1661 Corp. v. Tomlinson

247 F. Supp. 936, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5685, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7422
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 16, 1965
DocketNo. 64-171-Civ-J
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 247 F. Supp. 936 (1661 Corp. v. Tomlinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
1661 Corp. v. Tomlinson, 247 F. Supp. 936, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5685, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7422 (M.D. Fla. 1965).

Opinion

McRAE, District Judge.

This is a suit for refund of income taxes and interest claimed by plaintiff to have been illegally and erroneously assessed against and collected from plaintiff by defendant for the years 1960, 1961 and 1962.

Upon audit by defendant of plaintiff’s income tax return for each of these years, a claimed deduction for interest paid or accrued on debentures issued by plaintiff to its stockholders was disallowed on the grounds that the debentures represented capital contributions and not loans made by the stockholders to the corporation, and that the payments or accruals accordingly constituted a reduction in capital and not the payment or accrual of interest.

The sole question for determination, as has been stipulated by the parties, is whether or not the cash advances in the amount of $138,400.00 made to plaintiff by its stockholders constitute “indebtedness” within the meaning of Section 163 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Section 163(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:

“(a) General rule. — There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness.”

Most of the material facts of this case are set forth in a comprehensive stipulation between the parties which was filed in evidence as plaintiff’s Exhibit A.

In summary, plaintiff was chartered under the laws of Florida as a corporation for profit on December 12, 1955, for the primary purpose of constructing, owning and operating a professional office building in Jacksonville, Florida, for the benefit of its stockholders. By the terms of its charter, plaintiff was authorized to borrow money and generally to do everything necessary for the accomplishment of its primary purpose.

The authorized capital stock of the corporation, as provided by an amend[937]*937ment to the charter, was 560 shares with par value of $100.00 each.

At the organizational meeting of the corporation, subscriptions were received for 180 shares of its stock, and at the same time each stockholder agreed to lend to the corporation $400.00 for each share subscribed, such loans to bear interest at the rate of 7% per annum with the principal to be payable after discharge of the corporation’s indebtedness incurred for the construction of its building. It was also agreed at the organizational meeting that all persons occupying space in the building be required to enter into leases with the corporation, upon such terms and conditions as might be determined by the board of directors.

Following the organizational meeting, the stockholders had other meetings to discuss plans for the building and its financing, and each subscribed for additional stock and made loans to the corporation in the same proportion as the initial subscriptions and loans. A construction loan of $250,000.00, with interest at 5%%, was also obtained from Knight, Orr & Company and a permanent first mortgage loan was obtained from Aetna Life Insurance Company for $275,000.00, with interest at 5%%, amortized over a term of 18 years. Furthermore, a second mortgage loan was obtained from Foremost Properties, Inc., for $40,000.00, with interest at 6%, payable within 10 years, a $9,000.00 unsecured loan was obtained from The Atlantic National Bank, and $4,500.00 in loans were obtained from each of two stockholders. Unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain additional loans from outside sources.

At a directors’ meeting in February 1957, a “Stockholder’s Loan Sinking Fund” was established, into which surplus earnings to the extent of $10,000.-00 per year, if available, would be deposited. This Fund was to be used for repayment of the stockholder loans.

In August 1957, the directors authorized the issuance of the corporation’s debentures as evidence of and security for the stockholders’ loans. These debentures were to be payable on or before 19 years after date, with interest at 7% per annum, payable semi-annually, and to accumulate if not paid. No dividends were to be paid on the common stock so long as any interest on the debentures remained unpaid. The debentures were secured by a pledge of the full faith and credit of the corporation and by a pledge of the building rentals to the extent that such rentals were not previously pledged or assigned as security for mortgage loans, and were also secured by a pledge of any funds in the “Stockholder’s Loan Sinking Fund.”

During the years herein involved, 346 shares of $100.00 per value stock were outstanding in the hands of 15 stockholders, and debentures held by these stockholders were in the total amount of $138,-400.00. The construction loan of $250,-000.00, the second mortgage loan of $40,-000.00, the $9,000.00 Atlantic National Bank loan, and the two $4,500.00 loans made by the two stockholders were all previously paid, leaving outstanding only the $275,000.00 first mortgage loan and the debentures.

The deductibility of the interest on these debentures presents the question involved in this case. The answer to this question hinges upon whether or not the advances made to the corporation by its stockholders, as evidenced by the corporation’s 19-year debentures, were contributions to capital as contended by defendant or were loans as contended by plaintiff. If the advances were in fact loans, the interest paid or accrued thereon is deductible; but if the advances represent contributions to capital, they are not deductible.

Numerous courts have been faced with this problem in recent years, reaching various and sometimes even conflicting results. Fortunately, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and even this Court, have considered the problem in cases which appear to give reliable guidelines for determination of the present case.

In Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963), the Court laid [938]*938down the following criteria to be considered in determining this question:

“ ‘There are at least eleven separate determining factors generally used by the courts in determining whether amounts advanced to a corporation constitute equity capital or indebtedness. They are (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments ; (4) the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out of “dividend” money; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions.’ O. H. Kruse Grain & Milling Co. v. Commissioner [of Internal Revenue], 9th Cir. 1960, 279 F.2d 123, 125. See Mertens Federal Income Taxation § 26.10c.”

Applying these criteria to the present case, we find:

1. Name. The instruments evidencing the indebtedness are called “debentures”, and are in form and substance debentures. All references in the corporation’s minutes and books of account are to “loans.”

2. Maturity Date. The debentures have a definite maturity date, to-wit, 19 years after date.

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247 F. Supp. 936, 16 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5685, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7422, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/1661-corp-v-tomlinson-flmd-1965.