20221208_C361554_22_361554.Opn.Pdf

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 8, 2022
Docket20221208
StatusUnpublished

This text of 20221208_C361554_22_361554.Opn.Pdf (20221208_C361554_22_361554.Opn.Pdf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
20221208_C361554_22_361554.Opn.Pdf, (Mich. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

A. STEVEN PRUIETT and MELANIE PRUIETT, UNPUBLISHED December 8, 2022 Petitioners-Appellants,

v No. 361554 Tax Tribunal TOWNSHIP OF BILLINGS, LC No. 21-002970-TT

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SHAPIRO and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners appeal by right the May 6, 2022 order of the Michigan Tax Tribunal denying the parties’ amended stipulation for entry of consent judgment. Respondent does not oppose petitioners on appeal. To the contrary, the parties agree that the Tax Tribunal’s decision should be reversed so that the parties’ stipulation for a consent judgment, i.e., the parties’ settlement agreement, can be entered. Petitioners argue that the Tax Tribunal erred by denying the parties’ attempts to stipulate to an entry of consent judgment and by sua sponte dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Although we recognize that the parties wish to settle their dispute under the auspices of the Tax Tribunal and see no substantive reason to obstruct such a settlement, we may not reverse because under present law, the Tax Tribunal correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioners’ property bordered Wixom Lake and had 50 feet of waterfront when last assessed. Since that assessment, however, Wixom Lake completely drained after a dam failure in May 2020. This event did not alter the amount and location of petitioners’ property, but the property no longer had a waterfront, a significant factor in the previous valuation. Petitioners alleged their property’s 2021 taxable value was improperly calculated by respondent because it classified the property as waterfront property when, in reality, it had lost this distinction after the lake drained. Respondent had calculated the property’s taxable value at $34,000 based upon the property being classified as lakefront property, which significantly raises its valuation. Petitioners protested respondent’s taxable valuation at the July Board of Review. However, the July Board

-1- declined to consider the protest, concluding that, unlike the March Board of Review, it could not consider a challenge to valuation unless there was a “qualified error” as defined by MCL 211.53b(6)1 and that petitioners had not shown that such an error occurred. Petitioners appealed to the Tax Tribunal, where respondent argued that petitioners could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal based on MCL 205.735a(3), which provides that “for an assessment dispute as to the evaluation or exemption of property, the assessment must be protested before the board of review before the tribunal acquires jurisdiction of the dispute.” (Emphasis added). The Tribunal initially denied each side’s motion for summary disposition, reasoning that it could not rule on respondent’s jurisdictional argument until it determined whether there was a qualified error.

1 A “qualified error” is defined in MCL 211.53b(6) as one or more of the following: (a) A clerical error relative to the correct assessment figures, the rate of taxation, or the mathematical computation relating to the assessing of taxes.

(b) A mutual mistake of fact.

(c) An adjustment under section 27a(4) or an exemption under section 7hh(3)(b).

(d) An error of measurement or calculation of the physical dimensions or components of the real property being assessed.

(e) An error of omission or inclusion of a part of the real property being assessed.

(f) An error regarding the correct taxable status of the real property being assessed.

(g) An error made by the taxpayer in preparing the statement of assessable personal property under section 19.

(h) An error made in the denial of a claim of exemption for personal property under section 9o.

(i) An issue beyond the control of a disabled veteran or his or her unremarried surviving spouse that causes a denial of an exemption under section 7b. An issue beyond the control of a disabled veteran or his or her unremarried surviving spouse means an error made by the local tax collecting unit in the processing of a timely filed exemption affidavit or a delay in the determination by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs that a veteran is permanently and totally disabled as a result of military service and entitled to veterans’ benefits at the 100% rate.

-2- On April 29, 2022, the parties submitted a stipulation for entry of consent judgment, agreeing to a settlement in which the property’s taxable value would be set at $27,850 for 2021 instead of the $34,000 previously assessed. The stipulation stated that the parties agreed that it had been a qualified error for the property to have been “valued as premium lakefront at a rate of $546 per foot of frontage instead of $300 per foot of frontage, the value used by the [respondent] to assess the land in 2022.” On May 2, 2022, the Tax Tribunal denied the stipulation because “the Stipulation does not indicate the specific qualified error or the authority to reduce the property’s TV based on a ‘value loss.’ ”

On May 3, 2022, the parties submitted an amended stipulation stating that respondent’s original taxable valuation of the property in 2021 had been “ ‘an error of measurement or calculation of the physical dimensions or components of the real property being assessed’ under MCL 211.53b[(6)](d)”;2 that, “[f]or the purposes of settlement, the Parties stipulate that this was a qualified error under MCL 211.53b[(6)](d) that should have been corrected at the July Board of Review”; and that, “[m]ore specifically, the taxable value should have been lowered to account for losses resulting from the May 2020 flood.”

Despite its recognition of the fundamental principle that the law favors settlements, the Tribunal concluded that it could not issue such an order because it lacked jurisdiction. The Tribunal determined that there had been no qualified error related to the 2021 assessment and therefore the July Board lacked jurisdiction, which in turn left the Tribunal without jurisdiction. The Tribunal further determined that this case concerned the correction of a property’s valuation and so it needed to be brought before the March Board of Review. Accordingly, the Tribunal declined to enter the parties’ amended stipulation for consent judgment and dismissed the case.

On appeal, petitioners argue, and respondent agrees, that the Tax Tribunal erred by concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to accept the parties’ stipulation.3

“The jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal is granted by statute.” Nicholson v Birmingham Bd of Review, 191 Mich App 237, 239; 477 NW2d 492 (1991). In the absence of statutory authority, the Tribunal lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and “should not proceed further except to dismiss the action.” Electronic Data Sys Corp v Twp of Flint, 253 Mich App 538, 544; 656 NW2d 215 (2002). While stipulations and settlements are strongly encouraged, see Chouman v Home Owners Ins Co, 293 Mich 434, 438; 810 NW2d 88 (2011), the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction, see Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 56; 490 NW2d 568 (1992).

2 The list of qualified errors was previously located in MCL 211.53b(8). After a recent amendment, 2022 PA 141, the qualified errors are now found in MCL 211.53b(6). Because there were no substantive changes, we will refer to the current version of the statute. 3 “Absent fraud, our review of Tribunal decisions is limited to determining whether [the Tribunal] erred in applying the law or adopted a wrong legal principle.” Power v Dep’t of Treasury, 301 Mich App 226, 229-230; 835 NW2d 662 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

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Related

Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Flint Township
656 N.W.2d 215 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2003)
Nicholson v. Birmingham Board of Review
477 N.W.2d 492 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1991)
Bowie v. Arder
490 N.W.2d 568 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1992)
Mikelonis v. Alabaster Township
861 N.W.2d 354 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2014)
Huemiller v. Yellow Truck & Coach Manfg. Co.
292 N.W. 357 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1940)
Michigan Properties, LLC v. Meridian Township
491 Mich. 518 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2012)
International Place Apartments-IV v. Ypsilanti Township
548 N.W.2d 668 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1996)
Chouman v. Home Owners Insurance
810 N.W.2d 88 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2011)
Power v. Department of Treasury
835 N.W.2d 622 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2013)

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