14‐1348‐cv(L) United States v. Naranjo
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of April, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT: CHESTER J. STRAUB, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v. 14‐1348‐cr(L), 14‐1406‐cr(CON), LUPERIO NARANJO, SR., JOVER NARANJO, 14‐2503‐cr(CON) Defendants‐Appellants.
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FOR APPELLEE: ANDREW BEATY, Margaret Garnett, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT JOHN BURKE, Law Office of John Burke, LUPERIO NARANJO, SR.: Brooklyn, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT LLOYD EPSTEIN, Epstein & Weil, LLC, New JOVER NARANJO: York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Rakoff, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Following a jury trial in the district court, defendants‐appellants Luperio
Naranjo, Sr., and Jover Naranjo were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud,
mail fraud, conspiracy to commit witness tampering, witness tampering, and
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1341, 1512(k), 1512(b), and
1028A(a)(1), respectively. Jover Naranjo was also convicted of making false statements
to the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Luperio Naranjo, Sr., appeals a
judgment entered April 23, 2014, sentencing him principally to 48 monthsʹ
imprisonment. Jover Naranjo appeals a judgment sentencing him principally to 72
monthsʹ imprisonment, entered the same day. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with
the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
Defendants principally argue that they did not commit aggravated
identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A and their convictions should be reversed because
the government failed to prove that 1) they used another personʹs identity by
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pretending to be that person or received benefits otherwise intended for that person,
and 2) they used another personʹs identity without that individualʹs consent to the
unlawful use. ʺ[W]hile cast in terms of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,ʺ
this argument ʺis in essence a claim that the District Court erred by failing to instruct
the juryʺ that the government was required to prove additional elements. United States
v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004).
Titled ʺAggravated identity theft,ʺ 18 U.S.C. § 1028A provides as follows:
Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.
Subsection (c) includes mail fraud as a predicate offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5).
Defendants ran a demolition company that systematically underpaid its
workers ‐‐ primarily undocumented immigrants ‐‐ in violation of federal law. Their
scheme to avoid detection involved filing false payroll documents that used the names
of friends and family members instead of the workersʹ real names. The district court
instructed the jury that, to find defendants guilty under § 1028A, the government had to
prove that they ʺused, transferred or possessed the means of identification in
connectionʺ with the substantive offense, and that defendants acted ʺwithout lawful
authority,ʺ that is, used the identification ʺwithout the consent or knowledge of the
personʺ or used ʺthe identification in furtherance of a crime even with the personʹs
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consent.ʺ SJA 227. Defendants did not object to this instruction, nor did they argue
that their conduct was not covered by the statute or that it was ambiguous.
The government contends, and we agree, that defendants failed to
preserve this error for review by not objecting to the jury instructions or otherwise
challenging the applicability of the statute. Therefore, we review for plain error. See
United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). ʺFor plain error, we must find (1)
error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights; if these three conditions are
met, we have discretion to notice the forfeited error only if (4) the error seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.ʺ United States v.
Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 180 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010).
For an error to be ʺplainʺ it must be ʺclear or obvious, rather than subject
to reasonable dispute.ʺ Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). An error is not
clear or obvious ʺin the absence of binding precedent, where there is a genuine dispute
among the other circuits.ʺ Whab, 355 F.3d at 158.1
In this circuit, there is no binding precedent governing the issue of how
§ 1028A should be interpreted, or whether the government is required to prove that the
individuals did not consent to the unlawful use of their identities. The majority of other
circuits that have considered the questions raised by defendants have adopted the
1 Contrary to defendantsʹ contention, United States v. Draper, 553 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2009), does not suggest otherwise. In Draper, we recognized plain error where the jury instructions ʺfailed to set out what the statute and this Circuitʹs case law clearly require the government to also prove.ʺ Id. at 180‐81 (emphasis added).
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governmentʹs interpretation.2 Only the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held ‐‐ on
different grounds ‐‐ that § 1028A is ambiguous when applied to similar conduct. United
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14‐1348‐cv(L) United States v. Naranjo
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of April, two thousand sixteen.
PRESENT: CHESTER J. STRAUB, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v. 14‐1348‐cr(L), 14‐1406‐cr(CON), LUPERIO NARANJO, SR., JOVER NARANJO, 14‐2503‐cr(CON) Defendants‐Appellants.
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
FOR APPELLEE: ANDREW BEATY, Margaret Garnett, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT JOHN BURKE, Law Office of John Burke, LUPERIO NARANJO, SR.: Brooklyn, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT LLOYD EPSTEIN, Epstein & Weil, LLC, New JOVER NARANJO: York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Rakoff, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Following a jury trial in the district court, defendants‐appellants Luperio
Naranjo, Sr., and Jover Naranjo were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud,
mail fraud, conspiracy to commit witness tampering, witness tampering, and
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1341, 1512(k), 1512(b), and
1028A(a)(1), respectively. Jover Naranjo was also convicted of making false statements
to the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Luperio Naranjo, Sr., appeals a
judgment entered April 23, 2014, sentencing him principally to 48 monthsʹ
imprisonment. Jover Naranjo appeals a judgment sentencing him principally to 72
monthsʹ imprisonment, entered the same day. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with
the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
Defendants principally argue that they did not commit aggravated
identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A and their convictions should be reversed because
the government failed to prove that 1) they used another personʹs identity by
‐ 2 ‐
pretending to be that person or received benefits otherwise intended for that person,
and 2) they used another personʹs identity without that individualʹs consent to the
unlawful use. ʺ[W]hile cast in terms of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,ʺ
this argument ʺis in essence a claim that the District Court erred by failing to instruct
the juryʺ that the government was required to prove additional elements. United States
v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004).
Titled ʺAggravated identity theft,ʺ 18 U.S.C. § 1028A provides as follows:
Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.
Subsection (c) includes mail fraud as a predicate offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5).
Defendants ran a demolition company that systematically underpaid its
workers ‐‐ primarily undocumented immigrants ‐‐ in violation of federal law. Their
scheme to avoid detection involved filing false payroll documents that used the names
of friends and family members instead of the workersʹ real names. The district court
instructed the jury that, to find defendants guilty under § 1028A, the government had to
prove that they ʺused, transferred or possessed the means of identification in
connectionʺ with the substantive offense, and that defendants acted ʺwithout lawful
authority,ʺ that is, used the identification ʺwithout the consent or knowledge of the
personʺ or used ʺthe identification in furtherance of a crime even with the personʹs
‐ 3 ‐
consent.ʺ SJA 227. Defendants did not object to this instruction, nor did they argue
that their conduct was not covered by the statute or that it was ambiguous.
The government contends, and we agree, that defendants failed to
preserve this error for review by not objecting to the jury instructions or otherwise
challenging the applicability of the statute. Therefore, we review for plain error. See
United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). ʺFor plain error, we must find (1)
error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights; if these three conditions are
met, we have discretion to notice the forfeited error only if (4) the error seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.ʺ United States v.
Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 180 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010).
For an error to be ʺplainʺ it must be ʺclear or obvious, rather than subject
to reasonable dispute.ʺ Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). An error is not
clear or obvious ʺin the absence of binding precedent, where there is a genuine dispute
among the other circuits.ʺ Whab, 355 F.3d at 158.1
In this circuit, there is no binding precedent governing the issue of how
§ 1028A should be interpreted, or whether the government is required to prove that the
individuals did not consent to the unlawful use of their identities. The majority of other
circuits that have considered the questions raised by defendants have adopted the
1 Contrary to defendantsʹ contention, United States v. Draper, 553 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2009), does not suggest otherwise. In Draper, we recognized plain error where the jury instructions ʺfailed to set out what the statute and this Circuitʹs case law clearly require the government to also prove.ʺ Id. at 180‐81 (emphasis added).
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governmentʹs interpretation.2 Only the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held ‐‐ on
different grounds ‐‐ that § 1028A is ambiguous when applied to similar conduct. United
States v. Miller, 734 F.3d 530, 542 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Spears, 729 F.3d 753,
757‐58 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
While in the rare case we may find plain error ʺwhere this circuit has not
previously spoken on an issue and there is no discernible consensus among other
circuits,ʺ United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 665 n.10 (2d Cir. 2003), such circumstances
are not present here. Because the majority of other circuits have concluded that § 1028A
unambiguously includes the conduct at issue here, we cannot say that that any error
was ʺso egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in
permitting it, despite the defendantʹs failure to object.ʺ Brown, 352 F.3d at 664‐665
(quoting United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 42‐43 (2d Cir. 1998)). The district courtʹs
decision to instruct the jury in a way that conforms with most circuitsʹ interpretation of
the statute was not plainly erroneous.
Therefore, without reaching the merits of whether the district court erred
in its instructions, we affirm because the error ‐‐ if there was one ‐‐ was not ʺclear or
2 See United States v. Osuna‐Alvarez, 788 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 283 (Oct. 5, 2015); United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 434, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Lumbard, 706 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ozuna‐Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 498‐99 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Retana, 641 F.3d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 605‐07 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 607 (11th Cir. 2007) abrogated on other grounds by Flores‐Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009); see also United States v. Carrion‐Brito, 362 F. Appʹx 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
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obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.ʺ Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; see also
Whab, 355 F.3d at 158; Brown, 352 F.3d at 664‐65.
We have considered all of defendantsʹ additional arguments and find
them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
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