(2000)

85 Op. Att'y Gen. 18
Maryland Attorney General Reports·Decided February 7, 2000·Published

Opinion

Dear President Miller,

You have asked for our opinion on the constitutionality of employing statistically adjusted census data — as opposed to the traditional head-count data — in the preparation of State legislative districts. For the reasons detailed below, it is our opinion that the use of such data would be constitutional.

I
Background
A. Development of Statistically Adjusted Census Data

For a variety of reasons, the decennial census of the United States has failed to count the entire population. Following extensive litigation over the 1980 census, the Census Bureau developed a method to estimate the undercount in the census and to adjust the final numbers to reflect the actual population more accurately. This method involves a large sample survey, called the "Post-Enumeration Survey," that is conducted in conjunction with the decennial census. The Bureau compares the information gathered during this survey with information obtained in the

head-count and uses the comparison to estimate the number and characteristics of the people omitted from the head-count. See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 119 S.Ct. 765, 769 (1999).

The Census Bureau has made various decisions about the disclosure and use of the statistically adjusted figures for the 1990 and 2000 enumerations. Those decisions have been challenged in the courts with varying results.

B. 1990 Census

The Census Bureau initially planned to use statistically adjusted figures for the 1990 census. However, the Secretary of Commerce overruled that decision and the Commerce Department planned to rely on the head-count alone.1 Then, in response to a law suit, the Department agreed to have the Census Bureau perform the necessary post-enumeration survey and to consider whether to use the adjusted figures. See City of NewYork v. Department of Commerce, 739 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.N Y 1990). After the survey was done, the Secretary of Commerce determined not to use adjusted figures for the official census numbers and also not to release the adjusted figures, thus rendering them unavailable to those states that desired to use them. Both of those decisions were later upheld by the courts.Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996) (decision not to adjust 1990 census results within the discretion of the Secretary); Senate of the State of California v.Mosbacher, 968 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1992) (Secretary not required to release adjusted data).

C. 2000 Census

In preparation for the 2000 census, the Census Bureau announced that it intended to use adjusted figures for the official census numbers, on the grounds that the adjusted figures would be more accurate than the raw head-count. Members of Congress and others brought court actions to challenge this decision. The Supreme Court held that the Census Act requires the use of the actual head-count data in the apportionment of members of Congress among the states and bars the use of adjusted figures for that purpose. The Court did not reach the issue of whether other uses of adjusted figures would be constitutional. Department ofCommerce v. United States House of Representatives,525 U.S. 316, 119 S.Ct. 765 (1999).

Following that decision, the Secretary of Commerce announced that the Census Bureau would be releasing two sets of figures following the 2000 census: (1) the actual head-count, for use in apportioning the members of Congress among the states, and (2) statistically adjusted figures for other purposes, including redistricting and the allocation of federal funds. Statement of U.S. Secretary of Commerce William M. Daley on Plan for Census 2000 (February 24, 1999).

You ask whether there is a constitutional impediment to the State's using the Census Bureau's adjusted figures for redistricting.

II
Analysis
A. Standard for Use of Alternate Figures

A 1991 opinion of this Office concluded that use of statistically adjusted census data for State redistricting is constitutionally permissible so long as the data are reasonably have a "high degree of accuracy" accurate and are used consistently throughout the State. 76 Opinions of theAttorney General 209 (1991). That opinion concluded that neither the State Constitution nor the federal constitution requires use of head-count census figures for legislative redistricting,2 and that the use of other measures is permissible so long as they are sufficiently accurate to allow the State to comply with the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote. Noting the Secretary of Commerce's refusal to release the 1990 adjusted figures and his statement, with specific reference to Maryland and Baltimore City, that those figures were less accurate than the head-count, the opinion questioned whether the requisite showing could be made that the adjusted figures were superior to the head-count.

To date, there have been no cases assessing the actual use of statistically adjusted census data for State redistricting because no such data have yet been available for that purpose. However, cases arising out of the controversy over the 1990 census suggest that the conclusion of the 1991 opinion of this Office remains valid.

Subsequent to the 1991 opinion, a number of courts addressed the authority of states to make use of alternate data for state redistricting. For example, in City of Detroit v.Franklin, 4 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (6th Cir. 1993), cert.denied, 510 U.S. 1176 (1994), the Sixth Circuit concluded that neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court's decisions concerning state redistricting require the states to use only unadjusted census figures, but simply the "best census data available" in their attempts to create districts of substantially equal population. Similarly, in Senate of the State ofCalifornia v. Mosbacher, 968 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1992) the Ninth Circuit held that "[i]f the State knows that the census data is underrepresentative, it can, and should, utilize noncensus data in addition to the official count in its redistricting process. It is the State's responsibility, not the Secretary's, to satisfy the mandates of the Voting Rights Act." (citations omitted).

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Related

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler
394 U.S. 526 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Franklin v. Massachusetts
505 U.S. 788 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Wisconsin v. City of New York
517 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Senate Of The State Of California v. Mosbacher
968 F.2d 974 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
City of New York v. United States Department of Commerce
739 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. New York, 1990)
Latino Political Action Committee, Inc. v. City of Boston
568 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Massachusetts, 1983)
City of Detroit v. Franklin
4 F.3d 1367 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
Daly v. Hunt
93 F.3d 1212 (Fourth Circuit, 1996)
Senate of California v. Mosbacher
968 F.2d 974 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)