1 Community Compact v. City of Fresno

Opinion

Filed 8/21/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

1 COMMUNITY COMPACT, F089737

Plaintiff and Appellant,

(Super. Ct. No. 23CECG02740)

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, OPINION Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan M.

Skiles, Judge.

Law Offices of Brian C. Leighton and Brian C. Leighton for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Aleshire & Wynder, Anthony R. Taylor and Michael R. Linden for Defendant and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

SEE DISSENTING OPINION

Emphasizing the “profound impact” of Mexican-American labor leader and civil rights activist Cesar Chavez “on the people of Fresno” and concluding the renaming of a downtown thoroughfare in his honor would “provide a source of pride and community recognition,” the Fresno City Council (City Council) adopted Resolution No. 2023-056, which facilitated the renaming of the “East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, and West California Avenue alignment” (collectively, the Alignment) 1 to Cesar Chavez Boulevard.

Plaintiff 1 Community Compact, an unincorporated association, filed a lawsuit against defendant City of Fresno (City). Plaintiff’s operative complaint raised five causes of action: (1) City’s invalid exercise of police power under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution; (2) denial of due process under the federal and state Constitutions; (3) deprivation of free speech rights under the federal and state Constitutions and City’s liability therefor (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (4) waste of public funds (Code Civ. Proc., 2 § 526a); and (5) denial of equal protection under the federal and state Constitutions. The superior court sustained City’s demurrer as to the due process, free speech, and equal protection claims and then granted City’s motion for summary judgment as to the police power and waste claims.

On April 30, 2025, plaintiff filed this appeal. It presented the following arguments in its opening brief:

First, the superior court erroneously sustained City’s demurrer as to the free speech claim because the renaming of the Alignment compelled plaintiff’s members who reside or run a business on or near the Alignment “to carry or convey [City’s] preferred ideological message.”

1 In this opinion, we use “East Kings Canyon Road,” “East Ventura Avenue,” or “West California Avenue” when referring to a particular segment of the Alignment.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Code of Civil Procedure.

Second, the superior court erroneously granted summary judgment as to the cause of action for City’s invalid exercise of police power because (1) the renaming of the Alignment “had no real or substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” (boldface & capitalization omitted); (2) assuming, arguendo, pride and community recognition constitute legitimate governmental objectives, the renaming did not achieve these objectives; (3) the renaming substantially burdened only the residents and business owners on or near the Alignment; and (4) City’s renaming procedure was unfair.

Finally, the superior court erroneously granted summary judgment as to the cause of action for waste of public funds because City “violated its police power and/or violated the free speech rights of [plaintiff’s] members.”

On March 19, 2026, approximately three years after it adopted Resolution No. 2023-056, City Council adopted Resolution No. 2026-42 “to begin the process to remove the ‘Cesar Chavez Boulevard’ street signs” (some capitalization omitted) in light of “credible historical sources and public statements [that] have brought renewed attention to serious allegations regarding Cesar Chavez’s personal conduct, including accusations of sexual misconduct and abusive behavior toward colleagues and members of the farmworker community.” On April 23, 2026, City Council adopted Resolution No. 2026-61 reverting Cesar Chavez Boulevard back to the original street names. In a letter brief, City contended the appeal should be dismissed as moot given these resolutions. In another letter brief, plaintiff asserted this court has the discretion to decide the appeal under the public interest exception.

For the reasons set forth below, we exercise our discretion under the public interest exception to consider this appeal on the merits. (See In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23.) We conclude the superior court properly sustained City’s demurrer as to plaintiff’s free speech claim because the renaming of the Alignment did not infringe on plaintiff’s members’ free speech. We also conclude the court properly granted City’s summary judgment motion because (1) the renaming of the Alignment constituted a valid exercise of City’s police power; and (2) section 526a was inapplicable. Therefore, we affirm the judgments.

BACKGROUND

I. Context of the August 1, 2024 judgment of dismissal after the order sustaining City’s demurrer in part a. Contents of the operative complaint 3 The operative complaint alleges the following. The Alignment is composed of three streets “decidedly historical to [City]’s rich history.” East Ventura Avenue, which was named in 1873, “has always been the heart of [City’s] Armenian Community” and “was known as Armenian Town.” West California Avenue, which was named in 1881, is “the heart” of City’s African-American community. East Kings Canyon Road, which “is over 70 years old,” “has always been known to residents and tourists alike as the gateway to the Sierras and Kings Canyon National Park.” Cesar Chavez, who was “not a Fresno native and never lived in Fresno,” “has never been integral to nor associated with any of these [three] historical streets.” He was also a “divisive” and “objectionable political figure” who “alienated many farmers, packing houses and grocery stores and retaliated against those who did not join his union.”

Plaintiff “is an unincorporated grass roots association with [more than 1,000]

members who live, own, or operate a business on the historic … streets of [East] Kings Canyon Rd., [East] Ventura Ave., or [West] California Ave., and/or who reside or have

3 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 5, 2023, and a second amended complaint, i.e., the operative complaint, on April 18, 2024. The record does not contain the original complaint.

Since this appeal in part “arises from a dismissal following a demurrer, we rely on [the operative] complaint … for a summary of the factual background” with respect to the affected claims. (Gordon v. Law Offices of Aguirre & Meyer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 972, 975, fn. 2.) “We accept as true all properly pleaded allegations without concern for proof problems.” (Ibid.)

businesses in the immediate vicinity of said streets.” Plaintiff’s members viewed the renaming of the Alignment as City’s attempt to “erase or rewrite” “their personal or business history”; lamented “the enormous costs to each business or property owner, operator, tenant, and residents when the street name is changed”; and stressed only they were required to bear the “cultural and financial burden and impact in renaming [the Alignment]” and “propagate, echo, and spread … City’s message [about Cesar Chavez].”

Many members who reside on or near the Alignment “intentionally purchased their homes specifically because they were on those [three] streets and have lived there most of their lives.” “Those street names are part of their identity, tradition, and everyday lives” and members “had every reason to believe those street names would remain the same, and never change.” As a result of the renaming, these members were “uprooted and forever changed.” Furthermore, they needed to devote “substantial” “time and expense” to change their addresses on “trusts, wills, insurances (vehicle, homeowner, automobile etc.), social security checks, State or federal assistance income, medical or education/school mailings or notices, bank and credit union accounts, credit card companies, utilities, delivery services, property deeds, passports, driver licenses, property tax statements, or legal descriptions, any professional licenses, loan documents, mortgages, [Internal Revenue Service], Franchise Tax Board, Medi-Care, social security data, stocks and bonds, data registrations, vehicle registrations, and other documents and services requiring a correct address.”

Many members who own and/or operate businesses and property on the Alignment “built their businesses specifically on one of those [three] streets, because of its location, street name and the street’s reputation.” “The street name became part of their identity and goodwill and were advantageous to their businesses, were part of their sense of pride, and were proudly identifiable with them.” These members “had every expectation that when they moved their business, or opened, or built their businesses on one of those [three] streets, that the name would never change.” “The concept of, and identification with, Cesar Chavez [Boulevard] substantially impairs their goodwill and identity, and business model, and will have the tendency to make the public and customers believe they desired to have their business on Cesar Chavez [Boulevard] and consented to it.” Moreover, “[f]or business owners a change of address is a very costly and time-consuming project.” (Boldface omitted.) “Many will be required to remove exterior or street-front signage, which costs thousands of dollars and will have a greater impact if the street name is a part of the business name.” Addresses must be changed on “bank accounts, loan documents, lease agreements, business licenses, business Articles of Incorporation, Deeds and Titles to property, franchise agreements, business insurance, both liability and property, California Secretary of State, [Internal Revenue Service] file form 8822-B, U.S. post office changes, advertising and social media accounts, notification to all vendors, employees and insurance carriers, data [terms of service] lines and bank services, credit card companies, banking institutions, credit union, utility service providers, including power and internet/data, any and all state licenses, payroll, [human resources], retirement, [F]ranchise [T]ax [B]oard, Chamber of Commerce, water, sewer, and electricity providers, vehicle registration, website domain information, lengthy and uncontrolled updates with software mapping sites … , all landlord/business and property owner or operator tenant contract agreements, and changes of address with all vendors and other delivery operators,” which necessitated “pay[ing] for attorneys[] and[/]or [certified public accountant]s.” “In addition, if the business address is listed on the driver licenses, California IDs, Real California IDs, and passports those would have to be changed, and the business owners would have to expect longer response time of emergency service[s].”

Plaintiff questioned the renaming process. Under its rules and procedures for meetings, City Council “permits items to be placed on the ‘consent calendar’ but only if the items are ‘considered routine’ and ‘not controversial.’ ” However, in February 2022, City Council placed on its consent calendar Resolution No. 2022-053, which endeavored to “change [East] Kings Canyon [Road] and [East] Ventura Ave[nue] to Cesar Chavez Boulevard.” City Council purposely did this because the renaming “was very controversial” and “driven by ideology and politics” and councilmembers “did not wish to debate it, did not want the opposition to know about it, and already knew it would pass it.” When it adopted the resolution, City Council agreed to form an advisory committee “ ‘comprised of business owners and residents who will be affected by this Resolution’ ” that “ ‘shall meet as needed.’ ” Yet, “no committee was ever formed,” “no meetings ever occurred,” and City Council never explained this “course-reversal.” City Council also did not “discuss or consider any alternative ways to ‘honor’ [Cesar] Chavez, or why it … was necessary to rename a street, or an historical street, or two historical streets as was the case here.”

In July 2022, a PowerPoint presentation “regarding the procedures for street name changes” was “buried” within City Council’s meeting agenda. The presentation, prepared by City’s public works department, “was directed at all [three] streets” even though West California Avenue “was not even included in the February 2022 resolution”; detailed “the street name changes would affect 775 parcels and 3,150 addresses”; estimated the cost for “labor and materials to replace 260 signs would be $135,000.00”; “mentioned as a process to engage in public outreach, public hearings before the Planning Commission to consider a staff report and environmental documentation … , Public Safety Review and ceremonial street naming options”; and “recommended to give notice to all property owners and tenants located within a thousand feet” of the Alignment. However, “[n]o notice was provided to the residents, its business and property owners and operators impacted by the street name change” and City never engaged in the other aforementioned actions.

In March 2023, City Council “buried” on its consent calendar Resolution No. 2023-056, which directed City’s administration “to proceed with the renaming of [the Alignment], which runs east to west between Marks Avenue and Temperance Avenue to ‘Cesar Chavez Boulevard.’ ” City Council “never discussed nor considered alternative forms to ‘honor’ [Cesar] Chavez, nor ever stated why it decided to add [West] California Ave[nue] to the Renaming Project,” and “did not consult with police, fire or ambulance services for their input and concerns for emergency service responses.” The resolution “stated that notices would be sent to all property owners and tenants within 1,000 feet of the affected areas via U.S. mail and[/]or by publication in the Fresno Bee,” but “[n]one of the property owners, business owners, operators or tenants with businesses located on [the Alignment] were notified by U.S. mail” and “City did not notify anyone by publication in the Fresno Bee.” The resolution also “identified and allocated $1 million dollars in the fiscal year 2022–2023 budget in conjunction with the Renaming Project ‘to cover the application fees, labor and materials, replacement of existing street signs, replacement of [California Department of Transportation] freeway signage,’ and ‘reimburse businesses whose addresses are impacted by the street name change for actual and reasonable costs associated with the Renaming Project,” but “[t]here was no allocation by … City for reimbursing residents, property owners, or other business operators or tenants also affected” and “City provided no criteria for business reimbursement, nor any statement as to who with … City would make that determination, or any appeal process or hearing process for anyone who objected.”

Under the heading “First Cause of Action” (some capitalization omitted), plaintiff alleged City invalidly exercised its police power because (1) “Cesar Chavez has been honored already” (e.g., City’s Cesar Chavez Adult Education Center, a downtown mural, and a statue at California State University, Fresno) and “any further recognition [via the renaming of the Alignment] had no real or substantial relation to the public . . . health, welfare, public safety, morals nor for any other valid Municipal purpose, and was arbitrary, unreasonable, costly and capricious”; (2) “[e]ven if further honoring [Cesar] Chavez was rationally in furtherance of a municipal power,” the renaming of the Alignment significantly burdened plaintiff’s members and “less drastic measures were not even considered”; and (3) City “violate[d] [the] Due Process [and/]or the Free Speech/Association clauses of the California and/or U.S. Constitutions.”

Under the heading “Second Cause of Action” (some capitalization omitted), plaintiff alleged “Due Process requires that … City’s action be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly so that the people have confidence that the City Council members are acting only for good and altruistic reasons and have no hidden agendas,” but City “made no effort to notify the residents, property, and business owners of what [it] proposed to do.” Plaintiff also alleged its members had “significant property interests and goodwill and reputation in their businesses remaining on the street names and community they specifically chose on which to live and conduct their businesses”; “significant property and liberty interest[s] in residing in their homes they have lived in for decades”; and “significant liberty interest[s] in remaining free from being forced to be an everyday courier and mouthpiece for … City’s objectionable ideological and political message of honoring [Cesar] Chavez.”

Under the heading “Third Cause of Action” (some capitalization omitted), plaintiff alleged the renaming of the Alignment “denied Plaintiff the right to identify and speak with the street address they chose” and “compel[led] Plaintiff’s members to speak and write with a particular message by identifying themselves, their homes, and businesses with a street name they did not choose and a name to which they adamantly object, or with whom they do not wish to be associated.”

Under the heading “Fourth Cause of Action” (some capitalization omitted), plaintiff alleged “City’s resolutions to spend substantial amounts of public money to rename [the Alignment] to honor one of their icons [are] a waste of public funds” that should be enjoined pursuant to section 526a.

Under the heading “Fifth Cause of Action” (some capitalization omitted), plaintiff alleged the renaming of the Alignment “has singled out for disparate and unequal protection and impact the residents and business owners/operators on those

[three historic] streets which is a violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions ….”

b. City’s demurrer On May 20, 2024, City filed a demurrer. Among other things, it contended:

(1) with respect to the due process claim, plaintiff’s members “did not have a material right that could only be removed by due process of law in an adjudicatory proceeding”; (2) with respect to the free speech claim, City was “unaware of any authority standing for the proposition that changing a street name forces a property or business owner to ‘adopt’ a political message”; and (3) with respect to the equal protection claim, “Plaintiff does not have a right or interest in a street name,” “this matter does not involve a protected class such as race or religion,” and “[t]here was clearly a rational basis to honor Cesar Chavez.”

c. Ruling On July 31, 2024, the superior court issued a tentative ruling sustaining City’s demurrer as to the due process, free speech, and equal protection claims without leave to amend. The court concluded “these causes of action fail to identify how a right has been impinged to constitute an actual controversy.” On the other hand, the tentative ruling overruled City’s demurrer as to the police power and waste claims. On August 1, 2024, following a hearing, the court adopted its tentative ruling. II. Context of the February 26, 2025 judgment after the order granting City’s summary judgment motion a. City’s summary judgment motion On November 19, 2024, City filed a motion for summary judgment as to the remaining causes of action. City contended:

“The First Cause of Action for a violation of … City’s police powers is without merit because … City had the power to rename the streets in question and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that there is no basis to conclude that … City violated its police powers in renaming [West] California Avenue, [East]

Ventura [Avenue], and [East] Kings Canyon Road within the city limits to Cesar Chavez Boulevard. State law provides that a city may rename a street by resolution,[ 4] and there is nothing in the record that would lead to the conclusion that this process was arbitrary, capricious, or not allowed by law.

“The Fourth Cause of Action for a violation of … section 526a is without merit because the street renaming was a political act that involved a discretionary use of public funds. An action pursuant to Section 526a for an alleged waste of public funds cannot be based on a politically-based decision within a governing body’s discretion, and the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the street renaming project was a political decision with a discretionary outlay of budgeted funds.” b. Undisputed material facts The parties agreed on the following material facts: On February 11, 2022, City’s clerk posted the agenda for City Council’s February 17, 2022 regular meeting. Listed under the heading “Consent Calendar” (boldface, underscoring & some capitalization omitted) was item 1.-AA.: Resolution No. 2022-053 “[d]irecting [City’s] administration to present the processes to change [East] Kings Canyon [Road]/[East] Ventura [Avenue] to ‘Cesar Chavez Boulevard’ and directing the formation of a[] resident, business owner and stakeholder committee to engage the public and receive input, recommendations (Subject to Mayor’s Veto).” The resolution recited, among other things: “Cesar Chavez was a Mexican[-]American labor leader and civil rights activist who dedicated his life’s work to improving the living and working conditions of farm workers in the United States”; “Cesar Chavez’s life and work had a profound impact on the people of Fresno”; and “[City Council] from time to time may determine that the renaming of a City Street after individuals, events, or businesses will provide a source of pride and community recognition.”

4 “The legislative body of a county, city or city and county, … may by resolution change the name of any street, boulevard, park or place heretofore established ….” (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5026.)

At City Council’s February 17, 2022 regular meeting, 12 individuals publicly commented on Resolution No. 2022-053. For instance, one person opposed the resolution and advocated for renaming 2500 East Stanislaus Street—the address for Fresno Adult School—for Cesar Chavez. Afterward, City Council adopted the resolution, which instructed City’s administration “to pursue the process to change the name[s] of [East] Kings Canyon [Road] and [East] Ventura [Avenue] to Avenida Cesar Chavez.”

On July 18, 2022, City’s clerk posted the agenda for City Council’s July 21, 2022 regular meeting. Listed under the heading “General Administration” (boldface, underscoring & some capitalization omitted) was item 3.-D.: a workshop concerning “Procedures for Street Name Changes.” The agenda included a PowerPoint presentation for item 3.-D., which addressed the prospect of renaming West California Avenue along with East Kings Canyon Road and East Ventura Avenue as well as the option of ceremonial street naming, which would leave the original street names intact. City’s public works department submitted the PowerPoint presentation at the July 21, 2022 regular meeting.

On March 3, 2023, City’s clerk posted the agenda for City Council’s March 9, 2023 regular meeting. Listed under the heading “Consent Calendar” (boldface, underscoring & some capitalization omitted) was item 1.-S.: Resolution No. 2023-056 “[t]o begin the process to change [East] Kings Canyon [Road]/[East] Ventura [Avenue] to ‘Cesar Chavez Boulevard’ (Subject to Mayor’s veto)” (some capitalization omitted). As before, the resolution recited: “Cesar Chavez was a Mexican[-]American labor leader and civil rights leader … who dedicated his life’s work to improving the living and working conditions of farm workers in the United States”; “Cesar Chavez’s life and work had a profound impact on the people of Fresno”; and “[City Council] from time to time may determine that the renaming of a City Street after individuals, events, or businesses will provide a source of pride and community recognition.” The resolution also recited:

“on February 17, 2022, [City] Council passed Resolution No. 2022-053 directing [City’s] Administration to pursue a name change for … [East] Kings Canyon [Road]/[East] Ventura [Avenue] … to ‘Avenida Cesar Chavez’ ”; “[City] Council now desires to begin the process to change the name of [the Alignment], which runs east to west between Marks Avenue and Temperance Avenue to ‘Cesar Chavez Boulevard’ (the Renaming Project)”; and “City Council identified and allocated $1 million dollars in the Fiscal Year 2022–23 budget in conjunction with the Renaming Project to cover the application fee, labor and materials, replacement of existing City street signs, [and] replacement of [California Department of Transportation] freeway signage.”

On March 8, 2023, City Council received written public comments regarding Resolution No. 2023-056, which were compiled in a supplemental packet. In one letter, the Sunnyside Property Owners Association provided a history of East Kings Canyon Road and maintained “there will be numerous opportunities to appropriately recognize local community leaders and historic individuals on streets and public places” “[w]ith unprecedented growth and the [Southeast Development Area] Plan update.”

At City Council’s March 9, 2023 regular meeting, Councilmember Luis Chavez moved item 1.-S. to the “Contested Consent Calendar” (boldface, underscoring & some capitalization omitted). Thereafter, 25 individuals publicly commented on Resolution No. 2023-056. Opponents of the resolution proposed several alternatives to honor Cesar Chavez, including renaming 2500 East Stanislaus Street, renaming a trailway, and renaming a planned community. Others suggested omitting West California Avenue from consideration. Following public comments, City Council discussed the matter further. Councilmember Chavez noted he received feedback both in favor of and against the resolution and outlined his reasons for supporting its passage. He made a motion to approve item 1.-S., which was seconded by Councilmember Miguel Arias. Council Vice- President Annalisa Perea asked and received answers from councilmembers Chavez and Arias about West California Avenue’s recent inclusion in the renaming. Councilmember

Arias expressed his support for the resolution while Councilmember Garry Bredefeld expressed his opposition thereto. By a vote of six to one, City Council adopted Resolution No. 2023-056. 5 Section 15-6204 of City’s Municipal Code, which took effect January 9, 2016, provides: “Street name changes shall comply with adopted City policies regarding Street Name Procedures.” At no point before or during the process of renaming the Alignment did City Council “formally adopt[] any specific policies or procedures for street name changes.”

c. Ruling On February 3, 2025, the superior court issued a tentative ruling granting City’s summary judgment motion. With respect to the first cause of action, the court found “no triable issues of material fact” “as Plaintiff fails to overcome its burden to rebut” the “factual contention that the changing of the street names was an exercise of police power” and “the presumption” the renaming of the Alignment was valid. With respect to the fourth cause of action, the court found “no triable issues as to the issue of public waste” given “there is no identification of any duty imposed on [City] to refrain from changing street names” and “the purpose of the renaming was to honor [Cesar Chavez],” a “political issue, which is not subject to a waste action.” On February 4, 2025, following a hearing, the court adopted its tentative ruling. Judgment was entered February 26, 2025.

5 As noted, Resolution No. 2023-056 called for the renaming of the Alignment “between Marks Avenue and Temperance Avenue,” a 10.25-mile stretch. The resolution also “encouraged” the Fresno County Board of Supervisors “to effectuate the change within County jurisdiction.” However, on April 11, 2023, the board of supervisors unanimously adopted a resolution “preserving the historic naming of [West] California Ave[nue] and [East] Kings Canyon Road through county jurisdictions.” (Some capitalization omitted.) As a result, only approximately seven miles of the Alignment between South Marks Avenue and South Peach Avenue were renamed.

DISCUSSION

I. Notwithstanding subsequent acts or events that have rendered this appeal moot, we exercise our discretion under the public interest exception to consider the appeal on the merits As noted, pending this appeal, City adopted resolutions that reverted Cesar Chavez Boulevard back to the original street names. In its letter brief, City contended “[t]his appeal is clearly moot” and should be dismissed since “[t]he situation now is exactly how it existed prior to the street re[nam]ing.” (See In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404 [“ ‘[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.’ ”].) In its letter brief, plaintiff appeared to concede City’s latest resolutions rendered the appeal moot but asserted this court still has the discretion to decide the appeal under the public interest exception. (See In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 23 [“[I]f a pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot.”].)

This court recently applied the public interest exception to mootness in Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 88 (Ghost Golf). In that case, Governor Gavin Newsom and the State Department of Public Health—pursuant to the California Emergency Services Act (Gov. Code, § 8550 et seq.) and Health and Safety Code section 120140, respectively—issued in August 2020 the “Blueprint for a Safer Economy” (Blueprint), “which implemented a color-coded, risk-based framework for tightening and loosening restrictions on activities during the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Ghost Golf, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 94; accord, id. at p. 96.) The plaintiffs—two businesses affected by the Blueprint—filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, (1) the Governor lacked statutory authority to implement the Blueprint; and (2) a broad interpretation of the

California Emergency Services Act violated the California Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine. (Ghost Golf, at pp. 94, 96.) They then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which was denied by the superior court. (Id. at p. 95; accord, id. at pp. 96– 97.) Pending the plaintiffs’ appeal from the order denying injunctive relief, the Governor signed a June 11, 2021 executive order rescinding the Blueprint. (Id. at pp. 95, 97.) In a nonpublished opinion, this court “dismissed the appeal as moot because we could no longer grant [the] plaintiffs effective relief on their motion for a preliminary injunction.” (Id. at p. 95; accord, id. at p. 97.)

Thereafter, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment in the underlying lawsuit. (Ghost Golf, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 95, 97.) The superior court granted the defendants’ motion and denied the plaintiffs’ motion on the grounds the California Emergency Services Act (1) authorized the Governor to enact the Blueprint; and (2) was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor. (Ghost Golf, at p. 97.) The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment. (Id. at p. 98.) The defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis “the rescission of the Blueprint renders plaintiffs’ challenges to the Blueprint moot.” (Id. at p. 99.) Although we agreed “the appeal is moot” (ibid.) since “there is no longer anything to enjoin under [the] plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction, and a judgment as to the Blueprint’s validity would have no effect” (id. at p. 100), we nevertheless held “the public interest exception to mootness applies in this case” (id. at p. 99). We explained:

“[T]he issues presented here are not ‘essentially factual.’ [The p]laintiffs’ action challenges both the scope and constitutionality of the Governor’s emergency police power. As to its scope, [the] plaintiffs contend the [California Emergency Services Act] authorizes the Governor only to enforce existing laws, not to make new laws. They base this argument on a narrow interpretation of the term ‘police power’ as used in [Government Code] section 8627. As to the [California Emergency Services Act]’s constitutionality, [the] plaintiffs contend an interpretation of the [California Emergency Services Act] as authorizing the Governor to ‘make law’ would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power…. The question of whether the [California Emergency Services Act] allows the Governor to ‘make law’ in a state of emergency is an evergreen question that could arise in the context of any type of emergency. The same is true with whether the [California Emergency Services Act] unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Governor. Thus, were we to agree with [the] plaintiffs on either the scope or constitutionality of the [California Emergency Services Act], such a decision could foreseeably affect the Governor’s exercise of authority in other types of emergencies, not just emergencies involving diseases. For these reasons, the precise questions plaintiffs raise could be raised in the context of any state of emergency where the Governor seeks to ‘make law’ under the [California Emergency Services Act]. We therefore conclude that this case raises questions of broad public interest that are likely to recur.” (Ghost Golf, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.) We also find instructive Downtown Palo Alto Com. for Fair Assessment v. City Council (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 384 (Downtown Palo Alto). There, the city enacted an ordinance creating a downtown parking and business improvement area pursuant to the Parking and Business Improvement Act of 1979 (Sts. & Hy. Code, former § 36500 et seq.). (Downtown Palo Alto, supra, at p. 391.) The plaintiffs—a coalition of business operators affected by the ordinance—petitioned for writ relief. (Id. at p. 389.) Among other things, they argued the ordinance was invalid because the city failed to strictly comply with the notice provisions set forth in Streets and Highways Code former section 36522. (See Downtown Palo Alto, at pp. 389, 391–392.) The superior court found the ordinance valid and denied the petition. (Id. at p. 389.) It then denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and for a new trial. (Ibid.) While the appeal was pending, the city dissolved the downtown parking and business improvement area. (Id. at p. 391.) Division One of the First Appellate District recognized the dissolution “rendered moot the issues presented on appeal,” “[t]he validity of the ordinance is no longer of consequence to the parties before this court,” and “[a]ny ruling by this court can have no practical impact or provide [the] appellants effectual relief.” (Ibid.) Yet, invoking the public interest exception (ibid.), the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the plaintiffs’ “strict compliance” claim (see id. at pp. 391–393), which necessitated interpretation of Streets and Highways Code former section 36522 (see Downtown Palo Alto, at pp. 394–396). It reasoned:

“There is nothing in the record to indicate that the [c]ity intends to reenact the ordinance or otherwise attempt to establish a business and parking improvement area. But there was adduced testimony by Lee Strong, Mayor of Whittier, California, to the Palo Alto City Council prior to enactment of the ordinance, that ‘about fifty cities in California’ have enacted similar ordinances under authority of the Parking and Business Improvement Act of 1979 …. Hence, the question of whether strict or merely substantial compliance with the directive of [Streets and Highways Code former] section 36522 that ‘each business’ in the proposed improvement area be mailed notice of hearing and the intention to establish an improvement area is required, presents an issue of public concern which may recur in Palo Alto, or more likely in a number of other cities.” (Downtown Palo Alto, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at pp. 391–392, fn. omitted.) In the instant case, the overarching question of whether City may rename one of its streets after a polarizing figure necessitates an examination of both (1) the scope of a local government’s police power; and (2) the constitutionality of that entity’s exercise of that power with respect to state and federal free speech rights. (Cf. Ghost Golf, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.) The proper resolution of such legal issues is of sufficient import to the general public. (See ibid.; cf. Leenay v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 553, 573 [“The proper interpretation of a statute presents a matter of public interest.”].) As per City’s filings, the renaming of streets is commonly carried out not only by City but also other municipalities throughout the state and even nationwide. (Cf. Downtown Palo Alto, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at pp. 391–392, fn. omitted.) It is thus conceivable the foregoing issues could be raised again here or elsewhere. That no published case currently addresses them further militates in favor of a decision on the merits. (See In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1218 [“ ‘Even when moot, a novel question of continuing public interest is often deserving of consideration by an appellate court.’ ”].)

Because the case before us involves a broad public interest that is reasonably likely to recur, “we consider it appropriate not to sidestep but to determine the case, and thereby provide [other] courts and litigants in the future with definitive guidance on the question.” (Butler v. County of Los Angeles (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 633, 638.) II. Plaintiff’s appeal from the August 1, 2024 judgment of dismissal after the order sustaining City’s demurrer in part As noted, plaintiff contends on appeal the superior court erroneously sustained City’s demurrer as to the free speech claim because the renaming of the Alignment compelled plaintiff’s members who reside or run a business on or near the Alignment “to carry or convey [City’s] preferred ideological message.” We conclude the demurrer was properly sustained because the renaming of the Alignment did not infringe on plaintiff’s members’ free speech. 6 a. Standard of review “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] On appeal from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the complaint de novo in order to ascertain ‘whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being assumed true for this purpose.’ [Citation.] We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and viewing its parts in context. [Citations.] We assume the truth of the properly pleaded

6 Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), an issue must be stated “under a separate heading or subheading” and supported “by citation of authority.” “Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.” (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) In the body of its opening brief, plaintiff suggested the superior court erroneously sustained City’s demurrer as to the due process and equal protection claims. Because these points are not placed under proper headings and supported by legal authority, we need not address them.

factual allegations, facts that can be reasonably inferred from those pleaded, and facts of which judicial notice can be taken. [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of pleaded contentions and legal conclusions. [Citations.] And we may disregard allegations which are contrary to law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken. [Citation.]” (In re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1263.) “Appellants bear the burden of demonstrating the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer ….” (Ibid.)

b. Free speech under federal and state Constitutions The First Amendment to the federal Constitution, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 638–639 (Barnette); Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 484 (Gerawan)), prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech, … or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.). “While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the [First] Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.” (Healy v. James (1972) 408 U.S. 169, 181; see Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 622 [“[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”].)

Under article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution (article I), “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right” and “[a] law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” “As a general rule, … article I’s free speech clause and its right to freedom of speech are not only as broad and as great as the First Amendment’s, they are even ‘broader’ and ‘greater.’ [Citations.]” (Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 491.) “First, article I’s free speech clause, unlike the First Amendment’s, specifies a ‘right’ to freedom of speech explicitly and not merely by implication.” (Ibid.) “Second, article I’s right to freedom of speech, unlike the First Amendment’s, is unbounded in range. It runs against the world, including private parties as well as government actors.” (Id. at p. 492.) “Third, article I’s right to freedom of speech, unlike the First Amendment’s, is ‘unlimited’ in scope. [Citations.] Whereas the First Amendment does not embrace all subjects, article I does indeed do so, in ipsissimis verbis ….” (Id. at p. 493.) “However, ‘[m]erely because [article I] is worded more expansively and has been interpreted as more protective than the First Amendment … does not mean that it is broader than the First Amendment in all its applications.’ [Citations.]” (Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Management, LLC (2013) 58 Cal.4th 329, 341.) State case law “interpreting California’s free speech clause has given respectful consideration to First Amendment case law for its persuasive value ….” (Ibid.) “Thus, in appropriate situations … article I [has been construed] in a manner congruent with prevailing interpretations of the First Amendment.” (Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Com. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1204, 1221 (Delano Farms).)

i. Government speech doctrine “[A]s a general matter, when [a] government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and it carries out its duties on their behalf.” (Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 200, 208 (Walker).) “[W]hen it speaks, the government inevitably will express viewpoints that some members of the body politic not only disagree with, but indeed find highly objectionable.” (Delano Farms, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1222.) Nonetheless, “[t]his purposive messaging represents an integral and, on the whole, beneficial part of the government’s basic functioning.” (Ibid.) Without such latitude, “government would not work.” (Walker, supra, at p. 207; see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009) 555 U.S. 460, 468 (Pleasant Grove) [“ ‘If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed.’ ”]; Miller v. California Com. on Status of Women (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 693, 701 (Miller) [“If the government cannot address controversial topics it cannot govern.”].)

“[I]t is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on governmental speech.” (Walker, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 207.) “When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.” (Board of Regents v. Southworth (2000) 529 U.S. 217, 235; see Shurtleff v. City of Boston (2022) 596 U.S. 243, 252 [“The Constitution therefore relies first and foremost on the ballot box, not on rules against viewpoint discrimination, to check the government when it speaks.”]; Delano Farms, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1222 [“[T]he electorate and the political process ultimately will determine what the government does and does not say.”].)

These foregoing principles undergird what is known as the government speech doctrine, “a jurisprudential theory by which [a] government can regulate its own communication ‘without the constraint of viewpoint neutrality.’ [Citation.]” (Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. (9th Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d 871, 877.) In light of this doctrine, the “[f]ree speech guarantees under the federal and California Constitutions [generally] do not apply to government speech.” (Alliance Marc & Eva Stern Math & Science High School v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 930, 961, citing Pleasant Grove, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 467; Delano Farms, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1210– 1211; see Walker, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 207 [“When a government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.”]; Pleasant Grove, supra, at p. 467 [1st Amend. “does not regulate government speech”]; Gundy v.

City of Jacksonville (11th Cir. 2022) 50 F.4th 60, 71 [1st Amend. “ ‘not [used] as a sword to compel the government to speak for [private persons]’ ”].)

ii. Compelled speech doctrine “That is not to say that a government’s ability to express itself is without restriction.” (Walker, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 208.) The right to freedom of speech under both the First Amendment and article I “comprises both a right to speak freely and also a right to refrain from doing so at all, and is therefore put at risk both by prohibiting a speaker from saying what he otherwise would say and also by compelling him to say what he otherwise would not say.” (Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 491; see Wooley v. Maynard (1977) 430 U.S. 705, 714 (Wooley) [“The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’ ”].) Hence, the First Amendment and article I “may constrain the government’s speech if … the government seeks to compel private persons to convey the government’s speech.” (Walker, supra, at p. 208; see Cressman v. Thompson (10th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3d 938, 950 (Cressman) [“[T]he government-speech and compelled-speech doctrines are concerned with different things: the former focuses on the government’s interest in expressing its own views, while the latter ‘involve[s] the government putting particular messages in the mouths of private speakers.’ ”]; Miller, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 701 [critical distinction between government’s addition of its own voice and government’s silencing of others].)

“[I]n order to make out a valid compelled-speech claim, a party must establish (1) speech; (2) to which he objects; that is (3) compelled by some governmental action.” (Cressman, supra, 798 F.3d at p. 951; accord, Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 204, 249.) “The crucial question is whether, in speaking, the government is compelling others to espouse or to suppress certain ideas and beliefs.” (Phelan v. Laramie County Community College Bd. of Trustees (10th Cir. 2000) 235 F.3d 1243, 1247, italics omitted (Phelan).) “ ‘In order to compel the exercise or suppression of speech, the government measure must punish, or threaten to punish, protected speech by governmental action that is “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.” ’ [Citation.]” (Cressman, supra, at p. 951.) “[T]he focus of compelled-speech analysis is ultimately … that the particular ideas expressed through [the challenged] speech ‘alter [the speaker’s] own message,’ [citation] – and thereby harm the speaker’s sacrosanct ‘sphere of intellect and spirit,’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 964.)

c. Title 42 United States Code section 1983 “Local governmental entities ‘ “can be sued directly under [title 42 United States Code section] 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted ….” ’ [Citation.] Local governmental entities also can be sued ‘ “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In addition, ‘ “[t]he plaintiff must … demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the [entity] was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the [governmental] action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the [governmental] action and the deprivation of federal rights.” ’ [Citation.]” (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1147, italics omitted; see Jones v. Williams (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3d 930, 934 [plaintiff must demonstrate governmental action resulted in deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory right].)

d. Analysis “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer … , to the pleading on … the … ground[] … [¶] … [¶] … [t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (§ 430.10, subd. (e).) “To show entitlement to reversal the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleged facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. If the plaintiff failed to plead, or if the defendant[] negated, any essential element of a particular cause of action, [the appellate] court should uphold the sustaining of the demurrer[].” (Los Altos Golf & Country Club v. County of Santa Clara (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 198, 203.)

In the operative complaint, plaintiff alleged (1) City passed a resolution that changed the names of the Alignment (i.e., East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, and West California Avenue) to Cesar Chavez Boulevard; (2) plaintiff’s members who resided or ran businesses on or near the Alignment did not want to be associated with Cesar Chavez Boulevard because its namesake was a “divisive” and “objectionable political figure”; and (3) as a result of the renaming, plaintiff’s members were forced to use addresses displaying Cesar Chavez Boulevard as the street name instead of the former ones and expend significant time and money to change their addresses on various accounts and documents as well as business signage. These facts were sufficient to establish government speech to which plaintiff objects. (See Cressman, supra, 798 F.3d at p. 951.)

The remaining question is whether the facts were also sufficient to establish whether plaintiff’s members were compelled to espouse or suppress certain ideas and beliefs. (See Phelan, supra, 235 F.3d at p. 1247.) In resolving this issue, we find the United States Supreme Court cases of Barnette and Wooley illustrative.

In Barnette, West Virginia’s Board of Education enacted a resolution requiring children in public schools to regularly salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. (Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at pp. 625–629 & fns. 1–2.) As per this resolution, the refusal to conform would be “ ‘regarded as an act of insubordination’ ” and “ ‘dealt with accordingly.’ ” (Id. at p. 626; accord, id. at pp. 626–628, fn. 2.) In practice, noncompliant children were expelled and—under state law—could be “proceeded against as a delinquent.” (Id. at p. 629; accord, id. at p. 629, fns. 5–6.) Additionally, pursuant to state law, the parents or guardians of these “ ‘unlawfully absent’ ” children were “liable to prosecution” (id. at p. 629) “for causing delinquency”

(id. at p. 630) and—if convicted—“subject to [a] fine not exceeding $50 and [a] jail term not exceeding thirty days” (id. at p. 629). (See id. at pp. 629–630 & fns. 5, 7–8.) The United States Supreme Court held “the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.” (Id. at p. 642.) The high court noted:

“[T]he compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind…. To sustain [these actions] we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. [¶] … [¶]

“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein….” (Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at pp. 633–634, 642.) In Wooley, a New Hampshire law required noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates embossed with the state motto “ ‘Live Free or Die.’ ” (Wooley, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 707, fn. omitted.) Another state statute made it a misdemeanor to knowingly obscure “ ‘the figures or letters on any number plate,’ ” including said motto. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs George and Maxine Maynard, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, found the motto repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs and covered up the wording on their license plates. (Id. at pp. 707–708.) As a result, George was repeatedly fined for committing a misdemeanor and—due to his refusal to pay these fines—served a 15-day jail sentence. (Id. at p. 708.) The United States Supreme Court concluded the state “may not require appellees to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates ….” (Id. at p. 717, fn. omitted.) The high court explained:

“Here, … we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life—indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view—to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State ‘invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.’ [Citation.]

“New Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message—or suffer a penalty, as [George] already has. As a condition to driving an automobile—a virtual necessity for most Americans—the Maynards must display ‘Live Free or Die’ to hundreds of people each day. The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New Hampshire’s motto is not the test …. The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.” (Wooley, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 715, fn. omitted.) In view of Barnette and Wooley, we conclude the facts alleged were insufficient to establish plaintiff’s members were compelled to espouse or suppress certain ideas and beliefs. That plaintiff’s members had to reside or run a business on or near the renamed Cesar Chavez Boulevard and/or update their addresses to reflect this street name instead of East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, or West California Avenue, which ensured their homes or enterprises could be physically located, “is simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto ‘Live Free or Die ….’ ” (Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (2006) 547 U.S. 47, 62; see ibid. [“There is nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that … must [be] endorse[d].”].) Also, in contrast to Barnette and Wooley, the instant case did not involve a government measure that punished or threatened to punish plaintiff’s members’ protected speech by regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory action. (See Cressman, supra, 798 F.3d at p. 951; cf. Wooley, supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 707–708, fns. omitted [fines and 15-day jail term]; Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. at pp. 629–630 & fns. 5–8 [expulsion from school and criminal liability for delinquency]; cf. also Baird v. State Bar of Arizona (1971) 401 U.S. 1, 4–5 [State Bar denied admission to applicant who refused to answer question asking whether she “had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence’ ”]; Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) 385 U.S. 589, 591–592 [state university did not renew contract of faculty member who refused to sign certificate attesting “he was not a Communist” and dismissed nonfaculty employee who refused to answer question, “ ‘Have you ever advised or taught or were you ever a member of any society or group of persons which taught or advocated the doctrine that the Government of the United States or of any political subdivisions thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means?’ ”].) Far from becoming “instrument[s] for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view [they] find[] unacceptable” (Wooley, supra, at p. 715), plaintiff’s members “remained free to express [their opposing] views publicly and to criticize ….” (Phelan, supra, 235 F.3d at p. 1248.)

Plaintiff points out its members were “singled out” to shoulder the “administrative burden” of the Alignment’s renaming. This, however, is immaterial to a free speech claim. (See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (1976) 427 U.S. 50, 78 (conc. opn. of Powell, J.) [“The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact; rather, it looks only to the effect of th[e] [government action] upon freedom of expression.”]; Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 470, 497 [“To the extent [city and county] chose to exercise its discretion in a manner [plaintiff] feel[s] disfavors one group of people or one point of view over another, we need only state the obvious: Governing requires policy choices to be made. And in carrying out those choices, government must speak—and the First Amendment does not constrain what it says.”].) 7

7 On appeal, plaintiff asserts that if this court finds the demurrer should have been overruled as to the free speech claim, the demurrer also should have been overruled with respect to the equal protection claim. Having decided the demurrer was properly sustained as to the free speech claim, we necessarily reject this argument.

III. Plaintiff’s appeal from the February 26, 2025 judgment after the order granting City’s summary judgment motion Plaintiff contends the superior court erroneously granted summary judgment as to the causes of action for invalid exercise of police power and waste of public funds. We conclude summary judgment was proper because there is no triable issue of material fact and City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

a. Overview of summary judgment law “A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (§ 437c, subd. (a)(1).) Summary judgment “provide[s] courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); see Lee v. Marchetti (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 97, 99 [“ ‘The salient philosophy behind this procedural device is to provide a method for the prompt disposition of actions and proceedings which have no merit and in which there is no triable material issue of fact [citation].’ ” (italics omitted)].)

A summary judgment motion “shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken. The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (§ 437c, subd. (b)(1).) An opposition to a summary judgment motion “shall consist of affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) “The opposition papers shall include a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating if the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)

“The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).)

A defendant seeking summary judgment bears an initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating either one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849, 854–855.) If the motion is made against a plaintiff who would bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence at trial, the defendant “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact not to find any underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 851, italics & fn. omitted.) If the defendant makes a prima facie showing, 8 then the burden of production “shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

8 “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [Citation.] No more is called for.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 851.)

“The plaintiff … shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); accord, Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, at p. 850, fn. omitted.) “[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion[ 9] that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

b. Standard of review “When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, we independently consider whether a triable issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment or adjudication as a matter of law.” (Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 631, fn. omitted.) “In other words, we must assume the role of the trial court and reassess the merits of the motion. [Citation.] In doing so, we will consider only the facts properly before the trial court at the time it ruled on the motion. [Citation.]” (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601.)

“We apply the same three-step analysis required of the trial court. First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond. Second, we determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in the moving party’s favor. When a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the

9 Whereas a burden of production entails only the presentation of evidence, a burden of persuasion entails the establishment of a requisite degree of belief by way of such evidence. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493–494.) “Our obligation is ‘ “ ‘to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues themselves.’ ” ’ [Citation.] We must ‘ “consider all of the evidence” and “all” of the “inferences” reasonably drawn therefrom [citation], and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations], in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’ [Citations.]” (See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900.) “ ‘We are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationale. Instead, we review the summary judgment without deference to the trial court’s determination of questions of law.’ [Citation.]” (McGarry v. Sax (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 983, 994; see Stoltenberg v. Newman (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 287, 293 [“[W]e may affirm the summary judgment on a ground that was not the basis of the trial court’s ruling.”].)

c. Analysis – police power Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides: “A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” “Under the police power granted by the [state] Constitution, counties and cities have plenary authority to govern, subject only to the limitation that they exercise this power within their territorial limits and subordinate to state law.” (Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885.) Subject to this limitation, “the police power of a county or city is as broad as the police power exercised by the state Legislature itself.” (Conejo Wellness Center, Inc. v. City of Agoura Hills (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1552.) “The police power extends to legislative objectives in furtherance of public peace, safety, morals, health and welfare.” (Massingill v. Department of Food & Agriculture (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 498, 504 (Massingill).) Furthermore, “the police power is not a circumscribed prerogative, but is elastic and, in keeping with the growth of knowledge and the belief in the popular mind of the need for its application, capable of expansion to meet existing conditions of modern life and thereby keep pace with the social, economic, moral, and intellectual evolution of the human race.” (Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 485.) “A legislative body, in the exercise of its police power, has a broad discretion to determine both what public interests are and the measures necessary for the protection of such interests.” (Justesen’s Food Stores, Inc. v. City of Tulare (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 616, 621 (Justesen’s).)

“Whether a law is a constitutional exercise of the police power is a judicial question.” (Massingill, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 504.) A municipal ordinance or regulation “will ordinarily be upheld if ‘it is reasonably related to promoting the public health, safety, comfort, and welfare, and if the means adopted to accomplish that promotion are reasonably appropriate to the purpose. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners (1972) 7 Cal.3d 64, 72.) “The determination of the need for a mode of exercising the [police] power is primarily for the legislative body and the courts will not hold enactments invalid unless they are palpably unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, having no tendency to promote the public welfare, safety, morals, or general welfare.” (Justesen’s, supra, 43 Cal.App.2d at p. 621.) “A law is presumed to be a valid exercise of police power. The party challenging the law has the burden of establishing it does not reasonably relate to a legitimate government concern.” (Massingill, supra, at p. 504; see Arcadia Development Co. v. City of Morgan Hill (2011)

197 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1536 [“City’s exercise of its constitutionally derived police power is subject to substantial deference from the judicial branch.”].) 10 According to undisputed material facts, one of City’s objectives is to promote “pride and community recognition.” (See Disney v. City of Concord (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1416 [“ ‘ “The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.” ’ ”]; cf. Wooley, supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 716–717 [fostering appreciation of history and state pride a legitimate government interest]; Miller, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 701 [“ ‘Government has legitimate interests in informing, in educating, and in persuading.’ ”].) It recognized Cesar Chavez’s efforts “to improv[e] the living and working conditions of farm workers in the United States” “had a profound impact on the people of Fresno” 11 and determined that renaming the Alignment—a prominent downtown throughfare—in his honor would advance the aforementioned objective. We do not find City’s action “palpably unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious ….” (Justesen’s, supra, 43 Cal.App.2d at p. 621.)

Plaintiff insists the renaming of the Alignment is “completely arbitrary and unreasonable” because, among other things, (1) Cesar Chavez “was not born in Fresno”; “was not raised in Fresno”; “never lived in Fresno”; “was not part of the [B]lack community of [West] California Ave[nue] nor the Armenian Community of [East]

10 Plaintiff curiously cites Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129 for the “clear” proposition “the test is not one of ‘rational basis.’ ” This is incorrect. (See Birkenfeld v. Berkeley, supra, at p. 161 [“[O]ur task is to review the findings … and to sustain the propriety of rent controls under the police power unless the findings establish a complete absence of even a debatable rational basis for the legislative determination by the Berkeley electorate that rent control is a reasonable means of counteracting harms and dangers to the public health and welfare emanating from a housing shortage.”].)

11 On September 30, 1962, Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta established the National Farm Workers Association (predecessor of the United Farm Workers). Thereafter, the labor union held its January 21, 1963 constitutional convention in Fresno, where Cesar Chavez was named as president. (See Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (f), 452, subds. (g)–(h).)

Ventura Ave[nue]”; and had no “association” with either East Kings Canyon Road, East Ventura Avenue, or West California Avenue; (2) the renaming was politically motivated (3) the reach of the renaming was limited to “[City’s] south end”; and (4) other streets (e.g., “Blackstone, Shaw, Van Ness or Olive”) had “a lot more drivers, businesses and residents” and—if renamed instead of the Alignment—would have had “more eyeballs seeing [the Cesar Chavez Boulevard] street signs.”

None of these reasons convince us to overturn City’s action. “A court is not concerned with the wisdom or policy of the law [enacted under police power] and cannot substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body. If reasonable minds might differ as to the reasonableness of the regulation, the law must be upheld.” (Justesen’s, supra, 43 Cal.App.2d at p. 621; see Simpson v. City of Los Angeles (1935) 4 Cal.2d 60, 65 [“[I]f the constitutional limits of the exercise of the [police] power have not been transcended, that is, if there be any rational basis for its exercise in the particular case, the motive actuating the legislative body becomes immaterial and not a proper subject of inquiry, and the court will not substitute its opinion or judgment for that of the legislative body.”].)

Nor do we find persuasive plaintiff’s claim its members were “substantially burdened” by the renaming. (See California Reduction Company v. Sanitary Works (1905) 199 U.S. 306, 318 [“[N]o person has an absolute right ‘to be at all times and in all circumstances wholly freed from restraint;’ … ‘persons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and general prosperity of the State.’ ”]; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino (1946) 29 Cal.2d 332, 338 [“[T]he mere fact that some hardship is experienced is not material, since ‘Every exercise of the police power is apt to affect adversely the property interest of somebody.’ ”].)

Finally, plaintiff contends City “violated its police power” because “[its] process in renaming [the Alignment] was procedurally unfair” (boldface & capitalization omitted). (See South Lake Tahoe Property Owners Group v. City of South Lake Tahoe

(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 735, 747 [“Police power is not limitless. The due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions ‘are the most basic substantive checks’ on a government’s exercise of its police power. [Citation.] In general, a city does not violate due process so long as its regulation ‘is procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal.’ ”].)

“Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before governmental deprivation of a significant property interest.” (Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612.) “The procedural component of the [federal] Due Process Clause does not protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit’: ‘To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire’ and ‘more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’ [Citation.] Such entitlements are, ‘ “of course, … not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” ’ [Citations.]” (Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) 545 U.S. 748, 756.) Similarly, the California Constitution’s due process clause (see Cal. Const., art. 1, § 7, subd. (a)) “does not protect all conceivable property interests, but only those property interests or benefits that are conferred by statute” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 855).

Here, to the extent plaintiff contends its members have a property interest in street names, it fails to cite any statute conferring such interest. (Cf. Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5026 [“The legislative body of a county, city or city and county, … may by resolution change the name of any street, boulevard, park or place heretofore established ….”].) Plaintiff cites section 15-6204 of City’s Municipal Code, which provides “[s]treet name changes shall comply with adopted City policies regarding Street Name Procedures,” but does not cite any municipal code provision suggesting a property interest in street names was granted to the public. Moreover, it is an undisputed material fact City did not adopt any formal policies or procedures for street name changes before or during the process of renaming the Alignment 12 and plaintiff offers no municipal code provision obligating City to do so.

“It is equally well settled … that only those governmental decisions which are adjudicative in nature are subject to procedural due process principles. Legislative action is not burdened by such requirements.” (Horn v. County of Ventura, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 612, italics omitted.) Here, the challenged action was inherently legislative. (See Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5026; see also Crowe v. Boyle (1920) 184 Cal. 117, 149 [“[A] legislative act may be either in the form of a resolution or of an ordinance.”].) In addition, while City was not beholden to procedural due process principles, undisputed material facts demonstrate both notice and opportunities to be heard were afforded to the public. Agendas for City Council’s regular meetings on February 17 and July 21, 2022, and March 9, 2023, were posted at least 72 hours in advance and described the items of business to be discussed, which included matters related to the renaming of the Alignment. (See Gov. Code, § 54954.2, subd. (a).) Public comments were made orally at the February 17, 2022, and March 9, 2023 meetings and in writing prior to the March 9, 2023 meeting, which included numerous statements opposing the renaming of the Alignment and proposing alternatives thereto. Toward the end of the March 9, 2023 meeting, after receiving these comments, councilmembers acknowledged the positive and negative feedback and then registered their reasons for supporting or not supporting the renaming.

12 Thus, any language in Resolution No. 2022-053 calling for the formation of an advisory committee and meetings did not constitute a formal policy and procedure. In any event, Resolution No. 2023-056, which expressly recognized Resolution No. 2022- 053, recited City Council’s desire to proceed with the renaming, apparently dispensing with the committee. (See City of Sausalito v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 564 [“The power to legislate includes by necessary implication the power to amend existing legislation.”].)

d. Analysis – section 526a Section 526a, subdivision (a) provides: “An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency ….”

Such taxpayer suits “are authorized only if the government body has a duty to act and has refused to do so. If it has discretion and chooses not to act, the courts may not interfere with that decision.” (Daily Journal Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557–1558.) “ ‘[T]he term “waste” as used in section 526a means something more than an alleged mistake by public officials in matters involving the exercise of judgment or wide discretion. To hold otherwise would invite constant harassment of city and county officers by disgruntled citizens and could seriously hamper our representative form of government at the local level. Thus, the courts should not take judicial cognizance of disputes which are primarily political in nature, nor should they attempt to enjoin every expenditure which does not meet with a taxpayer’s approval.…’ [Citation.]” (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101, 1138–1139; see Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 482–483 [§ 526a’s prohibition against waste does not apply “to the vast majority of discretionary decisions made by state and local units of government”]; Humane Society of the United States v. State Bd. of Equalization (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 349, 356 [§ 526a “should not be applied to principally ‘political’ issues or issues involving the exercise of the discretion of either the legislative or executive branches of government”].)

Undisputed material facts demonstrate the renaming of the Alignment was discretionary rather than ministerial. Also, plaintiff alleged below and in its appellate briefs that the renaming was political. Therefore, section 526a was inapplicable.

On appeal, plaintiff maintains the waste claim “survives” because “th[is] Court must find that … City violated its police power and/or violated the free speech rights of [plaintiff’s] members.” We necessarily reject this argument: as previously discussed, we found City validly exercised its police power and did not infringe on plaintiff’s members’ free speech.

DISPOSITION

The August 1, 2024 judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer in part and February 26, 2025 judgment after an order granting a motion for summary judgment are affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendant and respondent City of Fresno.

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

Meehan, J., Dissenting.

Under the circumstances presented in the record, the parties’ briefs and oral argument, I join the majority in concluding the appeal is moot because respondent City of Fresno (City) reverted the at-issue streets back to their original names, effectively granting 1 Community Compact (plaintiff) the ultimate relief it sought. I respectfully part company with the majority, however, in reaching the merits under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. For reasons I will explain below, I am unconvinced the legal issues raised are likely to recur in this context, and even if they were, there are no compelling justifications to issue an advisory opinion, especially one addressing constitutional issues, under the public interest exception. Consequently, I would not exercise inherent discretion to reach the merits and would dismiss the appeal as moot. I. The Appeal is Moot A case that initially presents a true controversy may become moot “‘if before decision it has, through act of the parties or other cause, occurring after the commencement of the action, lost that essential character .…’” (Wilson v. L.A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453.) An appeal is moot when any decision of the reviewing court “can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888; accord, Golden State Water Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 380, 393.) Typically, when changed circumstances render an appeal moot, the appeal is dismissed. (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 132.) Underlying the mootness doctrine is a fundamental principle of judicial restraint: “[a] court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.), quoting Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863.)

Here, plaintiff filed a complaint challenging City’s March 9, 2023, resolution renaming approximately 10 miles of three historical streets as Cesar Chavez Boulevard. Plaintiff asserted due process, free speech/association, and equal protection claims under the federal and California Constitutions, and state law claims challenging City’s exercise of police power and for public waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. The trial court dismissed the constitutional claims without leave to amend; City was subsequently granted summary judgment as to the state law claims. Plaintiff appealed. During the appeal, negative publicity about Cesar Chavez was reported in the media and, in response to this publicity, City passed additional resolutions in March and April 2026 reverting the streets recently renamed Cesar Chavez Boulevard back to their original street names.

Given this changed circumstance, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the appeal was moot and should be dismissed. City responded in the affirmative. Plaintiff did not expressly concede the appeal was moot, and briefly referenced the possibility of an award of attorney fees and costs as the prospect of a remedy that could have practical and tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status, but plaintiff did not develop the argument and primarily urged us to exercise our discretion to decide the appeal under an exception to the mootness doctrine—i.e., the public interest exception or because material questions remained.

Plaintiff’s passing reference in its brief to attorney fees and costs does not persuade me plaintiff may gain a practical benefit from our review of the trial court’s ruling on City’s demurer and summary judgment motion. The record does not show that attorney fees were awarded to either party, and the attorney fees plaintiff sought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 in the complaint do not provide for an automatic award of fees to a prevailing party. (See generally Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc.

v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 935 [Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 does not afford relief for “the enforcement of ‘any’ or ‘all’ statutory rights. [Rather] … the statute directs the judiciary to exercise judgment in attempting to ascertain the ‘strength’ or ‘societal importance’ of the rights involved”].) Even if plaintiff were to win on the merits of the appeal, this would only, at most, return the case to the trial court for further proceedings—it would not make plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees. (Cf. Panoche Energy Center, LLC v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 68, 96–97 [arbitration decision would drive prevailing party determination on automatic fee-shifting provision; review of trial court’s order vacating arbitration award would be outcome-determinative as to attorney fees, and appeal not moot as a result].)

Presented with no basis to conclude we can provide plaintiff with any effective relief after City’s reversion of the street names, I join the majority in concluding the appeal is moot. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276 [“[a] case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the] plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief”’”].) 1 II. Discretion to Reach the Merits Should Not Be Exercised “Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282; see City of Plymouth v. Superior Court (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 454, 460 [mootness is not a jurisdictional defect].) In general, discretion to review a moot case may be exercised when “‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s

1 Other than passing reference to attorney fees in its supplemental brief, which was not reasserted at oral argument, plaintiff has not identified any other effective relief that we could grant now that City has reverted the streets to their original names. Absent any other developed argument by plaintiff, I agree the appeal is moot.

determination.’” (D.P., supra, at p. 282; see Ghost Golf, Inc. v. Newsom (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 88, 100.)

The majority elects to exercise discretion to reach the merits, finding the parties’

dispute presents issues of broad public interest likely to recur. I remain unpersuaded we should do so, even to the extent we may have discretion to reach this otherwise moot appeal under the public interest exception.

Although it is clear that renaming public streets falls within the broad scope of general public interest, that alone does not justify invoking the public interest exception to reach the merits, and I respectfully disagree it justifies the majority’s election to do so. As an initial matter, it is not clear how likely these issues are to recur. (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23 [court may reach moot case where it poses an issue of broad public interest “that is likely to recur”].) City notes that government entities frequently name and rename streets after individuals who have made significant contributions to society, and the majority concludes it is, therefore, conceivable the issues presented here will arise again elsewhere. But this is a non sequitur: the majority points to no evidence or authority suggesting the bulk of these government actions is anything but routine. That governmental entities undisputedly name or rename streets after notable citizens as part of their ordinary duties says nothing about how likely this legal controversy is to recur, especially because the circumstances here strike me as particularly unique. 2 While I agree that anything is theoretically possible, I am unable to conclude with confidence “‘there is reasonable probability that the same questions will again be litigated and appealed .…’” (Friends of Cuyamaca Valley v. Lake Cuyamaca Recreation & Park Dist. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 419, 425.)

As the majority notes, there is a paucity of case authority in this context, suggesting the parties’ dispute and the issues raised are uncommon and unique. The governmental setting for street naming and renaming probably contributes to this rarity: a government entity’s power to name and rename streets is tethered to the democratic process, and the government officials who participate in these decisions remain accountable to their constituents. This political reality likely informs the types of street names proposed and adopted, ultimately tempering the need for judicial intervention.

But even if recurrence is reasonably probable simply because government entities name and rename streets with frequency, I am unpersuaded we should exercise our discretion in this case to issue an advisory opinion, particularly one with constitutional dimensions. Courts have more frequently exercised their discretion under the public interest exception when, due to a dispute’s inherently temporary nature, any appeal will

2 Based on the complaint allegations, two of the three renamed streets have been in existence for over 150 years, bearing strong connections to African-American and Armenian- American history and heritage while having no special affiliation with Cesar Chavez. There had been a previous attempt in 1993 to rename these streets as Cesar Chavez Boulevard, but that resolution was met with such vocal opposition, the decision was reconsidered. In April 2023, after City again proposed renaming the three streets for Cesar Chavez, the Fresno County Board of Supervisors declined to rename those streets in its jurisdiction, leaving county islands within city limits bearing the original street names, meaning the street name change would not apply to one contiguous segment. Further, inasmuch as the name change itself was unpalatable to plaintiff, City’s specific process for notifying and allowing public input was a source of contention and another element of plaintiff’s claims. In other words, the claims here arose in a very particular historical context and involved fact-specific practical logistic issues and City’s particular actions in effecting the change—a confluence of circumstances that seems unlikely to repeat and give rise to the same legal questions.

typically become moot before it can be adjudicated. (See, e.g., In re Kerry K. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 [“[a]ppellate courts have shown a particular willingness to exercise such discretion when an issue is otherwise likely to evade appellate review due to its inherently temporary nature”]; In re Schuster (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 943, 952 [many formulations of the public interest exception are stated as one that may evade review because the controversy is so short lived; this represents “a strong reason to decide an issue” although technically moot]; accord, In re Robin M. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 337, 341, fn. 6.) Without appellate review of disputes of this nature, the interests of justice may not be served: parties will be denied any remedy repeatedly, potentially erroneous rulings will not be addressed, and important legal issues will remain unresolved, possibly leading to recurring disputes that will similarly become moot before they can be reached by the courts.

This appeal, however, does not present the exigency of a time-sensitive public interest dispute where fairness weighs more strongly in favor of issuing an advisory opinion. The nature of the parties’ dispute here is not ephemeral and, under ordinary circumstances, it does not tend to evade review. Because the appeal was mooted by City’s reversion of the street names, effectively granting plaintiff the ultimate relief it sought, plaintiff does not walk away empty handed. It is a fundamentally different circumstance when a plaintiff loses the ability to obtain any potential relief because the clock ran out on the dispute during the pendency of the appeal. For example, in Kunde v. Seiler (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 518, the question presented was whether a party’s electioneering materials and a request for contributions could be included in the official mailing of a sample voting ballot. (Id. at pp. 523–524.) The question on appeal became moot once the election was over, but the court exercised discretion to reach the merits under the public interest exception given the short timeframe between the mailing of sample ballots and the election (approximately one month)—the issue was generally evasive of timely appellate review, and that evasiveness itself precluded the plaintiff from obtaining any potential remedy. (Id. at pp. 527–528.) Neither circumstance is present here.

Additionally, the novelty of the parties’ dispute is a reason to abstain from, rather than embrace, issuing an advisory opinion. The dearth of decisional law in this type of street-renaming context leaves us with very few factual or analytical comparators. With such a limited universe to consider, I am disinclined, for example, to foreclose (at the demurrer stage) the possibility that free speech principles could ever be implicated by the naming or renaming of streets or other public asset, or to suggest that City’s power to name (or rename) streets, from a constitutional standpoint, is virtually absolute. Without the aid of varying factual scenarios and critical thought-percolation among other courts and litigants in this context, our review of the issues is necessarily disadvantaged and potentially even myopic. While that is always a challenge in addressing unprecedented disputes, I am unconvinced we should endeavor to do so in an advisory capacity, particularly when the likelihood of recurrence is speculative.

I am especially reticent to do so given the constitutional facets presented. In our state courts, the mootness doctrine rests on a principle of judicial restraint that limits courts from issuing advisory opinions on “‘“moot questions or abstract propositions”’” or “‘“to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter .…”’” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In deciding questions of constitutional magnitude, we are also guided by another “‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint’”: “‘if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.’” (People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 381, quoting PDK Laboratories Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (D.C. Cir. 2004) 362 F.3d 786, 799 (conc. opn. of Roberts, J.).) This is a variant of the general rule that courts will not render purely advisory opinions, especially as it pertains to constitutional questions. (See Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389, 415–416 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [observing general rule that courts do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter, especially when the question is moot].) I would leave these issues for resolution in the context of a live controversy where effectual relief can be granted, and where, at least potentially, the thought-landscape on these issues may be more advanced, better positioning us, or another court, to develop the law in this context.

The local controversy over Cesar Chavez Boulevard was resolved by the same political process through which it began, and the legal issues were mooted. The majority’s opinion offers no new legal principles, nor does it make any important clarifications of existing law. I find no compelling justification for weighing in on this now-moot controversy. While there may be compelling reasons in other cases to reach novel disputes of constitutional magnitude under the public interest exception to mootness, they are not present here. 3 Under the circumstances, I would not exercise discretion to reach the merits and would, instead, dismiss the appeal as moot. As such, I respectfully dissent.

MEEHAN, J.

3 Plaintiff also maintains we should reach the merits because material questions remain for the court’s determination. “A material question exists when the judgment, if left unreversed, would preclude a party from litigating its liability on an issue still in controversy.” (Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 205.) Plaintiff does not explain how the court’s resolution of the legal issues it identifies would encompass plaintiff’s future and contingent legal rights such that the appeal should not be dismissed as moot. (See Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 & fn. 2; cf. Lake Lindero Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Barone (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 834, 844 [material question for court’s determination encompassed the defendant’s future and contingent legal rights under the homeowner’s association bylaws and statutes governing recall of the board of directors].)