14-25 117

CourtBoard of Veterans' Appeals
DecidedMarch 23, 2018
Docket14-25 117
StatusUnpublished

This text of 14-25 117 (14-25 117) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Veterans' Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
14-25 117, (bva 2018).

Opinion

Citation Nr: 1817425 Decision Date: 03/23/18 Archive Date: 04/03/18

DOCKET NO. 14-25 117 ) DATE ) )

On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Waco, Texas

THE ISSUES

1. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

2. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD.

REPRESENTATION

Veteran represented by: Texas Veterans Commission

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

S. Patel, Associate Counsel

INTRODUCTION

The Veteran served on active duty from September 1988 to September 1992.

This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an April 2011 rating decision by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO).

The claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder was originally adjudicated as a claim for PTSD. The record reflects the Veteran has been diagnosed with dysthymic disorder and depressive disorder. See April 2011 and September 2011 VA Examinations. Thus, the Veteran's claim for has been recharacterized as shown on the title page. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009).

The reopened claim of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD is REMANDED to the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) and will be addressed in that portion of the decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD was previously denied by a May 2008 rating decision; the Veteran did not appeal the decision and VA was not in actual or constructive receipt of documentation constituting new and material evidence within the one-year appeal period.

2. Additional evidence received since the May 2008 rating decision is not cumulative or redundant of the evidence of record at the time of that decision, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The May 2008 rating decision denying service connection for PTSD is final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.201, 20.302, 20.1103 (2017).

2. New and material evidence has been received to reopen the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156 (2017).

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A claim for service connection for PTSD was originally denied in a May 2008 rating decision on the basis that the Veteran did not claim any specific stressor and there was no current PTSD diagnosis. The RO notified the Veteran of its decision, and of his appellate rights. The Veteran did not appeal the decision, nor did he submit any new and material evidence within a year following the decision; therefore, the decision became final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(c); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156, 20.200, 20.201, 20.302, 20.1103. Accordingly, the claim may now be considered on the merits only if new and material evidence has been received since the time of the prior adjudication. 38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a); Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Generally, a claim which has been denied may not thereafter be reopened and allowed based on the same record. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7105. However, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5108, if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the VA Secretary shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim.

New evidence is defined as existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers. Material evidence is defined as existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. Id. In determining whether evidence is new and material, the credibility of the new evidence must be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510 (1992).

The threshold for determining whether new and material evidence raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating a claim is "low." See Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010).

Evidence added to the record since May 2008 rating decision includes additional details regarding stressors and diagnoses of dysthymic disorder and depressive disorder. The evidence is new as it is not cumulative or redundant of the evidence of record at the time of that decision. It is also material, as it relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim (specifically, details regarding stressors), and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. Accordingly, the claim is reopened.

ORDER

New and material evidence having been received, the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD is reopened; to this extent only the appeal is granted.

REMAND

The record includes reports of VA examinations conducted in April and September 2011, but those examinations are inadequate to decide the claim. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007).

Both examiners answered "no" to whether the Veteran met the PTSD diagnostic criterion of having been exposed to a traumatic event as defined, but the RO essentially conceded the stressor (combat) in the September 2011 rating action on appeal. Thus, to the extent that the examiners appear to have discounted the occurrence of a stressor, the basis of the opinions is inaccurate.

The examinations included diagnoses of dysthymic disorder with mixed emotional features (April 2011) and depressive disorder (September 2011) but each examiner determined these conditions were "attributable" to the Veteran's substance abuse issues. Given the need for a new opinion on the issue of whether the Veteran meets the diagnostic criteria for PTSD, the question of whether any other acquired psychiatric disorder is related to service must be addressed also.

Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following actions:

1. Obtain the names and addresses of all medical care providers who treated the Veteran for psychiatric complaints since January 2013.

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Related

James P. Barr v. R. James Nicholson
21 Vet. App. 303 (Veterans Claims, 2007)
William N. Clemons v. Eric K. Shinseki
23 Vet. App. 1 (Veterans Claims, 2009)
William Shade v. Eric K. Shinseki
24 Vet. App. 110 (Veterans Claims, 2010)
Justus v. Principi
3 Vet. App. 510 (Veterans Claims, 1992)
Kutscherousky v. West
12 Vet. App. 369 (Veterans Claims, 1999)

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14-25 117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/14-25-117-bva-2018.