1000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro

26 P.3d 151, 174 Or. App. 406
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMay 30, 2001
Docket2000-002; A111766
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 26 P.3d 151 (1000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
1000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro, 26 P.3d 151, 174 Or. App. 406 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

*408 DEITS, C. J.

Petitioners - cross-respondents, Ryland Homes, Inc., and Springville Road Joint Venture (Ryland Homes) seek review of LUBA’s decision that remanded Metro’s adoption of an ordinance amending the Metro Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) to include 109 acres of exclusive farm use (EFU) land located in northern Washington County. LUBA’s remand to Metro was based on what it held to be deficiencies in Metro’s application of factors 3 to 7, the locational factors of Goal 14. 1 Respondents - cross-petitioners, 1000 Friends of Oregon and the Washington County Farm Bureau (respondents) cross-petition, arguing that LUBA committed legal error in upholding certain portions of Metro’s decision. In particular, respondents assert that Metro improperly relied on the 1997 Urban Growth Report (UGR) in determining the capacity of the UGB.

The property in dispute is part of a 488-acre area located in Urban Reserve Area (URA) 65. The specific property at issue here consists of 109 acres within URA 65 that is designated as Site 65. Site 65 is in the center of URA 65 and is zoned EFU. It is currently in agricultural use. The property is predominately made up of farm land consisting of Class II, III, and IV soils. Within URA 65, there is additional agricultural land, and there are two areas for which an exception to Statewide Planning Goal 3 has been taken. The purpose of *409 Metro’s expansion of the UGB at this location is to allow a residential development on Site 65. The concept plan adopted by Washington County for Site 65 provides for approximately 700 dwelling units.

As noted above, Ryland Homes’s assignments of error concern LUBA’s application of the locational considerations of Goal 14, factors 3 to 7. LUBA concluded that Metro’s findings under Goal 14, factors 5, 6, and 7, were inadequate and remanded the case to Metro to address the specific inadequacies that it identified. Ryland Homes argues before us that LUBA erred in two respects in its holding that Metro did not properly address the Goal 14 locational factors. First, it contends that LUBA generally applied an incorrect legal standard. Second, it asserts that LUBA’s specific assessment of the adequacy of Metro’s application of factors 5, 6, and 7 was wrong.

Ryland Homes’s argument concerning the general legal standard applied by LUBA is that “LUBA viewed each factor as an independent approval criterion that had to be satisfied based on its own specific findings and evidence.” It is Ryland Homes’s position that the proper standard of review for determining the adequacy of Metro’s findings regarding factors 3 through 7 is whether the “totality of the findings demonstrate that each factor has been considered and balanced as part of the locational analysis.” Ryland Homes contends that it is not always necessary that a local government make detailed findings for each of the Goal 14 factors. It argues that, in some instances, such as here, there is overlap among various factors and subfactors and that it is possible for a reviewing body, such as LUBA or this court, to determine that the local government has satisfied its obligation to consider and balance the locational factors by looking not just at the findings directed to each individual factor but at Metro’s findings “as a whole.”

Ryland Homes is correct that the locational factors are not independent approval criteria. It is not necessary that a designated level of satisfaction of the objectives of each of the factors must always be met before a local government can justify a change in a UGB. Rather, the local government must show that the factors were “considered” and balanced *410 by the local government in determining if a change in the UGB for a particular area is justified. It is within a local government’s authority to evaluate the Goal 14 factors and exercise its judgment as to which areas should be made available for growth. Branscomb v. LCDC, 64 Or App 738, 743, 669 P2d 1192 (1983), affd 297 Or 142, 681 P2d 124 (1984).

We agree with LUBA that Metro’s failure to articulate its findings regarding each of the locational factors and its reasons explaining how it balanced the factors makes it impossible to conduct a meaningful review of Metro’s decision. Contrary to Ryland Homes’s assertion, however, LUBA did not treat the Goal 14 factors as independent approval criteria. Rather, LUBA found that because of Metro’s failure to directly address certain aspects of factors 5, 6, and 7, it was not able to determine on review whether Metro had fulfilled its responsibility to consider and balance the locational factors of Goal 14. The requirement that each factor must be addressed does not make the factors independent approval criteria.

Ryland Homes, and perhaps Metro, seems to view the requirement that each of the factors be addressed as one of form over substance. As noted above, Ryland Homes asserts that, even if Metro did not address all of the factors, LUBA and this court can determine how Metro considered and balanced the factors by looking to other portions of Metro’s decision and considering Metro’s findings “as a whole.” The first problem with Ryland Homes’s position is that pertinent statutes and rules specifically require a local government to set forth findings of fact and statements of reasons when adopting or amending an urban growth boundary pursuant to Goal 14. ORS 197.732(4); OAR 660-004-0020(1) (Goal 2, Part II); OAR 660-004-0010(l)(b)(B).

Further, we do not agree that attempting to divine Metro’s unexpressed reasoning is an appropriate role for LUBA or this court on review. Our function as a reviewing body in this type of case is to review the local government’s action under the scope of review articulated in ORS 197.850. 2 *411 If the local government has not specifically articulated its findings regarding a particular factor and explained how it balanced that factor in making a decision regarding a change in a UGB, it is not properly within our scope of review to make assumptions and draw inferences from other portions of the local government’s findings in order to surmise what the local government’s decision really was. This is not a new standard. In 1977, the Oregon Supreme Court explained why it is necessary for government agencies to explain their decisions clearly and precisely in order to facilitate meaningful judicial review. The court stated:

“We wish to make it clear that by insisting on adequate findings of fact we are not simply imposing legalistic notions of proper form, or setting an empty exercise for local governments to follow. No particular form is required, and no magic words need be employed. What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what, specifically, the decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its decision is based. Conclusions are not sufficient.” Sunnyside Neighborhood v. Clackamas Co. Comm.,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 P.3d 151, 174 Or. App. 406, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/1000-friends-of-oregon-v-metro-orctapp-2001.