1001 Plays, Inc. v. White

2 Mass. Supp. 770
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1981
DocketNo. 81-2372
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Mass. Supp. 770 (1001 Plays, Inc. v. White) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
1001 Plays, Inc. v. White, 2 Mass. Supp. 770 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is an action in the nature of certiorari. Under G.L. c. 249, sec. 4 seeking áin order requiring defendant to approve an application for an entertainment license by the plaintiffs to operate a place of amusement in Allston, which was denied April 22, 1980.

The parties . filed a joint pre-trial submission, equivalent to an agreed statement- of facts, that the record of the hearing contains the material facts. Briefs which raised a number of issues were also filed.

The cáse came, on for hearing on Friday, September 11, 1981, and during argument both sides conceded that the Boston Code Ordinance 14, Section 426-430; amehded i’n 1978, was controlling and • was constitutional with the elimination of* its criteria (d), (in substance giving the Mayor the power to deny such applications if he found that the activity . would significantly harm legitimate protectable interests of the citizens). Both parties agreed that the sole question before thfe Court was whether there was ■ substantial evidence on the record to support the finding that the proposed activity violated any of the remaining three criteria.1

Counsel were granted until September 18 to file the record and the same arrived and was ’accepted as an exhibit, as enumerated'in defendant’s answer, A-a through kJ.' ’ ’ ’ '

APPLICABLE LAW

Chapter 140, Section 181 provides in relevant part that the Mayor may . . . grant . . . a license for . '. . public ámiiséiiients . . . ánd . . . shall grant such license or shall deny such license upon a [772]*772finding that issuance of such a license would lead to the creation of a nuisance or would endanger the public health, safety or order by: (a) unreasonably increasing pedestrian traffic in the area in which the premises are located or (b) increasing the incidence of disruptive conduct in the area in which the premises are located or (c) unreasonably increasing the level of noise in the area in which the premises are located. The ordinance (omitting the agreed-upon improper provision (d) ) tracks the statute.

The applicable test would appear to be found in Saxon Coffee House v. Boston Licensing Board, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1517; New Boston Garden v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1023; Konstatopoulos v. Town of Whately, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1669, that there must be substantial evidence (based on observations, not conclusions), more than some or any evidence, to support the Board’s conclusions, “such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate,” Saxon Coffee House v. Boston Licensing Board, supra, at 1528.

Predicting the probable future effect of an activity always involves some measure of judgment and inference. Cf. Boylston-Washington v. ABCC, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1898; Save the Bay, Inc. v. D.P.U., 366 Mass. 667 (1975).

If the inferences, reasonably drawn by the authority, support its conclusion on any of the three legal bases, its decision should be affirmed, since the statute, and the ordinance, are phrased in the disjunctive.

Also, “a licensing authority generally has considerable discretion to deny a license, and ... a judge cannot substitute his or her judgment for the board’s on a discretionary matter,” McDonald’s Corp. v. Board of Selectmen of Randolph, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 97, 99.

DISCUSSION

The proposed operation involved is to occupy a store of 740 square feet, located near the intersection of Harvard Avenue and Commonwealth Avenue, Allston, to be limited to 16 video games and 26 people inside the establishment at a time.

Exhibit A-a, copy annexed, is the decision of the Licensing Division, dated April 22, 1980, in which the Mayor’s delegee, Richard J. Sinnott, relied, with respect to his adverse finding pertaining to pedestrian traffic on evidence from Emily Lloyd, testimony from Counselor Langone, and Representatives Galvin and Melia; also letters from Counselors Sansone and DiCará (Exhibit A — page 2).

Sinnott’s decision with respect to disruptive conduct (phrased in terms of crime and vandalism) was based on evidence from Sergeant Feeney and Chairman of the Boston City Council Public Safety Committee O’Neil (Exhibit A-a — page 3 and 4).

Sinnott’s decision with respect to noise was based on his own inferences.

It is undisputed that there is very heavy traffic and parking pressure in the intersection in question, that there are nine liquor and entertainment establishments within about one-eighth of a mile with a capacity of 1700 patrons, that there is a good bit of criminal activity in the area including, within six months of the hearing, 15 assaults by means of dangerous weapons, 25 robberies, 8 handbag snatchings and 150 episodes of vandalism. (Exhibit A-h).

CONCLUSION

I am of the opinion that:

1. The licensing authority on the evidence could and did properly conclude that the proposed establishment would attract a substantial number of young people and, added to the already heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic, would endanger public health, safety or order by unreasonably increasing pedestrian traffic.

2. The licensing authority on the evidence was reasonable in concluding that the nature of the activity, [773]*773superimposed on the entertainment and drinking establishments already in the area, would endanger public health, safety or order by increasing the incidence of disruptive conduct.

3. The evidence did not support the inferences that the addition of this activity would endanger public health, safety or order by unreasonably increasing the level of noise in the area. The sole evidence, other than generalized unsupported conclusory predictions, is that of petitioner’s expert Lebow, whose evidence (and the licensing authority did not find it incredible) was to the effect that there would be no increase in noise.

4. The licensing authority’s decision was fair and reasonable, and within its discretion. Having properly found two of the three bases of denial, the decision was appropriate.

ORDER

The prayer for certiorari is consequently denied, and the complaint is dismissed.

Robert I. Hallisey I ustice of the Superior Court

9/30/81

Attachment A-a CITY OF BOSTON OFFICE OF THE MAYOR CITY HALL, BOSTON LICENSING DIVISION

April 22,1980

Ms. Irate Conti Marks

73 Marathon Rd.

East Arlington, Mass. 02174

Re: Application for an Automatic Amusement Arcade, “1,001 Plays” 1211 Commonwealth Ave., Allston.

Dear Mrs. Marks:

As you are aware, for the second time within 17 months a public hearing was held on your application for a license for an Automatic. Amusement Arcade at 1211 Commonwealth Avenue. The latest hearing was on Monday, March 10th and lasted from 10:45 a. m. until 1:35 p.m.

Although the new application shows a reduction in the number of machines applied for and the hours of operation reduced from those previously sought, opposition to this facility based on apprehension that it would adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare does not appear to have abated.

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Related

Save the Bay, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities
322 N.E.2d 742 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
2 Mass. Supp. 770, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/1001-plays-inc-v-white-masssuperct-1981.