(2003)

88 Op. Att'y Gen. 76
Maryland Attorney General Reports·Decided March 31, 2003·Published

Opinion

Dear Lance W. Billingsley, Esquire

On behalf of the City of Hyattsville, you have requested our opinion whether State law requires the City Council to approve a particular budgetary action by a supermajority vote.

Your inquiry arises out of a proposal during the course of the fiscal year to use money from the City's general fund to cover unanticipated expenditures of the municipal police department. Your inquiry raises two related questions, which we summarize as follows:

(1) Does a supermajority provision in Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 23A,

2(b)(2), apply to this type of proposal and thus make approval contingent on a two-thirds vote?

(2) Assuming that Article 23A, 2(b)(2) applies and that Hyattsville's charter itself does not require a supermajority to approve this type of action, does the supermajority requirement violate the municipal home rule amendment, Article XI-E of the State Constitution?

In our opinion, the answers to these questions are as follows:

(1) Because the Council's action is best characterized as a supplemental appropriation, the supermajority requirement in Article 23A, 2(b)(2) applies.

(2) Article 23A, 2(b)(2) is a public general law, applicable to every municipality governed by Article XI-E of the Constitution, and therefore does not violate the municipal home rule amendment. In any event, the municipal charter and the statute can be construed harmoniously so that no conflict exists.

I.
Background
Hyattsville is a municipal corporation subject to Article XI-E of the State Constitution, commonly referred to as the municipal home rule amendment. The governing body of Hyattsville consists of the mayor and 10 council members. Hyattsville Charter, C2-1, 4 Municipal Charters of Maryland, ch. 78.1 Like charters of numerous municipal corporations throughout the State, the Hyattsville Charter was modeled after former Article 23B of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 2

When it adopted the municipal budget for the current fiscal year, the Hyattsville City Council appropriated specific funding for each department of the municipal government, including the police department. During the course of the fiscal year, a proposal was made to use part of the unreserved fund balance available in the City's general fund to acquire additional vehicles and a rebuilt engine for the police department. A majority of the Council, but fewer than two-thirds of the members, supported the proposal.

You provided us with a detailed analysis arguing that the Council could approve the fund transfer by a simple majority vote. You noted that C5-8 of the Hyattsville Charter provides that "any transfer of funds between major appropriations for different purposes shall be approved by the Council. . . ." You also referred to C2-3(k) as the Charter procedural provision governing such transfers. That section requires "[a]t least six (6) affirmative votes . . . for the passage of . . . ordinances, resolutions, or laws," i.e., a simple majority of the body.

At least one Council member argued that a two-thirds majority vote was required to approve the transfer. You included with your inquiry a letter from the councilman, explaining his position in detail and citing Article 23A, 2(b)(2). That statute provides:

In addition to, but not in substitution of, the powers which have been, or may hereafter be, granted to it, [a municipal] legislative body also shall have the following express ordinance-making powers:

(2) To expend municipal funds for any purpose deemed to be public and to affect the safety, health, and general welfare of the municipality and its occupants, provided that funds not appropriated at the time of the annual levy, shall not be expended, nor shall any funds appropriated be expended for any purpose other than that for which appropriated, except by a two-thirds vote of all members elected to said legislative body.

Article 23A, 2(b)(2) (emphasis supplied).

In your letter, you argued that the supermajority requirement prescribed in Article 23A, 2(b)(2) did not pertain to the Council's action, because the funds had previously been appropriated that is, for unanticipated expenditures and the transfer in question was consistent with that purpose. Furthermore, you suggested that, to the extent Article 23A, 2(b)(2) conflicts with the Hyattsville Charter, it is inconsistent with the principles of municipal home rule. You asked w hether we agree with that analysis.

II
Whether the Supermajority Requirement Applies
We first address whether or not the Council's fund transfer comes within the scope of the supermajority provision of Article 23A, 2(b)(2). That provision applies if the funds in question were "not appropriated at the time of the annual levy" or if the proposed expenditure is "for any purpose other than that for which [the funds were] appropriated."

A. Hyattsville Budget Process

The Hyattsville Charter sets out detailed procedures governing municipal finances.

At least 32 days before the start of the fiscal year, the Mayor, or the Finance Committee Chairman acting at the direction of the Mayor, must submit to the Council a proposed balanced budget, providing a complete financial plan for the municipal government for the following fiscal year. The Council must hold a public hearing on the proposed budget, after which it may either increase or reduce proposed expenditures. If the Council increases spending, it must also provide for increased revenues. The budget must be prepared and adopted in the form of an ordinance by at least a majority of the Council. See Hyattsville Charter, C5-4 through C5-6. Absent an appropriation by the Council, public money may not be spent. Id., C5-7. Under the Charter, any transfer of money between major appropriations for different purposes requires Council approval.

Id., C5-8.

You indicate that the Council allocates excess anticipated revenue,3 including surplus funds available at the close of the prior fiscal year, to the unreserved fund balance in the City's general fund. We understand that this balance is treated as a reserve fund, available to cover unanticipated expenditures during the course of the fiscal year. In other words, surplus revenues apparently are treated as a rainy day account.

However, unlike a nonlapsing reserve fund, if revenue in the general fund is not spent during the fiscal year, it is included as anticipated revenue for the subsequent fiscal year. Charter, C5-10.

You suggest that, to the extent that the Council allocates to the general fund a specific level of anticipated revenue earmarked for unanticipated expenditures at the time the budget is adopted, the Council has in fact "appropriated the money" for a designated purpose i.e., unanticipated expenditures. Thus, you reason, the supermajority requirement of Article 23A, 2(b)(2) simply does not apply to the Council's action to devote those funds to a specific unanticipated expenditure, because the funds have already been appropriated for that purpose.

We respectfully disagree with that conclusion because we do not believe that the allocation of funds to the unreserved balance of the City's general fund is itself an appropriation.

B. What Constitutes an Appropriation

The Court of Appeals has described an "appropriation" as an authorization to disburse funds. City of Annapolis v.

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