114 College St. Permit Amendment

Vermont Superior Court·Decided December 14, 2007·No. 227-09-06 Vtec·Published

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} 114 College Street Permit Amendment } Docket No. 227-09-06 Vtec (re additional 20-space parking waiver) } (Appeal of McGrew, et al.) } }

Decision and Order

Appellants Barbara McGrew, Daniel Fivel, Jowall Limited Partnership, and Leonora,

LLC appealed from a decision of the Burlington Development Review Board regarding a

mixed residential and commercial project proposed for property located at 114 College

Street in Burlington. Appellants McGrew, Fivel, and Jowall Limited Partnership are

represented by Norman C. Williams, Esq. and Ross A. Feldmann, Esq.; Appellant Leonora,

LLC is represented by Robert C. Roesler, Esq.; Appellee-Applicant Investors Corporation

of Vermont is represented by Christina Jensen, Esq.; and the City of Burlington is

represented by Kimberlee J. Sturtevant, Esq.

Appellee-Applicant’s Motion to Dismiss Leonora, LLC as a Party

The Court ruled in Docket No. 199-10-04 Vtec that only Leonora, Inc. had party

status regarding issues affecting on-site circulation and access to the adjacent street

network, and that Appellants McGrew, Fivel, and Jowall Limited Partnership have party

status only on issues relating to the potential height of (and rooftop structures on) the

project building, and therefore its visibility potentially affecting their property at the corner

1 of St. Paul Street and Bank Street.1 In a decision issued on April 20, 2007 in the present

appeal, the Court denied Appellee-Applicant’s motion to dismiss the appeal, stating that

“[e]ven if Appellants McGrew, Fivel, and Jowall Limited Partnership were dismissed2 as

to the same issues as in Docket No. 199-10-04 Vtec, Appellee-Applicant’s motion to dismiss

the appeal for lack of standing would have to be denied on the basis that Appellant

Leonora LLC has standing to raise those issues.” Appellee-Applicant has now moved to

dismiss Appellant Leonora LLC, claiming that it lacks standing to proceed with this appeal.

Contrary to Appellants’ argument, a party’s standing or party status may be raised

at any time, if circumstances change so as to raise an issue of whether a party has become

divested of standing, as a party’s standing to proceed with the case may be jurisdictional.

See In re Appeal of Garen, 174 Vt. 151, 153–54 (2002); Town of Washington v. Emmons,

2007 VT 22, ¶6. For example, a party may lose standing by selling property or by moving

away from the neighborhood of the project. Similarly, a group party of ten citizens (having

standing under 24 V.S.A. §4465(b)(4)) may lose standing if one of its members withdraws

from the appeal. The issue of whether Leonora, LLC, lacks standing to continue with this

appeal is therefore properly before the Court.

Appellee-Applicant has not shown any reason to divest Leonora LLC of its standing.

Beyond the issue of height as it may be affected by the number of residential units in the

building, Leonora LLC has an interest in the parking regime for all the parking in the

1 Contrary to the characterization of them in their memorandum as adjoining property owners (across St. Paul Street), their building is not located directly across St. Paul Street from the project property. It is instead at the northerly end of the block, across from unrelated property at the corner of St. Paul and Bank Streets. In addition, a church is located on the westerly side of St. Paul Street between the project property and that unrelated building at the corner of Bank Street. 2 Those Appellants have not been dismissed as to those issues to date in the present appeal.

2 buildings on the neighboring merged property, including as to whether existing spaces that

are now informally available to the public will become unavailable for public use, as well

as to preserve the availability of the spaces to which it is entitled under its predecessor’s

1984 agreement. It also has an interest in the adequacy of circulation into and out of the

building from the adjoining street network, even though the alternate spaces under

consideration in the new waiver proposal have access from College Street rather than

exiting directly onto Pine Street.

Accordingly, Appellee-Applicant’s Motion to Dismiss Leonora LLC is DENIED.

Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony

At trial, Appellants renewed their motion to exclude the evidence of Mr.

Chamberlin, whose testimony taken subject to the later briefing of the motion.

That motion is DENIED, as Mr. Chamberlin possesses sufficient expert qualifications

to testify as an expert on parking and traffic management issues, as his testimony meets the

standards of V.R.E. 702, despite the hearsay nature of some of the information on which

he based his testimony. V.R.E. 703. However, in reaching its decision on the merits of the

present appeal, we must note that the Court did not find persuasive Mr. Chamberlin’s

testimony relating to the characteristics of commercial parking garages or garages outside

Vermont, especially those in Boston and in San Diego, because the out-of-state evidence

was insufficiently comparable to the subject proposal. In particular, the parking required

for the proposed project is to serve a multi-unit residential building in the same complex

as the parking facility. Unlike the Boston facilities it is not a free-standing commercial

parking garage in which spaces are leased independently of the parking requirements for

the residential units. In addition, unlike the San Diego examples, the parking necessary to

serve the proposed project must function during snow conditions when there may be an

overnight ban on on-street parking on certain streets or in certain areas.

3 Motion for Judgment based on Issue Preclusion and/or Res Judicata

At trial, Appellants moved for judgment as a matter of law “based on issue

preclusion and/or res judicata;” the trial proceeded subject to the later briefing of the

motion.

The single remaining question on the merits of the present appeal is whether

Appellee-Applicant is entitled to a waiver of twenty additional parking spaces, beyond the

waiver of thirty spaces approved in Docket No. 199-10-04 Vtec. In Docket No. 199-10-04

Vtec, now on appeal to the Supreme Court, this Court had approved almost all aspects of

the proposed project,3 but determined that the proposed parking arrangements only

supported a parking waiver for thirty of the fifty parking spaces otherwise required under

the ordinance.

The Court therefore conditioned its approval of the remainder of the project on

Appellee-Applicant’s obtaining additional approvals from the DRB, and granted a partial

remand to the DRB for that purpose. The Court ordered in pertinent part as follows:

As a waiver is only granted [by the Court decision] of thirty of the required spaces . . . , Appellee-Applicant shall obtain approval from the DRB either of additional waivers, or of revised parking plans showing additional parking spaces, either within the proposed building or as alterations to any other structures on the merged property, sufficient to meet the parking requirements discussed in this decision.

In re Appeal of McGrew, Docket No. 199-10-04 Vtec, slip op. at 19 (Vt. Envtl. Ct., Mar. 3,

2006). In its proceedings on remand, the DRB again granted a parking waiver for the

additional twenty parking spaces, and Appellants have again appealed in the present

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