BUTTLER, P. J.
Petitioner seeks review of LCDC’s continuance order in its compliance review of Linn County’s comprehensive plan and land use regulations. ORS 197.251. In its first assignment, petitioner argues that LCDC erred by approving the county’s “developed and committed” exceptions to Goals 3 or 4 for 20 areas, most of which are vacant and are contained within surrounding exception areas. Petitioner contends that the information the county submitted to LCDC in support of the challenged exceptions does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 197.732, Goal 2 and OAR 660-04-025 to 660-04-028, because it consists of “undigested” facts, does not address all of the concerns that the cited statute and rules require to be considered in connection with an exception based on commitment to nonresource uses,, does not contain the required explanation of why “the facts support the conclusion that it is impracticable to apply the Goal” to the areas, OAR 660-04-028(3), and, in some instances, does not even make clear — or analyze accordingly — whether the exception taken is to Goal 3 or 4.
Petitioner is correct. The statutory and regulatory requirements governing the informational support for goal exceptions are detailed and clear. We have held repeatedly that LCDC must require local governments to comply with those requirements as a prerequisite to the acknowledgment of an exception.
See Lord v. LCDC,
73 Or App 359, 361, 698 P2d 1026 (1985), and cases there cited. The county came nowhere close to complying here; therefore, LCDC erred in approving the exceptions.
Petitioner contends in its second and third assignments that LCDC contravened Goals 11 and 14 by approving provisions of the county’s “plan [and zoning ordinance] which allow new, urban (or nonrural) types, scales or intensities of development in rural areas” outside the urban growth boundary (UGB).
Petitioner argues that intense urban uses on rural land violate
those
goals, even if exceptions to the
resource
goals have been taken for the same territory, and that a separate exception to Goal 14 is necessary to permit urban level uses.
We held in
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC,
73 Or App 350, 698 P2d 1027,
rev allowed
300 Or 111 (1985), that a county which had taken Goal 2 exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 to permit nonresource uses on agricultural and forest land outside the urban growth boundary was not required to take a separate exception to Goal 14 to authorize those uses. The parties agree that that case decides the issues raised by these assignments, although petitioner argues that our opinion was wrong and that it denuded Goal 14 of its objective — independent of the resource protection objectives of Goals 3 and 4 — of
confining urban development to the urban and urbanizable areas within UGBs.
Notwithstanding the parties’ shared understanding that
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, supra,
73 Or App at 350, is decisive here, we think that there is a difference between the two cases. The issue which we understood that we were deciding in our earlier opinion was whether a separate exception to Goal 14 was necessary to allow the same or substantially similar nonresource uses as those which were authorized by the exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 for the resource land in question.
Our concern was with redundancy in the exceptions process. The issue which we understand to be presented here is different. The exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 are based on a certain level of development or commitment which ostensibly renders the resource use of the land impracticable; however, petitioner’s contention is that, even assuming the validity of those exceptions, the plan and ordinance provisions would allow much more intensive urban uses on the land than the existing uses which the county and LCDC offer as justifications for the exceptions. In other words, if the exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 are valid in the light of the
existing
development or commitment of the land, the
more intensive
development contemplated by the county’s plan and ordinance could, nevertheless, violate Goals 11 and 14, according to petitioner. We agree.
See Perkins v. City of Rajneeshpuram,
300 Or 1, 706 P2d 949 (1985), and
1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court,
299 Or 344, 703 P2d 207 (1985) (issued after our decision in
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, supra,
73 Or App at 350). Our decision in
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, supra,
was not intended to resolve that question. It was premised on the understanding that the petitioner sought that we require two separate goal exceptions to allow a single use; it did not indicate (at least intentionally) that a planning jurisdiction was entitled to authorize certain uses without regard for Goals 11 and 14 simply because it had taken exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 on the basis of totally different uses.
In this case, we conclude that the county was required either to comply with Goals 11 and 14 or to take Goal 2
exceptions to them with respect to the land in question. On remand, LCDC should determine whether the plan and ordinance provisions comply with those goals in the light of this opinion and the Supreme Court’s opinions in the
Perkins
and
Wasco County
cases.
Petitioner’s final assignment, in which the
amici
join, is that LCDC erred by approving the county’s ordinance provisions that purport to define when vested rights exist to conduct certain activities and uses.
Petitioner and the
amici
argue that the criteria that the ordinance establishes for the enjoyment of vested rights differ from, and are less stringent than, the tests established in Oregon appellate court decisions.
See, e.g., Polk County v. Martin,
292 Or 69, 636 P2d 952 (1981). Consequently, they contend, the ordinance is inconsistent with the goals insofar as it would allow the continuation or completion of uses that are in conflict with the goals and that would not qualify as vested under the tests articulated in the case law.
LCDC argues in its brief here:
“The existence or non-existence of vested rights is not a goal compliance issue. Vested rights are a species of property rights as affected by zoning and they are defined on a case by case basis.
“Petitioner and amicus have chosen the wrong forum and the wrong time to litigate the propriety of the vested rights issue. The proper forum for such a challenge is * * * LUBA [in an appeal from] a land use decision based upon the ordinance.
Forman v.
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BUTTLER, P. J.
Petitioner seeks review of LCDC’s continuance order in its compliance review of Linn County’s comprehensive plan and land use regulations. ORS 197.251. In its first assignment, petitioner argues that LCDC erred by approving the county’s “developed and committed” exceptions to Goals 3 or 4 for 20 areas, most of which are vacant and are contained within surrounding exception areas. Petitioner contends that the information the county submitted to LCDC in support of the challenged exceptions does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 197.732, Goal 2 and OAR 660-04-025 to 660-04-028, because it consists of “undigested” facts, does not address all of the concerns that the cited statute and rules require to be considered in connection with an exception based on commitment to nonresource uses,, does not contain the required explanation of why “the facts support the conclusion that it is impracticable to apply the Goal” to the areas, OAR 660-04-028(3), and, in some instances, does not even make clear — or analyze accordingly — whether the exception taken is to Goal 3 or 4.
Petitioner is correct. The statutory and regulatory requirements governing the informational support for goal exceptions are detailed and clear. We have held repeatedly that LCDC must require local governments to comply with those requirements as a prerequisite to the acknowledgment of an exception.
See Lord v. LCDC,
73 Or App 359, 361, 698 P2d 1026 (1985), and cases there cited. The county came nowhere close to complying here; therefore, LCDC erred in approving the exceptions.
Petitioner contends in its second and third assignments that LCDC contravened Goals 11 and 14 by approving provisions of the county’s “plan [and zoning ordinance] which allow new, urban (or nonrural) types, scales or intensities of development in rural areas” outside the urban growth boundary (UGB).
Petitioner argues that intense urban uses on rural land violate
those
goals, even if exceptions to the
resource
goals have been taken for the same territory, and that a separate exception to Goal 14 is necessary to permit urban level uses.
We held in
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC,
73 Or App 350, 698 P2d 1027,
rev allowed
300 Or 111 (1985), that a county which had taken Goal 2 exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 to permit nonresource uses on agricultural and forest land outside the urban growth boundary was not required to take a separate exception to Goal 14 to authorize those uses. The parties agree that that case decides the issues raised by these assignments, although petitioner argues that our opinion was wrong and that it denuded Goal 14 of its objective — independent of the resource protection objectives of Goals 3 and 4 — of
confining urban development to the urban and urbanizable areas within UGBs.
Notwithstanding the parties’ shared understanding that
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, supra,
73 Or App at 350, is decisive here, we think that there is a difference between the two cases. The issue which we understood that we were deciding in our earlier opinion was whether a separate exception to Goal 14 was necessary to allow the same or substantially similar nonresource uses as those which were authorized by the exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 for the resource land in question.
Our concern was with redundancy in the exceptions process. The issue which we understand to be presented here is different. The exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 are based on a certain level of development or commitment which ostensibly renders the resource use of the land impracticable; however, petitioner’s contention is that, even assuming the validity of those exceptions, the plan and ordinance provisions would allow much more intensive urban uses on the land than the existing uses which the county and LCDC offer as justifications for the exceptions. In other words, if the exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 are valid in the light of the
existing
development or commitment of the land, the
more intensive
development contemplated by the county’s plan and ordinance could, nevertheless, violate Goals 11 and 14, according to petitioner. We agree.
See Perkins v. City of Rajneeshpuram,
300 Or 1, 706 P2d 949 (1985), and
1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court,
299 Or 344, 703 P2d 207 (1985) (issued after our decision in
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, supra,
73 Or App at 350). Our decision in
1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC, supra,
was not intended to resolve that question. It was premised on the understanding that the petitioner sought that we require two separate goal exceptions to allow a single use; it did not indicate (at least intentionally) that a planning jurisdiction was entitled to authorize certain uses without regard for Goals 11 and 14 simply because it had taken exceptions to Goals 3 and 4 on the basis of totally different uses.
In this case, we conclude that the county was required either to comply with Goals 11 and 14 or to take Goal 2
exceptions to them with respect to the land in question. On remand, LCDC should determine whether the plan and ordinance provisions comply with those goals in the light of this opinion and the Supreme Court’s opinions in the
Perkins
and
Wasco County
cases.
Petitioner’s final assignment, in which the
amici
join, is that LCDC erred by approving the county’s ordinance provisions that purport to define when vested rights exist to conduct certain activities and uses.
Petitioner and the
amici
argue that the criteria that the ordinance establishes for the enjoyment of vested rights differ from, and are less stringent than, the tests established in Oregon appellate court decisions.
See, e.g., Polk County v. Martin,
292 Or 69, 636 P2d 952 (1981). Consequently, they contend, the ordinance is inconsistent with the goals insofar as it would allow the continuation or completion of uses that are in conflict with the goals and that would not qualify as vested under the tests articulated in the case law.
LCDC argues in its brief here:
“The existence or non-existence of vested rights is not a goal compliance issue. Vested rights are a species of property rights as affected by zoning and they are defined on a case by case basis.
“Petitioner and amicus have chosen the wrong forum and the wrong time to litigate the propriety of the vested rights issue. The proper forum for such a challenge is * * * LUBA [in an appeal from] a land use decision based upon the ordinance.
Forman v. Clatsop County,
297 Or 129, 132-33, 681 P2d 786 (1984).” (Citations omitted.)
LCDC is correct in contending that whether particular parties enjoy vested rights in particular situations is a matter for case-by-case determination. However, that proposition does not have any bearing on whether a local body violates the goals if it defines the tests to be applied in the case-by-case determinations or establishes incorrect tests for
the allowance of uses that are contrary to the goals. The issue here is whether the county’s plan and regulations comply with the statewide planning goals, and the ordinance’s vested rights provisions are as much subject to goal compliance review as any other provisions of the county’s land use regulations.
The challenged provisions were adopted in 1980, long after the goals were promulgated. The provisions ostensibly make conformance with pre-1980 county legislation the principal determinant of whether a vested right exists. That legislation was never acknowledged to be in compliance with the goals, and the county’s vested rights provisions do not make the protected status of a use dependent in any way on whether the use commenced before the adoption of the goals or was ever in compliance with them. In short, the vested rights provisions, as they apply to uses that are inconsistent with the goals, would create a grandfather clause where there is no grandparental lineage; on their face, they would insulate certain uses from the application of the goals, even if the uses violated the goals from their inception.
Although we need not decide the question here, we assume that, if a use had begun before the goals were promulgated and if a vested right in the use arose by virtue of its consistency with existing county legislation and its satisfaction of the other tests the courts have enunciated for the enjoyment of a vested right, the use would be as insulated from the goals as it would be from changes in the county legislation. However, that is not the problem here. The provisions petitioner and the
amici
challenge do not establish substantive regulations of the use of land; they purport to define the conditions under which compliance with prior county legislation makes a use impervious to
any
regulation other than the prior county legislation with which the use complied. It is simply not compatible with Oregon’s statewide land use regulatory scheme for a county to be able to legislate, in the guise of a definition of “vested rights,” whether state regulations can be applied to the use of land within the county’s territory.
See Mason v. Mountain River Estates,
73 Or App 334, 340 n 6, 698 P2d 529,
rev den
299 Or 314 (1985).
We
conclude that petitioner’s fourth assignment of error is also well taken.
Reversed and remanded for reconsideration.