111 Salvage, LLC v. Metro East Sanitary District

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250727-U NOTICE Decision filed 07/28/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0727 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

111 SALVAGE, LLC, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 24-LA-1104 ) METRO EAST SANITARY DISTRICT and MIKE ) NORDSTROM in his capacity as Executive ) Director of METRO EAST SANITARY DISTRICT, ) Honorable ) Sarah D. Smith, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hackett and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The dismissal of plaintiff’s action is affirmed where plaintiff failed to comply with the notice provisions of section 1-5 of the Metro East Sanitary District Act (70 ILCS 2905/1-5 (West 2024)).

¶2 Plaintiff, 111 Salvage, LLC (111 Salvage), appeals from the circuit court order granting

the defendants’ motion to dismiss, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the

discovery rule to the notice provision in section 1-5 of the Metro-East Sanitary District Act of 1974

(Act) (70 ILCS 2905/1-5 (West 2022)). For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 19, 2024, plaintiff, 111 Salvage, LLC, filed a two-count complaint against

defendants, Metro East Sanitary District (MESD) and Mike Nordstrom in his capacity as Executive 1 Director of the MESD, for damages that resulted from a fire on plaintiff’s property at 2188 State

Route 111, Granite City, Illinois. The complaint provided the following allegations. MESD owned

property at 1800 Edison Ave., Granite City, Illinois, which was adjacent to plaintiff’s property.

On or about August 20, 2023, the Madison Fire Department and other fire districts responded to a

report of a fire at plaintiff’s property. Upon arrival, first responders found multiple cars on fire and

the fire. After two days of applying suppression techniques, the Madison Fire Department, and the

other agencies, eventually controlled the fire. The Madison Fire Department was unable to

determine the cause of the fire. On March 29, 2024, plaintiff received a letter from the Illinois

Environmental Protection Agency, indicating an intent to pursue legal action for the environmental

effects caused by the suppression techniques used to extinguish the fire at its property. The

complaint stated, “As a result of this correspondence, and an attempt to determine the cause of the

fire beyond the Madison Fire District’s inability to determine the cause, [plaintiff] began its own

investigation into the cause of the fire.”

¶5 Plaintiff’s complaint further alleged that on August 18, 2023, due to the abnormally dry

conditions, Madison County issued a no burn order. As such, MESD owed a duty of care to

plaintiff as an adjoining landowner who may have been impacted by a violation of the burn order.

The complaint asserted that MESD violated such duty on August 18, 2024, when MESD, its

agents, employees, and others at its direction, were engaged in the burning of driftwood, trash,

debris, and other objects on its property immediately adjacent to plaintiff’s property (burn site).

The burn operation was part of a pattern and practice of burning unwanted items that continued

for multiple administrations. The complaint contended further violation of the duty occurred when

MESD, its agents, employees, and others at its direction, left the burn site unattended from and

after August 18, 2023, without ensuring that the fire was completely extinguished. The fire, along

2 with parts and embers therefrom, spread from the burn site to the cars located on plaintiff’s

property, ignited the stack of vehicles at that location, and lead to a significant fire that required

response and suppression. Plaintiff suffered economic loss from the property consumed in the fire

and the remediation required after the fire suppression efforts. The first count was based on a

theory of negligence, and plaintiff requested an amount in excess of $50,000, plus costs of suit and

other such relief as the court deemed just and proper.

¶6 The second count of the complaint alleged intentional trespass. It incorporated the previous

allegations and further alleged that MESD’s agents, employees, and others at its direction intended

to burn driftwood, trash, debris, and other objects at the burn site on August 18, 2023. The fire,

parts and embers therefrom, at the burn site spread from the burn site to the cars located on

plaintiff’s property, despite the absence of plaintiff’s permission to cause fire to spread to its

property. Plaintiff requested an amount in excess of $50,000, plus costs of suit and for such further

relief as the court deems just and proper.

¶7 On September 16, 2024, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant

to sections 2-619(a)(5) and (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5), (9) (West

2024)). The motion stated that section 1-5 of the Act required plaintiff to notify MESD of its

alleged damages “within 6 months after the occurrence of the damage or injury.” It argued plaintiff

failed to timely notify MESD of its damages and therefore plaintiff’s suit for property damage

against defendants must be dismissed with prejudice.

¶8 On December 13, 2024, plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion to dismiss. The

response argued, inter alia, that defendants’ argument mistakenly assumed that plaintiff should

have reasonably known its injury was caused by defendants on August 22, 2023. Citing the

discovery rule—which tolls the start of a statute of limitations period until the injured party

3 reasonably should know that the injury was wrongfully caused (Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88

Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981))—the response contended that section 1-5’s notice provision began once

plaintiff reasonably should have known its injury was wrongfully caused. It argued that this was

not a situation like an auto accident where the injured party immediately knew—at the time of

injury—the individual responsible for the wrongful conduct at issue. The response also contended

that this case involved ongoing action by defendants to actively conceal the improper and negligent

burning activities occurring on its property and a series of agency investigations into the cause and

origin of the fire which occurred on plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff contended it could not have

reasonably known the injury was wrongfully caused by defendants until February 16, 2024. The

response explained that the Madison Fire Department, the Office of the State Fire Marshal, and a

variety of claims adjusters, conducted independent investigations into the cause of the fire, which

took months. On February 16, 2024, the investigating entities provided plaintiff with their reports,

which revealed the entities could not determine the cause of the fire. Thereafter, plaintiff received

correspondence from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, indicating its intent to pursue

a civil action against plaintiff as a result of the fire suppressant foam deployed by the fire

departments.

¶9 The response further argued that because multiple governmental bodies—which possessed

the relevant knowledge and skills—were already investigating the cause of the fire, plaintiff did

not need to conduct its own investigation until well after August 22, 2023. After diligent

investigation, plaintiff provided written notice to defendants on August 16, 2024, via an email

from plaintiff’s attorney to MESD’s clerk, Stacey Partney. The response contended that because

February 16, 2024, was the earliest possible date that plaintiff could have reasonably known that

its injury was wrongfully caused by defendants’ negligence, it complied with section 1-5’s notice

4 provision by providing defendants with notice of damages by August 16, 2024. Alternatively,

plaintiff argued that there was, at the least, a material issue of fact as to the date the claim accrued

and was tied to defendants’ wrongful conduct under the knew or should have known analysis

implicated in section 1-5’s notice provision.

¶ 10 On January 8, 2025, after a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the circuit court granted the

motion to dismiss without prejudice. The circuit court’s order stated “none of the allegations made

during Plaintiff’s argument were alleged in the complaint” as required by law and provided

plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint “to add facts supporting its claim that its cause of

action is not time barred (ie. [sic] continuous harm or equitable tolling/estoppel claims).”

¶ 11 On February 7, 2025, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint

asserted the same counts and allegations as the first complaint. Additionally, it alleged, “On

February 16, 2024, Plaintiff was made aware of facts leading it to believe that Defendant MESD

could potentially be responsible for conduct that led to the fire and damage to” plaintiff’s property.

Thereafter, plaintiff investigated whether defendants were responsible, including Freedom of

Information Act requests, hiring experts, and review of reports generated by the agencies that

responded to the fire. It further contended that the cause of the fire was not readily apparent at the

time of the occurrence and no clear cause was identified by the responding agencies. The amended

complaint stated that plaintiff provided written notice to defendants on August 16, 2024. It further

contended that the doctrine of equitable tolling and estoppel also applied where plaintiff

demonstrated diligence through extensive investigation and resource expenditure and the

extraordinary circumstance of defendants attempting to conceal its activities.

¶ 12 On September 16, 2025, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended

complaint, asserting the same arguments as its initial motion to dismiss. On December 13, 2024,

5 plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, also asserting the same arguments as

before.

¶ 13 On March 20, 2025, plaintiff file a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint,

which was attached to the motion. The second amended complaint corrected which paragraphs

should be incorporated into count II but was otherwise unchanged. On March 31, 2025, the circuit

court ordered the second amended complaint filed instanter and struck defendants’ motion to

dismiss the amended complaint.

¶ 14 On April 3, 2025, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended

complaint, arguing that based on the plain language of section 1-5 of the Act, the discovery rule

did not apply to that statute’s notice provision. They explained that section 1-5 does not state that

notification is required within six months after the cause accrued or the party knew or should have

known that its damage was wrongfully caused. Rather, section 1-5 states that MESD should be

notified within six months of “the date the damage occurred.” They contended that when plaintiff

knew or should have known what caused the fire was irrelevant to whether plaintiff’s claims were

barred under the notice provision in section 1-5, as the only relevant date was the date the damages

occurred. Defendants also argued that equitable tolling was not applicable and could arguably

apply only if MESD somehow prevented plaintiff from discovering its injury.

¶ 15 On May 5, 2025, plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion to dismiss the second

amended complaint. The response argued that giving notice to MESD within six months of

damages regardless of whether plaintiff knew the origin of the fire or who may have been

responsible for its cause or not violated the discovery rule. Plaintiff reminded the court that the

purpose of the discovery rule was to ameliorate the potentially harsh effect of a mechanical

application of a statute of limitations that would result in it expiring before a plaintiff knew of his

6 cause of action. Henderson Square Condominium Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL

118139, ¶ 52. Plaintiff thus asserted the proper date to begin the notice provision was not August

22, 2023, as it could not have reasonably known its injury was wrongfully caused by defendant.

Alternatively, plaintiff also argued that equitable tolling applied where defendants actively

concealed the burning on its property.

¶ 16 On May 13, 2025, defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss the second

amended complaint. Defendants noted, inter alia, that plaintiff did not support its position with

the language of the statute or a statutory analysis. They further contended that equitable tolling

was also inapplicable because the discovery rule was inapplicable to section 1-5 of the Act.

¶ 17 On June 12, 2025, the parties presented their arguments on the defendants’ motion. The

circuit court took the matter under advisement.

¶ 18 On August 25, 2025, the circuit court filed an order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss

the second amended complaint with prejudice. The circuit court acknowledged the force of

plaintiff’s arguments and that dismissal with prejudice was a drastic measure significantly

impacting plaintiff’s ability to seek redress. Nevertheless, the circuit court found the statutory

language clear and did not incorporate the discovery rule. It felt compelled to grant dismissal

absent express legislative language or controlling precedent extending the discovery rule to section

1-5. It also found “equitable tolling is not applicable as the Plaintiff was not prevented from

discover[ing] the injury.” The circuit court agreed with plaintiff that the outcome compelled by the

strict notice requirement was unduly harsh under the facts alleged, and that such rigid application

of the statute could extinguish claims before the discovery of their wrongful nature was reasonably

possible but held that such fairness concerns should be left to the appellate court or the legislature.

Defendants timely appealed.

7 ¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 Plaintiff argues that the circuit court erroneously believed the discovery rule was

inapplicable to section 1-5’s notice provision. Plaintiff contends this court should adopt the

analysis in the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 70 (1969),

which in determining whether or not to apply the discovery rule, looked to the totality of the

circumstances and whether problems of proof would result from applying discovery rules. Plaintiff

states the circuit court did not even reach this question because it erroneously read section 1-5 to

exclude the discovery rule. Plaintiff further argues that to adopt defendants’ interpretation of

section 1-5 would actively incentivize MESD to conceal its tortious conduct and allow the mere

passage of time to absolve MESD’s tort liability.

¶ 21 Neither party has cited a case that has explicitly found the discovery rule applicable to

section 1-5. We need not address whether the discovery rule is applicable to section 1-5 because

we find, assuming arguendo that the discovery rule applies, the rule would not toll the notification

period here.

¶ 22 To alleviate the harsh consequences that flow from literal application of a statutory

limitations period—which could bar plaintiffs from bringing suit before plaintiffs were even aware

that they were injured—the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the discovery rule. Golla v. General

Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 360 (1995). Under this rule, the commencement of the statute of

limitations is delayed until “the injured plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he has been

injured and that his injury was wrongfully caused.” Id. at 361. The Illinois Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that in cases involving sudden and traumatic events, a claim accrues and the statute

of limitations begins when the damage or injury occurred. Id. at 361-63.

8 ¶ 23 Plaintiff argues that the “sudden and traumatic event” is an exception to the discovery rule

inapplicable here. It contends that there was no way of knowing of MESD’s involvement until

further information was unveiled as a result of various investigations completed by the local

agencies and plaintiff. It further contends that it would be harsh and oppressive to require a party

to give notice of an injury without first knowing that such wrongful actor existed at all.

Alternatively, plaintiff argues that not all sudden and traumatic events are treated the same and

such rule should not apply due to “the unknown factors which prevented 111 Salvage from

appreciating and understanding the scope of the event, the damages arising therefrom, and the

parties responsible thereto, to any requisite level for a cause of action to accrue instantaneously

upon occurrence.” It also contends that to require it to investigate adjoining neighbors without

cause to suspect their wrongdoing “stretches credulity.” We find plaintiff fundamentally

misunderstands the principles of law regarding the discovery rule and sudden and traumatic events.

¶ 24 Plaintiff casting the sudden and traumatic event as an exception to the discovery rule does

not sufficiently present the interplay of both legal principles. The discovery rule tolls the beginning

of a statutory limitations period until a party knows he or she is injured and has reasonable cause

to know the injury was wrongfully caused. (Emphasis added.) Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 364. “The nature

and circumstances surrounding the traumatic event are such that the injured party is thereby put

on notice that actionable conduct might be involved.” Id. at 363. So, claims based on sudden and

traumatic events are not excused from the discovery rule, but due to the nature of a sudden and

traumatic event, any cause of action based on such events necessarily meets the requirements of

the discovery rule (i.e. the party had reason to believe his or her injury was wrongfully caused) at

the time the sudden and traumatic event occurred.

9 ¶ 25 With that said, plaintiff is correct that not all sudden and traumatic events put a plaintiff on

notice that an injury was wrongfully caused. As explained in Hochbaum v. Casiano, 292 Ill. App.

3d 589, 595 (1997),

“Where a traumatic injury is sustained in the absence of an apparent non-

negligent cause, it is fair to place a burden on the injured party to inquire as to the

actual cause. On the other hand, in the case of an injury that appears to have been

caused by some non-negligent event, such as an illness, and the actual cause is

unknown, the injured party has no reason to conduct such an inquiry and to require

him or her to do so would be patently unfair.”

The record here shows there was no apparent non-negligent reason for the fire.

¶ 26 LePretre v. Petrie Brothers, 113 Ill. App. 3d 484 (1983), is instructive. The plaintiff in

LePretre was injured in an explosion at work. Id. at 486. The plaintiff was hospitalized from the

date of the explosion on August 22, 1979, until the week before Thanksgiving in 1979. Id. In the

spring of 1980, the plaintiff visited the site of the explosion and learned that an underground gas

pipe had been dug up and removed as the result of an investigation into the explosion. Id. In

November of 1981, plaintiff was advised by an attorney that his injuries may have been wrongfully

caused and plaintiff subsequently filed suit on December 31, 1981. Id. The trial court dismissed

the plaintiff’s claims, ruling that his claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Id.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, finding “the Statute

of Limitations began to run on August 22, 1979, the date of the explosion.” Id.

¶ 27 While the plaintiff in LePretre was not injured at his own property, he—like plaintiff

here—was unaware of who was responsible for his injuries at the time the event occurred. If an

explosion is of such nature that the event itself puts a reasonable person on notice, we find an

10 unknown, unexpected fire also constitutes a sudden and traumatic event. See, e.g. Pratt v. Sears

Roebuck & Co., 71 Ill. App. 3d 825, 829 (1979) (stating that a claim for damages caused by a fire

accrued when the fire occurred).

¶ 28 Despite plaintiff’s argument that it did not know it should notify MESD until it was aware

that MESD was potentially liable, the discovery rule does not concern plaintiff’s knowledge of

who was responsible for the injury. See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, et al., 85 Ill. 2d 161,

169-70 (1981) (explaining that knowledge of a parties’ negligent conduct is not required under the

discovery rule, and to require otherwise would impose a standard “beyond the comprehension of

the ordinary lay person to recognize” and “assumes a conclusion which must properly await legal

determination.”); Knox College, 88 Ill. 2d at 416 (“Wrongfully caused *** does not connote

knowledge of negligent conduct or knowledge of the existence of a cause of action.”). For example,

in Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 550-51 (1974), the plaintiff filed breach of warranty

of fitness and strict liability claims against the manufacturer and seller of birth control pills,

alleging that she had suffered a stroke as a result of the unreasonably dangerous nature of the pills.

Id. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that her cause of action did not accrue

until she discovered that the pills may have caused the stroke. Id. at 559. The Berry court found

the plaintiff’s stroke was a traumatic event, and her complaint showed that she knew of the stroke,

that she was ill, and that the stroke caused damage. Id. at 558-59. As such, it held the statutory

limitation began at the time of her stroke. Id. Accordingly, plaintiff’s knowledge of MESD’s, or

any other parties’, specific involvement in the fire on its property is not determinative or relevant

for the purposes of the discovery rule. Plaintiff’s arguments that the discovery rule tolled the notice

provision based on its unawareness of the party responsible must therefore fail.

11 ¶ 29 The relevant inquiry is when the injured person possessed sufficient information

concerning the injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on notice “to determine whether

actionable conduct is involved.” Knox College, 88 Ill. 2d at 416; Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 363-64.

Because plaintiff’s claims stem from the sudden and traumatic event of an unknown fire, it was

reasonably put on notice to determine whether actionable conduct was involved. Thus, even

assuming the discovery rule applied, the rule did not toll the notice provision under section 1-5.

¶ 30 Regarding plaintiff’s contentions that such outcome is harsh, the Illinois Supreme Court

has disagreed with similar policy and fairness-based arguments. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 371. It

explained that statutes of limitation rest on the premise that after some time, the right to be free of

stale claims should prevail over the right to prosecute the wrongdoing. Id. at 369. Statutes of

limitation encourage claimants to investigate and pursue causes of action. Id. at 370. In analyzing

the Rozny balancing test of a claimant’s and defendant’s interests, the court stated, “the interests

of the plaintiff would prevail over those of the defendant, and the discovery rule would apply, only

in circumstances where a plaintiff neither knew nor should have known of the existence of her

right to sue within the applicable limitations period.” (Emphasis in original.) Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at

364-65. The sudden and traumatic event rule is aligned with that balance, and “[a]lthough any

bright line rule has the potential for creating hardship in an individual case, the plaintiff cannot

persuasively argue that the ‘sudden, traumatic event’ rule is burdensome and unjust to plaintiffs in

general.” Id. at 371.

¶ 31 Moreover, we do not find hardship under the circumstances here. While plaintiff

admittedly delayed its own investigations, governmental agencies promptly investigated the fire.

Plaintiff further admits that once these agencies provided their reports to plaintiffs on February 16,

2024—six days before the section 1-5 notice provision expired—plaintiff was aware of MESD’s

12 possible involvement in the fire. Such facts show that prompt investigation was possible and

plaintiff was aware of MESD’s possible involvement prior to the notice period expiring.

Accordingly, we do not find the application of the sudden and traumatic event rule harsh as applied

here.

¶ 32 For the same reasons, we moreover reject any notion that the application of the sudden and

traumatic event rule under the facts of this case necessarily required plaintiff to send notice to any

conceivable responsible party without reason or cause. Our holding simply abides by the long-

standing legal principles that “once it reasonably appears that an injury was wrongfully caused,

the party may not slumber on his rights.” Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 171. Therefore, even if the discovery

rule applied to the notice provision in section 1-5 of the Act, the rule did not toll the notice

provision under the circumstances of this case.

¶ 33 Alternatively, plaintiff contends that it provided “alternative backing for its claims of

negligence and intentional trespass through the theory of equitable tolling.” The conclusion section

of plaintiff’s appellate brief further states that plaintiff “alternatively relies on the principles of

equitable tolling to allow Plaintiff’s Complaint to be heard, especially given the standard that a

court should dismiss only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support its cause of

action.”

¶ 34 Plaintiff overlooks that the circuit court below considered its equitable tolling argument

and rejected it on the merits. Plaintiff provides no argument as to how the circuit court’s ruling

was erroneous or any authority to support that equitable tolling is applicable to this case.

Accordingly, it has forfeited these arguments. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 35 While we do not address the circuit court’s reasoning for granting the motion to dismiss,

we may affirm for any reason supported by the record. Zibrat v. City of Chicago, 2025 IL App

13 (1st) 241273, ¶ 34. Here, assuming the discovery rule applies to section 1-5 of the Act, plaintiff

still did not comply with section 1-5’s notice provision. As such, the grant of the motion to dismiss

was not error, and we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal.

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 The circuit court did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed

to notify defendants of its damages within the notice period pursuant to section 1-5 of the Act, and

plaintiff’s arguments of equitable tolling are forfeited. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s

order.

¶ 38 Affirmed.