. South Carolina, 445 F.Supp. 1094 (D.S.C.1977), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 1026, 98 S.Ct. 756, 54 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978), a three-judge district court held that even though prospective black teachers obtained disproportionately low scores on the NTE, the use of those scores for certifying teachers and for determining their salaries violated neither the Constitution nor Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The present case is a close relative of United States v. South Carolina ; the issue is whether the use of certification grades for determining the recipients of a pay raise violates the Constitution or Title VII.

The court in United States v. South Carolina described in detail the certification systems employed in South Carolina since 1945. See 445 F.Supp. at 1101-02. For our purposes, a brief summary is sufficient. From 1945 through 1968, the State Board issued four grades of certificates: A, B, C, and D. In 1969 the State Board began to issue two certificates professional and warrant rather than A, B, C, and D certificates. Warrant teachers were classified administratively with professional certificate holders for their first five years of teaching. If by that time a warrant teacher had not obtained a professional certificate, his salary was frozen at the five-year level. In 1976 the Board again revised the certification system, eliminating prospectively the warrant status and issuing the professional certificate to those who obtained a minimum NTE score or higher.

Teachers are permitted to take the NTE an unlimited number of times. Each teacher retains the certification issued at the time he last took the NTE, despite the subsequent revisions in the certification system. There are, then, practicing teachers certified either as A, B, C, or D; practicing teachers certified either as professional or warrant; and, since 1976, teachers who obtained professional certification as a prerequisite to practice.1 Apparently, A certificate holders, professional certificate holders, and for the first five years of teaching, warrant certificate holders are compensated according to the same pay scale.

Teacher salaries in South Carolina are paid from state funds and local supplements. The formula for state aid to a local school district factors in the types of certificates held by the district's teachers. The local supplement provided by the Charleston County School District has also differentiated among teachers on the basis of certification.

In July 1976 the Board of the Charleston County School District increased the local supplement for all teachers by $300. In December 1976 the Board granted an additional raise to A and professional teachers. Warrant teachers also received the raise, although there is no indication that the Board directed or even discussed their inclusion in the benefitted class. Apparently, the warrant teachers were included because they were classified administratively with A and professional teachers.

The racial composition of A and professional teachers is predominantly white. B and C teachers, as well as warrant teachers, are predominantly black. The statistics reveal that two percent of white teachers and 38.6% of black teachers were denied the pay raise.

Challenging this pay raise, the plaintiffs, representing the class of all Charleston County School District teachers who were denied the pay raise, filed suit against the superintendent and the Board of Trustees of the Charleston County School District. The defendants counter-claimed for declaratory relief. After a nonjury trial,2 the district court entered judgment for the defendants.

Although other claims were raised and rejected below, the plaintiffs on appeal press only two claims. First, the plaintiffs claim that granting the pay raise to A and professional teachers, but not to B and C teachers, violated Title VII. The district court held that this claim was foreclosed by United States v. South Carolina. Second, the plaintiffs claim that granting the pay raise to warrant teachers, but not to B and C teachers whose NTE scores were higher than the minimum score required for warrant status, was so arbitrary as to violate the Constitution. The district court rejected this claim, finding a rational basis for the inclusion of warrant teachers in the benefitted class.

We agree with the district court's conclusions and affirm.

I. The Title VII Claim

The denial of the pay raise had a disproportionate impact on black teachers. The defendants therefore have the burden of proving that the challenged employment practice serves legitimate employment objectives of the school district. United States v. South Carolina, 445 F.Supp. 1094, 1112 (D.S.C.1977), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 1026, 98 S.Ct. 756, 54 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978). See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2728, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2375, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). In Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), this court stated that

the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.

The three-judge district court in United States v.

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